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This dissertation is comprised of four separate articles describing four separate studies, 
all of which deal with property rights and problems of collective action in land use.  
Each of the studies addresses the same central question:  How can the problems 
associated with fragmenting a landscape into separate spheres of control be avoided 
while still maintaining a wide distribution of private rights?  Two of the studies are 
about cooperation between private landowners, and two of them describe situations of 
shared ownership.  The first, which was located in Vermont, uses a mail survey to 
answer the question of whether conservation on private land is impeded by problems 
of collective action.  It also explores the question of whether the public planning 
process can be an effective means for citizens to overcome these problems.  The 
second study deals with cooperation between private landowners in Norway.  It 
describes how two seemingly contradictory imperatives—coordinating wildlife 
management across large areas, while keeping benefits and control in the hands of 
local resource users—are resolved through a nesting of management institutions; and 
it identifies some of the key factors, both structural and cultural, that contribute to the 
success of this system.  The third study looks at land reform in Scotland, which, rather 
than breaking large estates into many small holdings, facilitates the transfer of land 
into community ownership.  Using historical analysis and in-depth interviews with 
contemporary land reformers, this study explains why community ownership makes 
  
sense in rural Scotland today.  The fourth study looks at the much older example of 
common property in Norway and offers those interested in Scottish land reform a 
glimpse at how well this type of ownership might meet their expectations.  The study 
compares two similar Norwegian cases in order to understand whether community 
ownership makes a difference or whether it is sufficient for local users of the 
commons to have secure use-rights.  A theme that emerges across all four of these 
studies is the significant and often unexpected role of the state.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The spark of inspiration for the research described in this dissertation was first 
struck during a course on land reform that I took with Charles Geisler in the spring of 
2003.  As a lover of small farms and rural democracy, the idea of dividing large 
estates into many small holdings of course sat very well with me.  But it occurred to 
me at a certain point that such a program stands in tension with the ecological 
imperative of managing landscapes as an integrated whole.  I later came to understand 
how fragmented management can also be an obstacle to the satisfaction of human 
needs, such as economic development and effective land use planning.  Wendell 
Berry‘s assertion that land ―should be divided into small parcels among a lot of small 
owners‖ (1995: 49) turns out to be highly problematic.  This is an uncomfortable thing 
to realize for anyone with a cultural affinity for the small private landowner.  But what 
are the alternatives?  Even those with no libertarian streak in them will, when they 
consider the failures of the state in terms of conservation and planning, begin to 
wonder if there isn‘t a third way.  This is the core question underlying my whole 
dissertation:  Is there a way to have the wide distribution of benefits that comes from 
diffuse ownership of private rights, without diminishing the land‘s value through 
fragmented management?    
 
 In this introduction I present a critique of the classical model of property and 
go on to theorize an alternative model intended to avoid some of the pitfalls of the 
classical one.  I argue that the classical idea of a coherent bundle of rights allowing 
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title holders to use their property however they want is an obstacle to overcoming 
problems of collective action that arise when communities want to manage landscapes 
to produce such public goods as ecological functions and economic development.  I 
then draw on the proprietarian tradition and its American incarnation in civic 
republicanism to theorize a model of property that protects private rights, but attaches 
to them public responsibilities by embedding them in a structure of democratic 
decision-making.  Each of the case studies described in my research is a real-world 
example that fits this general model, and thus each of them serves as a test case that 
can shed some light on the degree to which it might serve as a model for property 
rights in the future.  The more people realize how many of the benefits that landscapes 
provide are public goods, and the more they come to face the problems of collective 
action inherent in the provision of such goods, the more valuable this model will 
become.   
 
When we gaze at a rural landscape—a windswept heath, perhaps; a hemlock 
forest where deer shelter in the winter; or a hay field descending to a wet area where 
red-winged blackbirds call from amongst the cattails—when we gaze at such a 
landscape, do we see property?  We may see a bramble-covered wall along the edge of 
a meadow or running through the middle of a forest that once was pasture.  If we are 
in the United States, we might see signs telling us that trespassing is prohibited; 
although we wouldn‘t find any such signs in either Norway or Scotland.1  Whatever 
clues there may or may not be, we can be fairly sure that the land we are looking at is 
somebody‘s property. 
If we go to the town clerk‘s office we can look at a local map showing 
property boundaries.  It will be covered with intersecting lines, such that the land 
                                                 
1
 In both countries the public has a right of recreational access on undeveloped private land. 
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appears to be composed of a large number of polygons that fit together like puzzle 
pieces.  Each of these polygons has a name attached to it indicating who the owner is.  
Were we to ask how that person came to be owner, we would probably be told that 
they either bought or inherited the land from somebody else; and it might be possible 
to trace the land‘s history of voluntary and involuntary transactions back through time.  
But were we to ask what it means to own land in the first place, or how and why 
ownership came to be, we would be asking a much more difficult question—one that 
nobody at the town office may be prepared to answer.   
 
What is property? 
A property map does not describe the land in any greater detail than is 
necessary to identify it and to define its boundaries.  The exact character of the land is 
not relevant to a person‘s ownership.  The polygons on the map are only meant to 
describe spheres of prerogative.  The concept of property refers not to things, but to 
rights regarding things.  A property map doesn‘t tell us the owner‘s feelings about his 
or her land, as this would also be irrelevant.  Ownership is not a relation between a 
person and a thing, but between a person and other people.  When a person owns 
something, it means that they have certain rights regarding that thing, which other 
people have an obligation to respect.  What are these rights of ownership?  Neither the 
map nor the deed contains a list.  Nor do they offer a complete list of all the rights that 
non-owners might have.  If they did, it would have to be updated periodically, because 
property rights change over time with changes in legislation, common law, and local 
regulations.   
The world is full of objects, and people are full of desires; but simply laying 
claim to an object, does not establish ownership.  Property comes into existence when 
other people respect that claim, which they very often do.  Formal recognition of 
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possessive claims decreases anxiety over security of possession and decreases 
potential for conflict.  If there were no scarcity of things that people wanted, and if 
everyone was willing and able to stay in their own separate space making sure that the 
effects of their behavior didn‘t spill over into anyone else‘s sphere, then the idea of 
property would be rather simpler.  However, not only do we live in a world of scarcity, 
we also live in a social world where many of the rights on which we depend require 
positive actions on the part of other people.  Most of the objects and benefit streams to 
which we lay claim are products of a complex division of labor, and many of these we 
enjoy together with other people.  The definition of private rights in a jointly occupied, 
jointly created world of limited resources is a complicated business.   
Even if our biological nature drives us to make possessive claims and inclines 
us to respect other people‘s claims (Ellis 1985), yet it remains for each society to 
define what kind of claims will be respected, who may make such claims, and under 
what circumstances.  Property rights have varied greatly between societies and 
throughout history.  Different ways of defining and organizing property rights have 
profound effects on the history of a society and the day to day lives of its people.  For 
this reason, those who are interested in the human condition and in social change often 
turn their attention to property rights, which Aristotle referred to as ―the chief point of 
all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn‖ (The Politics: 1266a37). 
 
What does property do? 
 What are some of the effects that property arrangements have on society?  Two 
of the most discussed relate to democracy and to economic development.  It has long 
been claimed that democratic institutions depend on diffuse ownership.  ―That the 
equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly 
understood even by some of the old legislators‖ –so said Aristotle in the fourth century 
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B.C. (The Politics: 1266b15).  He goes on to explain that ―democracies are safer and 
more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more 
numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle 
class, and the poor are excessive in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to 
an end‖ (1296a14-1296a18).  In 1831 Alexis de Tocqueville attributed the success of 
democracy in America to the degree of equality among the people.  Daniel Webster 
observed that the early New England settlers  
…were themselves either from their original condition, or from the necessity of their 
common interest, nearly on a level with respect to property.  Their situation demanded 
a parceling out and division of the land, and it may fairly be said that this necessary 
act fixed the future frame and form of their government.  The character of their 
political institutions was determined by the fundamental laws respecting property…  
The consequence of all these causes has been a great subdivision of the soil and a 
great equality of condition; the true basis, most certainly, of popular government 
(Goldschmidt 1978: 279). 
Many of the Founding Fathers believed that the success of a free and democratic 
republic depends on the economic independence of its citizens.  James Madison 
claimed, ―The best distribution [of occupations] is that which favors… competency in 
the greatest number of citizens‖ (Schwarz 1997: 23).  The idea of competency meant 
that a household owned sufficient property to provide for their basic needs without 
being dependent on the goodwill of anyone else.  Competency could be achieved 
through the ownership of a farm, or by possessing the tools and skills necessary for a 
trade.
2
  Jefferson and other Founders believed that successful democracy depends on 
the ―civic virtue‖ of its citizens—and that civic virtue depends on competency.  John 
Schwarz explains, 
Virtue, to [civic]
3
 republicans, meant in part the ability of an individual citizen to 
think and be willing to act in the public interest and for the good of the whole rather 
than out of private and narrow interest.  Citizens could not be virtuous by definition if 
they either were economically dependent upon another individual, and thus subject to 
another‘s will, or were destitute, and thus necessarily self-interested.  In the eyes of 
                                                 
2
 Thomas Jefferson believed that everyone had a right to farm the land.  In a letter to James Madison 
dated October 28, 1785, he said, ―The earth is given as common stock for man to labor and live on.‖   
3
 Schwartz uses the term ‗classical republicanism.‘  I am using the term ‗civic republicanism‘ instead in 
order to avoid confusion later on in my contrast between this and the classical model of property.     
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the revolutionaries, therefore, independence was an essential condition of virtue; a 
virtuous citizenry, in turn, was vital to the survival and success of self-government 
and a free republican society (Schwarz 1997: 25). 
We will return to civic republicanism shortly. 
 Economists argue that property rights do two things to promote the efficient 
use of resources.  First, investment and conservation are encouraged when the rewards 
and costs of decisions are brought home to the decision-making owners.  Second, the 
right of alienability enables trade.  It is believed that these two functions of property 
will cause resources to gravitate to the most efficient users, resulting in greater wealth 
creation overall (Anderson and McChesney 2003).  From this perspective, the initial 
allocation of property rights might be considered less important than making sure that 
ownership is clear and tradable.   
 Property arrangements can also confer benefits on some people at the expense 
of others.  Because property is fundamentally about relationships between people, 
rather than between people and things, shifting property institutions will likely result 
in, or be the result of, shifting power relationships between people.  Sometimes it is 
the distribution of property that affects these relationships.  Ownership of land, for 
example, can bring with it the power to extract rent, services, or fealty from those who 
don‘t have land of their own.  Sometimes it is the nature of property that affects power 
relationships.  The establishment of fee simple ownership and clear title, for example, 
facilitates a government‘s ability to assign and collect taxes (Scott 1998), which in 
turn privileges certain land uses—i.e., those that are likely to produce revenue.  
 Thus, while in a certain sense it is impossible to see property—since property 
refers not to the land itself but to a sphere of rights—we can readily see the effects of 
property arrangements on the landscape.  Not only do land uses change according to 
the preferences of different owners—pasture on one side of the property line, forest on 
the other—how people use the land is also affected by how society defines the bundle 
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of rights called ownership.  Does the owner have secure tenure, or is any investment in 
the land at risk of being lost?  Is the owner allowed to build a shopping center, or is 
the destruction of farmland prohibited?  Can the owner subdivide the land?  How we 
define what it means to own land produces lasting effects both on the landscape and 
on the character of society.   
 
The classical view 
 Anyone who has served on a public planning and zoning commission, or who 
has attended the hearings of a development review board, has probably listened to at 
least one angry citizen declare ―It‘s my property and I can do whatever I want with it!‖  
This popular view of ownership has its roots in the classical conception of property, 
which tends to assume one easily identifiable person having complete control over a 
well-defined material sphere.  While many variations on this situation are readily 
accepted, this is still the baseline assumption to which we default in the absence of any 
further specification.  Such a person is said to have title; and the establishment or 
identification of clear title is thought to be a useful way of organizing and adjudicating 
conflict regarding property.  The classical conception of property is about boundaries 
in the world of things—this is mine, and that is yours—as well as complete freedom of 
action with regard to those things that we own.  This view of property has been 
criticized on the grounds that it is both inaccurate and dysfunctional (Freyfogle 1996; 
Singer 2000). 
 
How the classical model is inaccurate 
 There are a variety of ways in which the classical model of property is 
considered inaccurate.  I will begin by listing each of these in brief; then in the 
following paragraphs I will go into each of them in greater detail.  The first way in 
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which the classical model is inaccurate is that it describes ownership as a coherent 
bundle of rights belonging to the titleholder.  Legal realists, on the other hand, point 
out that these rights may be divided up among many people, not all of whom are title 
holders.  Second, whereas the classical model thinks of property as belonging to either 
individuals or the state, a great deal of property is held by neither individuals nor the 
state.   Third, the classical model assumes that the value of property is created by the 
labor that the owner invests in it.  Others claim that property values are socially 
created.  Fourth, whereas the classical model regards property rights as sacred and 
unchanging, legal historians claim that property rights change over time, and that 
justifications for each of these changes are made on the grounds of instrumentality.  
Lastly, the classical model portrays property rights as being absolute and 
uncomplicated.  Contemporary legal scholars, on the other hand, depict property rights 
as highly contingent on other public and private rights.  They also point out that when 
property disputes occur between owners, each of their own property, as well as 
between the holders of rights to a single property, the identification of title is not very 
useful to dispute prevention or resolution.   
 Property rights are divisible, and often intangible.  A horse is not easily 
divisible without compromising its value, but property rights regarding that horse are.  
One person might hold title to the horse, but other people may have legal rights 
regarding race winnings, stud services, or other uses.  Additionally, the owner may be 
limited in her use of the animal by laws that prohibit horses on highways, or which 
forbid cruelty to animals.  Similarly, the ownership of land is often complicated by 
easements, rights of way, mortgages, rights of first refusal, zoning regulations, and 
other legal claims that can leave a title holder with a far lesser form of ownership than 
the ―sole despotic dominion‖ described by Blackstone.   
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Max Lerner suggests that in America of the 18
th
 century, actual property forms 
were not so distant from the classical idea of property.  Most of the property rights that 
people had did refer to actual things over which they could exercise some control 
(Lerner 1957).  Today, important forms of property are becoming increasingly 
intangible.  Still, 
In our everyday language, we tend to speak of these rights as if they were attached to 
things.  Thus we ―deposit our money in the bank,‖ as if we were putting a thing in a 
place; but really we are creating a complex set of abstract claims against an abstract 
legal institution (Grey 1980: 70). 
In ―The Disintegration of Property,‖ Thomas Grey argues that property, as popularly 
conceived, is disappearing.  It is coming to be replaced by a complex system of claims 
that do not necessarily relate to things (Grey 1980).  It would be wrong to assume that 
prior to the 19
th
 century property rights were private and absolute.  The feudal system, 
which classical liberalism was attacking, was based on a highly contingent form of 
property ownership.  All estates were held of a higher lord, on the condition of loyalty 
to that lord.  Additionally, at the village level, some important property use rights 
(such as grazing on the commons) were held collectively.  Charles Reich argued in the 
1960s that a new form of feudalism is arising as government largess replaces private 
ownership as a significant source of wealth.  Largess includes not only benefits, 
transfer payments, services, and subsidies, but also jobs, franchises, contracts, and the 
allocation of professional and other occupational licenses.  While these things are all 
important sources of wealth, they are not secure property rights.  Any of them might 
be lost without the same due process normally required to deprive citizens of their 
property.  Rather than saying we should do away with government largess, Reich 
suggests that we should establish definite rights regarding this largess.  These rights, 
which he calls ―the new property,‖ would be protected by procedural safeguards 
(Reich 1964).  John Umbeck suggests that even the simple ownership of tangible 
things would be better understood if we thought of property as a variable bundle of 
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rights, rather than dominion over a thing.  These rights are necessarily limited by the 
rights of others.  ―When I buy an automobile,‖ for example, ―I am actually buying 
certain rights or a set of alternative uses from which I am allowed, as the owner, to 
choose.  If the rights to the use of the car were without limit, there would be no 
property rights for anyone else.  I could use the car to kill or injure anyone unless they 
paid me not to, and in this fashion could deprive everyone of their property rights‖ 
(Umbeck 1981: 56). 
 The dichotomy between public and private property gives an incomplete, and 
often inaccurate, picture of the forms that property takes.  By drawing our attention to 
the many private rights that individuals have regarding public property, as well as the 
many public rights that affect private property, Charles Geisler has called the 
usefulness of this distinction into question.  The alienability and taxability of grazing 
rights on public land, for example, give them a strong resemblance to private property.  
In downtown Baltimore, fifty percent of the privately owned homes sit on land that is 
owned by the city, to which the homeowners pay a ground rent.  From the other side, 
―private land does not have to undergo a title change to become quasi-public.‖ 
Public sector taxation, spending, and regulation all blur public and private 
distinctions.  Many other forms of government action condition the use, value, and 
disposition of private holdings as well, including public planning, impact assessment, 
loans, improvements, and a gallery of legislation which, directly or indirectly, 
separates ownership from control (Geisler 2000: 68). 
In addition to blurring the line between public and private property, Geisler describes 
a number of estates that are not exactly public or private.  These include common 
property regimes, Indian lands, corporate property, and land belonging to utilities 
(Geisler 2000).   
 Property is social.  Thorstein Veblen criticized the classical idea that private 
ownership of nature is justified by individual labor.  He points out first, that 
production is a cooperative effort on the part of a whole society, and second, that the 
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power relationships created by property tend to associate labor with a lack of 
ownership (Veblen 1898).  C. Ford Runge et alios have elaborated on Veblen‘s first 
point.  Despite all the controversy over ―takings‖ cases, wherein government 
regulation is accused of decreasing private property values, far less attention has been 
paid to ―givings‖—situations in which government actions raise private property 
values.  This happens, for instance, as a result of zoning regulations, provision of 
public infrastructure and services, public investment in research, and regulation of 
trade and interest rates (Runge, Duclos, and et al. 2000).   
Another sense in which property can be social is when it forms an integral part 
of community life, not as a commodity to which someone possesses alienable title, but 
in the way that Karl Polanyi described land, as ―an element of nature inextricably 
interwoven with man‘s institutions… organizations of kinship, neighborhood, craft, 
and creed—with tribe and temple, village, guild, and church‖ (Polanyi 1957: 178).  
For most of human history economic behavior has been embedded in personal 
relationships and social institutions.  Economic exchanges were also social exchanges.  
The employment of labor and land as inputs to production was less subject to market 
mechanisms.  Rather, production and exchange activities were often motivated by a 
desire for social rewards and were generally governed by social institutions rather than 
market mechanisms.  Lewis Hyde talks about the importance of gifts in cementing 
community relationships: ―…a group may form, cohere, and endure when property 
circulates as a gift, and it will begin to fragment when the gift exchange is interrupted 
or when gifts are converted into commodities‖ (Hyde 1983: 76).  Because meaning is 
socially created, the classical idea of property as an isolated relationship between a 
person and a thing presents the risk of things becoming meaningless.
4
  By 
                                                 
4
 This parallels Weber‘s concern that Zweckrational behavior is coming to dominate every aspect of 
western culture.  The tragedy of Zweckrationalität is that the actor who is constantly calculating (and 
for this reason reducing things to their quantifiable aspects) comes to regard everything as a means-to-
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decommodifying things however, and re-embedding them in social institutions and 
personal relationships, they can become meaningful and provide greater satisfaction.   
Property serves instrumental purposes and its definition changes over time as 
society’s needs change.  The classical view, which presents property rights as natural 
rather than socially constructed, is reflected in American culture by the idea that 
property rights are sacred, and therefore unchangeable.  Historically, this is inaccurate 
(Freyfogle 1996; Friedman 2001).  The early 19
th
 century saw the beginning of a trend 
that ran counter to the established principle that people could only use their property in 
ways that neither harmed their neighbor, nor interfered with their neighbor‘s right to 
the quiet enjoyment of their own property.  Jurists responsible for this trend sought to 
protect owners‘ rights to use their property intensively, seeking also to protect owners 
from liability for the effects of such use.  The distributional effects of such decisions 
were very much in favor of the private sector industrial development that America was 
experiencing.  During the Great Depression, and even a little bit earlier, the pendulum 
began to swing back the other way, with courts ruling against intensive land use rights 
when they threatened the public interest.  Beginning in the 1980s there has been a 
counter-offensive by intensive land use interests, centered mainly on the idea of 
―takings‖.  Nineteenth century courts reinterpreted the longstanding principle that one 
must use one‘s property in such a way as to avoid causing any harm.  They 
downplayed the harms that land use might cause to a particular neighbor, choosing 
instead to consider the net harm or benefit to society at large.  The special privileges 
and immunities granted to intensive land users were justified by the supposed public 
benefits of industrial economic development.  Even as judicial views change regarding 
the public good and the purpose of private property, instrumentalist arguments have 
                                                                                                                                            
an-end, thus losing sight of ultimate ends.  Of things that might have provided satisfaction as ends-in-
themselves he or she comes to ask, what use are they? 
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remained the dominant form of justification for competing definitions of property 
rights.   
Property rights are contingent.  The contingency of property rights is made 
apparent by nuisance law, which limits an owner‘s right to use property in ways that 
interfere with other people‘s rights.  The possession of title is in no way a license to do 
as one pleases.  The rights of ownership are also limited by extensive regulation, as 
well as by the public‘s rights of taxation and eminent domain.  Private property rights 
are further limited by the entitlements of non-owners.  Joseph William Singer (2000) 
offers us the example of public accommodation laws, which make it clear that 
ownership of a restaurant does not allow one to refuse service to a black customer. 
One might not like these limits, and many of them could be removed, but the 
idea of property rights as absolute is a logical impossibility.  A property model that 
defines ownership as ―the right to do whatever you want with what‘s yours‖ falls apart 
as soon as we consider disputes between owners, such as might arise when one person 
uses his or her property in a way that interferes with someone else‘s use of their 
property.  Judgments in such disputes cannot be characterized as either pro- or anti-
property; they inevitably protect some property rights as the expense of others.  To say 
that one person has a right is to say that other people have a responsibility to respect 
that right—a condition that imposes limitations on people‘s behavior.  When 
everybody has a similar right, then everybody shares corresponding responsibilities.  It 
is these responsibilities (to refrain from interfering with people‘s rights) that give rise 
to rights in the first place.  This is why responsibility (i.e., restraints) must attach to 
ownership, and why certain restraints are a protection, not a diminishment, of property 
rights.  Eric Freyfogle puts it well: 
Aside from its factual inaccuracy, the absolute-ownership myth simply makes no 
sense when we apply it to an actual piece of land.  …How ―absolute‖ is my ownership 
if I cannot protect myself from interferences by neighbors:  from the pollution of my 
groundwater, from the disruption of animal migration patterns that cross my land, or 
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from upstream drainage practices that unnaturally flood my tract?  Unless I can halt 
inconsistent uses by neighbors, I have few rights that really count.  Yet, if I can limit 
what my neighbors do, have not their ―absolute‖ rights been constricted?  And if I can 
limit what they do, cannot they in fairness similarly limit what I do as well (Freyfogle 
1996: 178)? 
The lines that simultaneously limit and protect—indeed, which create and define—
property rights have to be drawn somewhere; the question is where.  This is an 
important question to discuss, one that hinges on what it is we want property to do.  
But the discussion can‘t happen if people don‘t admit that there are any lines to be 
drawn.   
 
How the classical model is dysfunctional 
 I mentioned above the risk that when property is detached from social 
relationships it may become meaningless, and thus lose its ability to motivate or 
satisfy.  Here I wish to focus primarily on two economic functions of property—the 
internalizing and allocative functions—and problems associated with the division of 
property amongst many owners.  John Umbeck defines the internalizing function of 
property:   
Individual ownership of resources, or a system of private property rights, will bring to 
bear on an owner all of the economic consequences from the use of his property.  If 
there are no costs of contracting, and if exclusive and transferable rights are assigned 
covering all economic goods, then all the economic gains or losses accruing to other 
property values as a result of an individual‘s use of his property will be brought to 
bear on him (Umbeck 1981: 56). 
The devil, of course, is in the details.  It is very difficult, if not impossible, to meet 
both of these conditions.  The myriad effects arising from each of our actions are often 
difficult to control, much less commodify.  And how do we determine whether they 
are positive or negative externalities?
5
  If my neighbor can overhear me playing my 
piano, should I be charging her for the performance, or will she charge me for the 
nuisance?  In order to limit the production of harmful externalities, the public has 
                                                 
5
 Externalities are costs or benefits that fall to parties outside the firm, in the absence of a transaction. 
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always sought to regulate private land use to a certain degree.  Even if it were possible 
to eliminate all externalities, this would not necessarily be a good thing.  Freyfogle 
points out that many of the ―positive externalities‖ of certain land uses are the 
ecological functions of a healthy landscape, essential to all life.  Management of these 
functions cannot be fragmented over many small properties, but rather needs to 
happen at a landscape level.  For this reason, Freyfogle disagrees with privatization as 
a solution to the ―tragedy of the commons‖ (Freyfogle 2003).  Privatization creates 
more boundaries, and thus more problems of externality and transaction cost—the 
very tragedy that we are trying to avoid.  The question is: how do we create secure 
private rights to land, ones that generate adequate motivation and reward, without 
fragmenting all aspects of landscape management?  How can users of the land 
cooperate as a problem-solving community to generate the public goods that markets 
can‘t provide?     
 The allocative function of property presupposes its ability to internalize the 
effects of choices, and is based on the right of alienability.  The transferability of title 
is supposed to make property gravitate toward those owners who will use it most 
efficiently.  This is the function of markets.  Markets however are criticized not only 
on account of externalities, but also because imperfect competition
6
 prevents market 
mechanisms from carrying out their allocative function properly.  Without any limits 
on accumulation, the property right of alienability creates the opportunity for some 
individuals to acquire enough property, and thereby non-market powers as well, to 
distort the operation of markets.  In many countries where land reform has taken place, 
it has been necessary to forcibly dispossess large land holders of their property, 
distributing it to more efficient small farms.  If markets and private property really 
                                                 
6
 Imperfect competition is when a single firm is large enough to affect prices; the extreme case of which 
is a monopoly.   
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operated to distribute resources to the most efficient users, we would not expect to see 
thousands of acres in Scotland devoted to hunting rather than farming; nor would we 
expect to see farms in the United States operating at sizes many times beyond what 
efficiencies of scale demand.   
The concentration resulting from alienable property rights tends not only to 
distort markets, but also to create unequal power relations (which can further distort 
markets).  In 1851 Herbert Spencer observed that if  
…the whole globe may become the private domain of a part of its inhabitants; and if, 
by consequence, the rest of its inhabitants can then [exist] only by consent of the 
landowners, it is manifest that an exclusive possession of the soil necessitates an 
infringement of the law of equal freedom.  For men who cannot [live] without the 
leave of others cannot be equally free with those others (Spencer 1970: 104). 
Aldo Leopold echoed this sentiment almost a century later in his Sand County 
Almanac, asking ―Of what avail are forty freedoms without a blank spot on the map?‖  
Singer provides us with an answer to Leopold‘s question by making a distinction 
between title and entitlement.  One does not require title to have rights regarding 
property.  Accepting Singer‘s answer means rejecting the classical idea of absolute 
ownership.   
 Related to the issue of public goods mentioned above is the inability of 
markets to overcome the tyranny of small decisions and other problems of collective 
action.  ―The tyranny of small decisions‖ is a term coined by economist Alfred Kahn 
to describe how many small decisions taken over time by many people can add up to 
outcomes that none of those people would have voted for had that outcome ―ever been 
presented for their explicit consideration.‖  In this way, ―the consumer can be 
victimized by the narrowness of the contexts in which he exercises his sovereignty‖ 
(Kahn 1966: 24).  Kahn is speaking of individual consumers, but the concept applies 
equally well to our political decisions about how to regulate property and markets.  
One can imagine, for example, communities all across the country each permitting a 
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supermarket to be built on their last piece of farmland, each assuming that they will be 
able to import food from other communities.  Another classic problem of collective 
action is the plight of dairy farmers.  Overproduction of milk has created low prices 
that threaten to put farmers out of business.  In order to make the same amount of 
money at a lower price, each farmer responds by adopting practices that increase their 
production and lower their per-unit cost of production.  As everybody increases 
production, the price continues to fall.  It is obvious to all the farmers that as a group 
they need to decrease production, but any farmer who does this unilaterally will be put 
out of business.
7
    
 Dividing a landscape amongst many owners causes these kinds of dilemmas to 
multiply and makes it difficult to address large scale problems and goals.  Mark Fiege 
tells the story of how serious weed problems in Montana in the early 20
th
 century 
challenged the idea that a landscape can be divided into discrete spheres of interest.  
Spread by wild animals, irrigation systems, machinery, vehicles, and the wind, exotic 
weeds rapidly invaded fields, crowding out crops and reducing profits.  Farmers who 
refused to control weeds on their property infuriated their neighbors, but nuisance law 
could not adequately deal with the problem:  In 1920 botanists declared that it was 
―almost impossible for a man to keep his land free from certain weeds …unless there 
is concerted effort to the same end by all farmers in the immediate neighborhood‖ 
(Fiege 2005: 8).  By the late 1930s agricultural production had been curtailed on 
thousands of acres.  Farmers responded by creating informal groups through which 
they cooperated to eliminate weeds.  In 1939 legislation was passed enabling 
communities to create districts in which there would be expanded public power to 
control weeds.  Fiege tells how ―a hybrid geographic space—a kind of common 
                                                 
7
 Donella Meadows offers a discussion of this situation based on a System Dynamics study by Philip 
Budzik, concluding that the government should intervene to limit production (Budzik 1975; Meadows 
1991).  
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ground—began to appear in the midst of their otherwise separate parcels of land.‖  
The mobility of weeds across property boundaries ―began to open a landscape defined 
less by linear divisions than by the shared experience of ecological connections.  That 
ecological landscape presented opportunities for neighbors to work together to 
overcome mutual problems‖ (Fiege 2005: 2).  Indeed, throughout the ‗30s and ‗40s 
Montanans exhibited a general trend toward collective tenure with the formation of 
districts for soil conservation and especially common grazing.   
 Another problem of fragmented ownership, and one that nuisance law is also 
unable to solve, concerns land uses (or other behaviors) that by themselves are 
harmless, but which can add up to serious threats when enough people engage in them.  
Freyfogle warns,  
When too many fields in a watershed are plowed, or too many fields are drained, or 
too much wildlife habitat is altered, or too many homes are built in an area, or too 
much impervious pavement distorts hydrologic patterns, the ecological status of entire 
landscapes can be degraded (Freyfogle 2003: 221). 
By the end of the 19
th
 century, excessive timber cutting in Maine had resulted not only 
in ruined scenery, but also in silted rivers with altered flow patterns, reduced fish 
stocks, local climate change, and economic decline.  Asked by the state legislature for 
an advisory opinion in 1907, the Maine Supreme Court declared unanimously that the 
legislature had a right to regulate private property in the public interest—including 
land uses that in isolation could not be considered a nuisance—and that the legislature 
had a right to do this without having to compensate owners (Freyfogle 2003).   
 The classical idea of property is about boundaries.  It suggests that when we 
look at a map and see a polygon of crisp black lines with someone‘s name in it, we are 
to understand that this person and no other has control over what goes on in that space, 
and that they and no other have a right to any benefits arising from that space.  The 
web of lines, with names hanging in the spaces, describes a fragmentation of benefits 
and control.  Nature, on the other hand, ignores human boundaries.  The vast and 
19 
varied landscape cannot be divided up in practice or else it would cease to provide the 
many benefits on which our lives depend.  These benefits include clean air and water, 
a stable climate, waste assimilation, and biodiversity (Olson 1999).  These ecological 
functions, which in a settled landscape depend on management decisions, are public 
goods and cannot be provided by markets.  Provision of these goods requires other 
institutions for motivating and coordinating the management decisions of all the land 
owners.   
 
Looking for an alternative 
 So far I have raised several criticisms of the classical model of private property 
in land.  I have discussed the impossibility of confining people‘s interests to any small 
parcel, as well as the inadequacy of markets to satisfy those interests.  At this point, 
some readers may think it obvious that we should turn to public property.  But that is 
not the direction I‘m headed.  I am interested in whether we can have private rights 
regarding land and natural resources without the problems of the classical model.  At 
this fork in the road I‘ll take a moment to justify my path to those who don‘t see why 
we should worry about having private rights at all.   
 First, public property may be fine; but since there are so many people who 
want at least some private rights regarding property, I think it at least worth asking 
whether there is any way to make this work.  Second, public property has its own long 
record of failure in terms of environmental protection and economic development.  
Third, there are numerous benefits to private property that we don‘t want to lose.  
These include economic incentive, psychological need for a sphere of personal 
control, the joy of sharing, or the importance of competency for good citizenship.  
Fourth, failures of democracy can make public ownership resemble monopoly private 
ownership, with all the attendant abuses, inefficiencies, and injustice.  Fifth, and most 
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important, just as there is no completely private property, neither can property be 
completely public.  To the extent that any individuals have secure rights regarding 
public property, we have something that begins to resemble private property rights; 
and thus we have not escaped the question of how these should be managed.  I offer 
these five points, not in an attempt to dissuade anybody about the value of public 
property, but only to justify my inquiry regarding how private rights might be better 
arranged.    
 
 We do not have to go far to find examples of private property greatly at 
variance with the classical model.  Many of them are hidden in plain view.  Because 
the popular conception of property in America so closely resembles the classical 
model, it‘s surprising to realize how little resemblance this model bears to the reality 
of property in America today.  Condominiums, land trusts, utilities, and zoning all 
represent significant departures.  Yet it is difficult to identify a coherent philosophy 
that might serve as an alternative to the classical view of property.  In an effort to do 
that, let us go back to the civic republicanism of late 18
th
 century America. 
 From the perspective of civic republicanism, the purpose of property is to 
promote good social order.  This view forms a part of the ―proprietarian‖ tradition 
(Alexander 1997; Rose 1994), although it also departs from that tradition in at least 
one significant way.  Proprietarianism suggests that each person should have those 
things that are necessary for them to fulfill their role in society.  For example, it is 
right that the janitor should have a broom, and that other people should not be allowed 
to take or damage the janitor‘s broom.  Such an arrangement is necessary for the 
janitor to be able to do his or her job for us.  Yet by attaching property rights to 
particular roles, rather than to people, an important contingency arises.  It is not 
appropriate for the janitor to destroy the broom or to make off with it in dereliction of 
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duty.  If the janitor wishes to quit, he or she must leave the broom for the next person 
who fills that role.  Similarly, in order for society to be fed, the farmer must have 
secure possession of farmland, as well as a certain amount of discretion in 
management.  It is not inconsistent with this model for the farmer to sell the fruits of 
his or her labor.  What would be inappropriate, however, is for him or her to destroy 
the land or, perhaps, to leave it idle.  We are still discussing private property, but 
whereas the classical model says that property exists for the benefit of the owner; 
proprietarianism says that property, even private property, exists to serve the public 
good.  The way in which civic republicanism departs from traditional proprietarianism 
is in the strong emphasis that civic republicanism places on equality.  The reason for 
this is a belief that successful democracy requires ―competency‖ on the part of its 
citizens.  In order for a person to act in the public interest, it was believed that he must 
be neither destitute nor dependent.  A certain amount of property was considered 
appropriate to the role of citizen.   
 By the beginning of the 19
th
 century a growing tension emerged between civic 
republicanism and what we have been calling the classical model, which views 
property as a commodity (Alexander 1997).  These two competing views of property 
represent two different visions of society.  To the civic republicans, property enabled 
citizenship, and the public realm was supposed to be a place where people cooperate 
to solve common problems.  From the property-as-commodity perspective, property 
exists to enable individual freedom, and the public realm is a place where we compete 
in defense of our private interests.  Civic republicans believed that when individuals 
fail to exercise their property rights in a manner consistent with the public good, the 
government has a right to intervene.  From the property-as-commodity perspective, 
however, government should never interfere with private property rights.   
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As the industrial revolution gathered steam throughout the 19
th
 century, and the 
public good came to be defined in terms of economic growth, courts increasingly ruled 
in favor of industries that stood accused of causing harm.  Freyfogle describes how a 
split occurred between common and statutory law (Freyfogle 2003).  As the courts 
became increasingly permissive of intensive land use, and the harmful effects of 
industry became more acutely felt, legislatures began to regulate land use more 
aggressively.
8
  This simultaneous expansion of private rights and public power 
obscured the fact that private property rights are inherently limited by other people‘s 
rights—that they are in fact created and defined by limitations on other people‘s 
freedom of behavior—making it appear instead as if they are threatened only by 
government interference.   
Law and government would be set apart from ordinary people and given a new, more 
hostile image.  The mutual reliance of individual and community would decline, and 
liberty would be seen more as immunity from governmental interference and less as 
freedom to engage with other community members in collective self-governance 
(Freyfogle 2003: 80-81). 
The tension between proprietarianism and the classical model of property evolved into 
a conflict over the right of government to regulate private property in the public 
interest.  Private property was in fact heavily regulated throughout the 19
th
 century 
(Novak 1996), but the role of private property drifted toward that of commodity.   
 During the 20
th
 century, the willingness of government to regulate has varied 
greatly; but the public role of private property (and of private citizens) has remained 
obscured.  Growing alarm over the seriousness of environmental problems has 
prompted some jurists to call for a new stewardship ethic to guide land use—as well as 
legislation and courtroom decisions to enforce this ethic (Freyfogle 1996; Karp 1993).  
This places responsibility squarely on the individual.  Yet the inadequacy of nuisance 
                                                 
8
 This corresponds perfectly to Polanyi‘s description of the ―double-movement‖ that results from 
transition to a market economy (Polanyi 1957).  It also illustrates a significant flaw in the classical 
model: competitive individualism demands authoritative intervention, thus undermining the very 
freedom that it seeks to increase.   
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law and the importance of collective action in solving environmental problems suggest 
the need for additional solutions.   
 Wendell Berry speaks of ―an economics of cooperation rather than 
competition,‖ but believes that land ―should be divided into small parcels among a lot 
of small owners‖ (Berry 1995: 5, 49).  Brian Donahue, on the other hand, believes that 
we should move away from private ownership.  He rejects the Jeffersonian ideal of 
―widely dispersed private ownership of land by independent yeoman farmers,‖ 
because  
Far more often than not, private ownership of land in rural America has not meant an 
abiding commitment to community and place.  It has been a means to accumulate 
wealth and eventually to cash out‖ (Donahue 2003: 38, 40). 
The property-as-commodity version of ownership, described by Donahue above, 
indeed represents a tragic frustration of the Jeffersonian vision of private property 
enabling good citizenship.  Yet William Simon, in his treatment of ―social-republican 
property,‖ describes a type of private ownership that would encourage commitment to 
community and limit the ability of people to treat land as a commodity.   
The distinctive feature of social-republican property is that it is held by private 
individuals subject to two types of conditions—one requiring that the holder bear a 
relation of potential active participation in a group or community constituted by the 
property, and another designed to limit inequality among the members of a group or 
community (Simon 1991: 1336). 
These conditions function as restraints on alienation and accumulation and might 
enable Berry‘s Jeffersonian vision to meet with Donahue‘s approval.  This critical 
revival of civic republicanism might also suggest a viable alternative to the classical 
model of property rights.   
 
At this point I‘ll attempt to restate the problem in brief.  On the one hand, 
private property rights are desirable for reasons both political and economic, as well as 
personal.  On the other hand, a division of the land into separate spheres of ―sole 
despotic dominion‖ is highly problematic.  Thus we require property institutions that 
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protect private rights to a certain degree while at the same time recognize everyone‘s 
interest in the whole landscape and enabling people to overcome problems of 
collective action in landscape management.  To put it another way, we need 
institutions that establish secure private rights within a landscape-wide management 
scheme that is democratically decided upon by the rights-holders.   
Haim Darin-Drabkin suggests something like this when he describes a model 
of community ownership mixed with individual use rights.   
The liberal concept of universal application of individual rights in the sphere of land 
should result, due to the interrelatedness of different land uses, in the transfer of 
ownership rights to the community in order to assure for everyone individual land-use 
rights…  [This would enable] planning the use of land according to the long-term 
needs of society… Obviously such a transfer should be done simultaneously with the 
creation of institutional means for allocating land-use rights for the whole 
population… (Darin-Drabkin 1977: 420) 
This radical-seeming proposal is fairly consistent with the civic republican tradition.  
When Darin-Drabkin speaks of ―land-use rights given to individuals but ultimate 
ownership reserved for the use of future generations,‖ he seems to echo Thomas 
Jefferson‘s assertion that ―the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.‖9   
 Darin-Drabkin‘s suggestion represents one possible alternative to the classical 
model of ownership; but it is certainly not the only one that would meet my criteria of 
having diffuse private rights in a landscape where management is coordinated in some 
democratic fashion.  Each of the studies presented in this collection explores a 
variation on this theme, and each sheds light on different questions that arise in the 
attempt to balance public and private interests in the land.  Two of the studies are 
about cooperation between private landowners, and two of them describe situations of 
shared ownership.  The first, which was located in Vermont, uses a mail survey to 
answer the question of whether conservation on private land is impeded by problems 
of collective action.  It also explores the question of whether the public planning 
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 Letter to James Madison, September 1789.   
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process can be an effective means for citizens to overcome these problems.  The 
second study deals with cooperation between private landowners in Norway.  It 
describes how two seemingly contradictory imperatives—coordinating wildlife 
management across large areas, while keeping benefits and control in the hands of 
local resource users—are resolved through a nesting of management institutions; and 
it identifies some of the key factors, both structural and cultural, that contribute to the 
success of this system.  The third study looks at land reform in Scotland, which, rather 
than breaking large estates into many small holdings, facilitates the transfer of land 
into community ownership.  Using historical analysis and in-depth interviews with 
contemporary land reformers, this study explains why community ownership makes 
sense in rural Scotland today.  The fourth study looks at the much older example of 
common property in Norway and offers those interested in Scottish land reform a 
glimpse at how well this type of ownership might meet their expectations.  The study 
also compares two similar but different Norwegian cases in an effort to understand 
whether community ownership makes a difference or whether it is sufficient for local 
users of the commons to have secure use-rights.  A theme that emerges across all four 
of these studies is the significant and often unexpected role of the state.   
 
 Property, including private property, is inherently social:  it is a set of 
prerogatives that are socially defined.  When we look at property, what we are looking 
at is a set of relationships.  Understanding patterns of land use is a matter of 
understanding the social relationships in which land use is embedded.  The papers in 
this collection all explore alternatives to the classical model of property.  This is not 
primarily a legal exercise, but rather a study of social institutions.  Each of the 
alternatives represents a way of embedding private rights in some kind of structure 
that makes them responsive to other people‘s rights and which allows rights-holders to 
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communicate and make decisions about their land use practices.   To say that property 
is a set of relationships is not far from saying, as Aldo Leopold said, that land is a 
community to which we belong.  As people define and redefine the meaning of 
property, they are shaping and reshaping the meaning of community.  When we gaze 
at an expanse of grass and trees, our sense of what sort of place it is will vary 
depending on whether it is called a commons, an estate, or a parcel.  The question of 
whether land is a commodity or whether it is ―an element of nature inextricably 
interwoven with man‘s institutions‖ (Polanyi 1957: 178) is inseparable from the 
question of whether human relationships are primarily governed by markets or 
whether they too are bound up with ―kinship, neighborhood, craft, and creed.‖  The 
following chapters present a variety of ways in which human relationships and rights 
to land are bound up in various institutions.  Taken as whole, they illustrate both the 
challenges and opportunities for having diffuse private rights without fragmenting the 
landscape.   
 
 
27 
REFERENCES 
 
Alexander, Gregory S. 1997. Commodity and propriety: competing visions of property 
in American legal thought, 1776-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Anderson, Terry L. and Fred S. McChesney. 2003. Property Rights: cooperation, 
conflict, and law. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Berry, Wendell. 1995. Another Turn of the Crank. Washington, DC: Counterpoint. 
 
Budzik, Philip M. 1975. "The Future of Vermont Dairy Farming." Thayer School of 
Engineering, Dartmouth College. 
 
Darin-Drabkin, Haim. 1977. Land policy and urban growth.  Elmsford, NY: 
Pergamon Press. 
 
Donahue, Brian. 2003. "The Resettling of America." Pp. 34-51 in The Essential 
Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community, and the Land, edited by N. 
Wirzba. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky. 
 
Ellis, Lee. 1985. "On the rudiments of possessions and property." Social Science 
Information 24:113-143. 
 
Fiege, Mark. 2005. "The Weedy West: Mobile Nature, Boundaries, and Common 
Space in the Montana Landscape." The Western Historical Quarterly 35(1). 
 
28 
Freyfogle, Eric T. 2003. The Land We Share: private property and the common good. 
Washington, DC: Island Press/Shearwater Books. 
 
------. 1996. "The Construction of Ownership." University of Illinois Law Review:173-
187. 
 
Friedman, Gerald. 2001. The Sanctity of Property Rights in American History. 
Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts. 
 
Geisler, Charles. 2000. "Property Pluralism." Pp. 65-87 in Property and Values: 
Alternatives to public and private ownership, edited by C. Geisler and G. 
Daneker. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Goldschmidt, Walter. 1978. As You Sow. Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun. 
 
Grey, Thomas C. 1980. "The Disintegration of Property." Pp. 69-87 in Property: 
NOMOS XXII, edited by J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman. New York: New York 
University Press. 
 
Hyde, Lewis. 1983. The Gift: imagination and the erotic life of property. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
Kahn, Alfred E. 1966. "The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market failures, 
imperfections, and the limits of economics." Kyklos 19(1):23-47.  
Karp, James P. 1993. "A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing Our Land 
Ethic." Environmental Law 23:735-762. 
29 
 
Lerner, Max. 1957. America as a Civilization: Life and thought in the United States 
today. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Meadows, Donella H. 1991. The Global Citizen. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Novak, William J. 1996. The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-
Century America. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Olson, Richard K. 1999. "A Landscape Perspective on Farmland Conversion." Pp. 53-
95 in Under the Blade: The Conversion of Agricultural Landscapes, edited by 
R.K. Olson and T.A. Lyson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Reich, Charles A. 1964. "The New Property." The Yale Law Journal 73(5):733-787. 
 
Rose, Carol M. 1994. Property and Persuasion: essays on the history, theory, and 
rhetoric of ownership. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
 
Runge, C. F., M. T. Duclos and et al. 2000. "Public Sector Contributions to Private 
Land Value." Pp. 41-62 in Property and Values: Alternatives to public and 
private ownership, edited by C. Geisler and G. Daneker. Washington, DC: Island 
Press. 
 
30 
Schwarz, John E. 1997. Illusions of Opportunity: the American dream in question. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Simon, William H. 1991. "Social-Republican Property." UCLA Law Review 
38(6):1335-1413. 
 
Singer, Joseph W. 2000. Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Spencer, Herbert. 1970 (1851). Social Statics. New York: Robert Schalkenback 
Foundation. 
 
Umbeck, John R. 1981. A Theory of Property Rights, With Application to the 
California Gold Rush. Ames, IA: The Iowa State University Press. 
 
Veblen, Thorstein. 1898. "The Beginnings of Ownership." The American Journal of 
Sociology 4:352-365. 
 
 
 
31 
CHAPTER 2 
 
The Planner’s Dilemma 
A Tragedy in Two Acts 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper describes a single case-study carried out in a small Vermont town.  
The purpose of the study was two-fold: first, to determine whether citizen commitment 
to conservation is impeded by problems of collective action; and second, to evaluate 
how well the public planning process serves as a tool for overcoming these problems.   
The first of these questions was answered by means of a mail survey, which found that 
landowners are strongly in favor of conservation and would be most willing to make 
conservation commitments if their neighbors agreed to do the same.  Several months 
after the survey was conducted, however, the passage of a new conservation-oriented 
town plan met with strong opposition.  Opponents of the plan tended to view the 
planning process as a contest between the Planning Commission and landowners, 
rather than as a venue for cooperation between neighbors.  Much of the resistance was 
rooted in a cultural conception that private property rights are absolute in their ideal 
form, being limited only by the state and always to the landowner‘s misfortune.  The 
ability of public planning to help people achieve desired land use outcomes may 
depend less on procedural innovations and more on advancing the understanding that 
landowners can benefit from mutual restraint and, more fundamentally, that property 
rights are not God-given but evolve as a product of public deliberation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The provision of landscape-level public goods such as scenery or adequate 
wildlife habitat requires coordination among many landowners.  This paper examines 
how problems of collective action can stand in the way of such coordination, even 
among landowners who value these public goods.  It is based on a single two-year 
case study in a small Vermont town.  The study proceeded in two phases and contains 
two kinds of empirical data: a mail survey of all households, and a period of 
―participant observation‖ during which I attended public meetings throughout the 
contentious process of adopting a new town plan.  The mail survey was designed to 
determine whether an expansion of landowner commitment to conservation could be 
expected to result from an increase in public education or whether such commitment is 
inhibited by problems of collective action.  Survey results indicated that most 
landowners already care about conservation and that the chief incentive they need to 
commit to conservation on their own land is a mutual agreement with other 
landowners.  A newly proposed town plan, however, with goals closely matching the 
desires of most survey respondents, met with strong opposition.  During the second 
phase of the study I sought to understand why.     
 
The woods and fields that compose a typical Vermont landscape provide many 
public benefits for which landowners are not, and cannot be, rewarded in the market 
place.  These include, for example, scenic views, watershed maintenance, wildlife 
habitat, cultural significance, and a basis for tourism.  About ninety-five percent of 
Vermonters in a recent poll say that they value the working landscape, making it the 
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highest ranking value in that study (Council on the Future of Vermont 2009).  This 
finding is consistent with the concern that Vermonters have shown in other polls 
regarding sprawl (Smart Growth Vermont 2009).  And yet, at the same time that 
Vermonters articulate appreciation and concern for the landscape, it is rapidly being 
destroyed.  During the last half of the 20
th
 century Vermont lost over two million acres 
of farmland and more than ten thousand working farms (The Vermont Forum on 
Sprawl 1999).  Between 1982 and 1992, while the population of Vermont grew by less 
than ten percent, the amount of developed land increased by more than twenty-five 
percent (Yacos and Wilhelm 1999).  Nearly forty percent of this newly developed land 
was formerly cropland and pasture (The Vermont Forum on Sprawl 1999).   
 It is clear both that Vermonters care about their landscape and that this 
landscape is threatened by their choices.  The fact that both of these things are true 
demonstrates that caring is not enough.  There are obstacles that come between an 
individual‘s values and the actions that he or she might take to protect those values.  
This paper is about those obstacles as they pertain to the protection of rural 
landscapes.  There are two factors in particular that undermine a landowner‘s 
willingness and ability to contribute to the protection of a landscape that he or she 
cares about.  First, many of the essential functions or benefits of rural landscapes can‘t 
be provided on any particular small parcel in isolation, but rather must be managed on 
a large scale.  This may diminish the incentive for a landowner to act without the 
cooperation of other landowners.  Second, many or most of these benefits have the 
nature of public goods.  This means that a landowner‘s investment in conservation will 
go unrewarded by the marketplace.  Thus the protection of rural landscapes is 
threatened by two problems of collective action: one between landowners, who must 
cooperate in their stewardship; and one between members of the general public, who 
need to compensate landowners, but who instead have a tendency to free-ride on the 
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conservation investments of others.  In the remainder of this section I will first explain 
how problems of collective action affect landowner decision-making and why these 
problems need to be a central concern for conservationists.  Then I will introduce the 
community in which my empirical study took place.   
 
 Nearly three quarters of the forest land in the northeastern United States is 
privately owned, with an average parcel size of about 22 acres (Kittredge 2005).  Such 
a highly fragmented pattern of landownership is problematic for managing ecosystems 
as an integrated whole.  Many important ecological functions, from hydrology to 
habitat, need to be managed on a large scale (Forman and Godron 1986).  Likewise, 
many of the challenges that landowners face, such as invasive plant species, are nigh 
impossible to manage on one property in isolation, due to their mobility across 
property lines (Fiege 2005).  Small parcels are poorly insulated from the effects of 
surrounding land use decisions.  The difficulty of managing the content of natural 
areas without any control over the context suggests the necessity of landscape-level 
conservation strategies (Noss 1987).  Patterns of land use matter.  The contents of a 
landscape, such as woods, fields, and roads, will function differently or have different 
effects depending on how they are arranged in relation to each other (Olson 1999). 
Adverse effects of local resource use on large ecosystems may not be immediately 
apparent at the local level (Herring 1990); and practices that may not seem very 
harmful in isolation can add up to serious threats when enough people engage in them 
(Freyfogle 2003).   
 Fragmented ownership, when combined with the need for landscape-level 
management and the public goods nature of the benefits, can result in a situation 
where ―individual forest owners are captured in a prisoner's dilemma‖ (Glück 2000: 
181).  Imagine that the presence of wild turkeys is something that the people of a 
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given area greatly desire and that it costs something for a landowner to create or 
maintain turkey habitat.  Let‘s also say that it is not adequate for only a small number 
of landowners do this—in order for there to be turkeys, lots of landowners need to 
maintain habitat.  Let‘s also say that if only a few people don‘t maintain habitat it 
won‘t make any difference; there will still be turkeys.  The problem then arises at the 
level of each landowner‘s decision making.  Even if every landowner would gladly 
pay the cost of maintaining habitat on their property for the sake of having turkeys in 
the area, each might reason:  ―If I undertake to maintain habitat and not enough other 
people do, I‘ll have paid the cost and there won‘t be any result.  Conversely, if most 
other people do maintain habitat, then there will be turkeys whether I contribute or 
not.‖  When the basis for decision-making is minimizing cost and weighing the 
probable impact of one‘s actions, rational landowners are likely to hang back from 
making any commitments to habitat protection.  The tragic result is that none of the 
landowners will get to enjoy the sight of turkeys, even though each of them would be 
willing to contribute to habitat if only they could trust others to do the same.  It is 
interesting to note the reversal here, from the suggestion that privatization may be 
necessary to avoid a ―tragedy of the commons‖ (Hardin 1968; Smith 1981), to a 
recognition that where it is impossible to internalize the effects of decision making, 
some mechanism of cooperation needs to be established in order to avoid a tragedy of 
fragmentation. 
 The resemblance that private land use decision-making bears to a prisoner‘s 
dilemma game has long been recognized in the planning literature.  Davis and 
Whinston take ―the fact that the value of any one property depends in part upon the 
neighborhood in which it is located‖ as their point of departure for using game theory 
―to explain how interdependence can cause urban blight‖ (Davis and Whinston 1961: 
107).  Mandelker made the same observation: ―In any deteriorating urban area, it is 
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against the self-interest of any one property owner to rehabilitate his property unless 
adjacent property owners do so as well‖ (Mandelker 1965: 27).  McMillan applies this 
analysis to the problem of open space preservation: 
Decision makers appreciate the value of open space and recognize that all would be 
better off if everyone preserved some open areas in their developments. Yet, due to 
the publicness of the benefits open spaces offer, an individual decision maker can gain 
more if he fully develops his own property while others continue to maintain open 
areas. But, if he is the only landowner to preserve open areas while others develop 
fully, he will be severely disadvantaged. Each decision maker is enticed by the 
potential benefits of being the only one to develop fully and prodded by the fear of the 
loss if he is the only one to maintain open areas. Hence, no open space is forth-coming 
since it is not to the advantage of any small decision maker to set aside open areas 
without the assurance that others will do likewise (McMillan 1974: 411).  
Because the gains that a private landowner stands to make by developing open space 
are so large compared to his or her share of the public loss, there is the potential for a 
marked divergence between a landowner‘s preferred outcomes and his or her 
contribution to those outcomes.  In the absence of any mechanism to internalize the 
effects of private land use decisions, ―the piecemeal nature of private development is 
typified by a series of individual maximizing decisions the product of which the 
decision-makers themselves consider unsatisfactory‖ (McMillan 1974: 411).    
 This divergence between landscape preference and personal choice is clearly 
evident in Vermonters‘ housing decisions.  According to the annual Vermonter Poll, 
about two-thirds of Vermonters think that low-density, automobile-oriented 
development outside of existing town centers is becoming a problem in Vermont and 
that action should be taken to stop it.  When asked where they think that new 
residential development should occur, nearly ninety percent of respondents said that it 
should be located in existing towns rather than in the countryside.  However, when 
asked where they would like to live if money were no object, nearly two-thirds of 
these same respondents said that they would purchase a house in countryside (Smart 
Growth Vermont 2009).    
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 Many aspects of rural land use are plagued by dilemmas of this kind.  Dairy 
farmers, unable to collectively reduce production, each respond to low prices by 
increasing their production in an effort to lower their per-unit costs and to benefit from 
a greater volume of sales—thereby driving prices still lower (see Meadows 1991).  
Another example is to be found in the nexus between property taxes and development.  
In some places, the leading reason for the sale of undeveloped land is property tax 
pressure (National Agricultural Statistics Service 2005).  At the same time, one of the 
main factors behind rising property taxes is increasing development (Brighton and 
Northup 1990; Brighton and Hausauer 2002).  These vicious circles are everywhere; 
and the study described in this paper shows how the protection of wildlife habitat on 
private land is similarly threatened, not by a lack of knowledge or caring on the part of 
landowners, but by the lack of an effective mechanism for cooperation.   
 
 In the town that is the focus of this paper, an effort is underway to make a 
town-wide plan for the protection of biodiversity.  This project, organized by the town 
Conservation Commission, is inspired by the report of the Vermont Biodiversity 
Project (Thompson 2002).  Its efforts are guided both by this report and by a manual 
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Department (Austin et al. 2004).  These documents lay 
out conservation goals for the entire state but leave it up to local communities to 
implement strategies that will achieve these goals.  At the time that this study was 
undertaken, this was the first town attempting to implement a biodiversity protection 
plan.  Members of the Conservation Commission have worked with volunteers to 
inventory and map places of ecological importance, including such habitat elements as 
vernal pools, wetlands, mast stands, and deer yards.  Based on this information, the 
Commission is creating a detailed conservation plan for the town.  Recognition that 
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the area is at high risk of habitat fragmentation due to increased housing development 
(Stein et al. 2005) has imparted a sense of urgency to the work.  
One of the maps created as part of this project places a white circle over every 
house, such that spaces more than six hundred feet from any house are left green.  This 
makes it possible to identify contiguous areas of undeveloped land that might serve as 
core wildlife habitat, and also to evaluate connectivity between these areas.  In some 
places, the thin ribbon of green connecting one habitat area to another is narrow 
enough that the construction of a single house would eliminate it.  This is problematic 
because many species need to range over large areas in order to satisfy their needs.  
Effective preservation of wildlife habitat, therefore, is not something that can be 
practiced on a parcel by parcel basis.  It is something that needs to be organized at a 
landscape scale.   
 The great challenge facing implementation of a town-wide conservation plan is 
the fact that the landscape to which it applies belongs to hundreds of private owners 
whose cooperation is necessary for its success.  The hope is that landowners will 
donate easements to the development of ―a regionally integrated system of conserved 
lands,‖ and in other ways commit to accommodating the needs of wild nature.  What is 
going to make them willing to do this?  The main idea has been to run an educational 
campaign that will teach landowners the importance of protecting biodiversity. The 
apparent assumption is that active landowner support for the plan will hinge on 
whether or not they favor its goals.  But even if most landowners are in favor of the 
conservation plan, it does not necessarily follow that they will actively support it.  
This is because of the frequent divergence discussed above between the shared goals 
of a group and the incentives faced by each member as an individual. 
 The expectation with which I undertook this research was that education is not 
the sticking point, but rather that landowner commitment to conservation planning is 
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undermined by problems of collective action.  When this expectation was borne out by 
the survey results, I developed another, perhaps more naïve expectation: that if 
landowners are informed about their mutual interests and have the opportunity to 
communicate face-to-face, problems of collective action arising from isolated 
decision-making can be overcome by landowners willing to make mutual 
commitments about conservation on their land.  This may potentially be true; but such 
a process has difficulties and complications of its own.  Attempts to bring residents 
together in neighborhood groups fell flat for lack of participation; and the passage of a 
new conservation-oriented town plan was vigorously opposed.  Act I of this paper 
presents the survey results, revealing both widespread support for conservation and a 
willingness on the part of landowners to participate in conservation agreements with 
other landowners.  Act II describes the contentious public hearing process for the 
adoption of a new town plan.  In the discussion section that follows I try to make sense 
of why the plan met with such opposition and speculate about what would be 
necessary to advance conservation planning in the future. 
  
 
METHODS 
  
 The study took place over a two-year period in a Vermont town of about two 
thousand people.  The town was chosen for being a place where the question of 
landowner commitment to conservation is of immediate practical concern and where, 
consequently, the Conservation Commission and other citizens were interested in 
collaborating on this research in a participatory fashion.  It is an area of high 
biodiversity, lying where the northern and southern limits of many species‘ ranges 
overlap; but it is also an area at high risk of habitat fragmentation due to increased 
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housing development (Stein et al. 2005).  At the time that this study was undertaken, 
this was the first town attempting to implement a biodiversity protection plan 
following the recommendations of the Vermont Biodiversity Project.   
 The primary purpose of my study was to determine whether the willingness of 
landowners to go along with town-wide conservation planning is impeded by 
problems of collective action, as opposed to a lack of awareness or caring about 
conservation issues.  A secondary and unanticipated aspect of the study was the 
opportunity to see how well the public planning process can serve as a mechanism for 
overcoming problems of collective action.  The study proceeded in two phases and 
contains two kinds of empirical data.   
The first phase was the distribution of a survey with questions about 
recreational access, biodiversity conservation, and development.  The survey was 
intended to evaluate whether the satisfaction of local landscape preferences is impeded 
by problems of collective action.  It contains questions asking respondents how aware 
they are of certain threats to recreational access, biodiversity, and farmland; how much 
they care about these issues; and, most importantly, what would make them willing to 
contribute to the protection of these things.
10
  The survey was sent to all local 
households plus those of non-resident landowners—about nine hundred in all.  
Surveys were also available at the town clerk‘s office and upon request.  Forty percent 
of the surveys were returned in usable form.   
 The second phase of my project began shortly after the survey research was 
finished, when the town Planning Commission completed their draft of a new, 
significantly more conservation-oriented town plan and a public hearing process for it 
began.  This presented the opportunity to ask the following question: can the public 
planning process—containing, as it does, opportunities for public engagement and 
                                                 
10
 Please contact the author for the complete survey or for the complete survey results.   
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mechanisms for mutual commitment—can this process be a solution to problems of 
collective action in land use?  I answer this question based on a period of ―participant 
observation,‖ lasting more than a year, during which time I attended all of the public 
meetings and hearings related to the new town plan, took notes on the public 
discussion, and spoke informally with as many people as possible.  
  
 
ACT I:  THE SURVEY 
 
 Respondents to a survey carried out by the Planning Commission in 2002 
identified ―natural beauty‖ and ―rural atmosphere‖ as the town‘s two leading assets, 
demonstrating similar values to those of Vermonters state-wide (Council on the Future 
of Vermont 2009).  Ninety-two percent of respondents to the Planning Commission‘s 
survey said that they would like to see large undeveloped tracts of land in the town 
protected.  The values expressed in response to the survey I carried out in 2009 are 
consistent with these previous surveys.   
 Responses indicate that most people are at least moderately well aware of 
conservation issues and that they care a lot about them (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
11
   
More than three quarters of respondents said that they care ―a lot‖ about the loss of 
adequate habitat for wildlife.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Questions and response categories depicted in the charts are in many cases rephrased and condensed 
for the sake of space.  They are not necessarily a verbatim representation of how the questions or 
response categories appeared on the actual survey. 
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40% 
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54% 
33% 
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Very aware A little aware Not very aware
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plants
Habitat
loss
Figure 2.1  Awareness of invasive plants and habitat loss as local problems. 
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Figure 2.2  Degree of caring about invasives and about habitat loss.  
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When respondents were asked to ―consider the following goal: That all native animal 
and plant species have the habitat they need to live here in [the case-study 
community],‖ more than two thirds said that they were ―definitely in favor of that;‖ 
while only seven percent either didn‘t care or were ―against having that kind of goal‖ 
(see Figure 2.3).  
 
The distribution of responses from landowners with greater than ten acres was almost 
the same as above, with sixty-three percent saying that they are ―definitely in favor‖ 
and twenty-seven percent saying that they ―might be in favor.‖ 
Asked whether they would be ―willing to commit to preserving wildlife habitat 
on [their] own land,‖ sixty-three percent of these landowners said ―yes‖ and twenty-
four percent said ―maybe.‖  At first glance, this might seem to indicate that there is no 
problem of collective action, since the distribution of responses indicating what people 
are personally willing to contribute matches their desired outcomes.  These 
expressions of willingness to contribute, however, are currently only a latent 
68% 
25% 
2% 
5% 
Definitely in favor  Maybe  Don't care  Against
Figure 2.3  Agreement with the goal of having adequate habitat for all native species. 
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orientation.  The fact is that there are only twelve parcels of land in the town that are 
protected and, despite several public informational meetings on the subject, the local 
land trust has not been contacted by anybody from this town during the past two years.  
It might be suspected that if the question were rephrased such that ―would you be‖ was 
changed to ―are you,‖ and the vague term ―commit to‖ replaced with ―make a 
permanently binding legal agreement for,‖ the distribution of responses would shift 
more heavily to Maybes and Nos.  The primary reason given by landowners for not 
committing to habitat preservation is that they want to keep their options open (see 
Figure 2.4).  
 
 
Once we know that landowners are aware of conservation issues and care about them, 
the main thing we want to find out is what it would take for them to commit to 
conservation on their own land.  The most important question on the survey in this 
regard is this one:   
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Figure 2.4  Reasons for not committing to habitat preservation.  (Respondents were 
permitted to indicate more than one choice.) 
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Which of the following, if any, would make you more willing to commit to 
preserving wildlife habitat on your own land?  Check all that apply, and please circle 
the most important one.  
□ An agreement with a large number of other landowners who have all promised 
to preserve habitat on their land if I do on mine.  
□ Public recognition.  
□ Some financial compensation (but not the full development value). 
□ Other _______________________________________________ 
□ Other _______________________________________________ 
□ I’m not willing to make commitments about what I do with my land, period.   
 
The most important incentive landowners identified was the first one, a mutual 
agreement with other landowners.  This box was checked by more than twice as many 
respondents as the next most important incentive, financial compensation (see Figure 
2.5).  Out of those respondents who circled a ―most important‖ incentive, seventy-nine 
percent indicated that a mutual agreement with other landowners would be most 
important to them, while twenty-one percent circled financial compensation.  When all 
respondents (both landowners and non-landowners) were asked whether they would 
be willing to contribute money to a fund that compensates landowners for protecting 
habitat, forty percent said that they would, while another thirty-four percent said that 
they would like to if only they could afford it.   
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Figure 2.5  What would make you more willing to commit to habitat preservation on 
your land?  (Respondents were permitted to indicate more than one choice.) 
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Figure 2.6  Views on Sprawl. 
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Responses to questions about sprawl also indicate high levels of concern; but 
people seem wary regarding conservation easements and hesitant to donate either 
money or development rights.  Most respondents think that sprawl
12
 could become a 
problem in the town (see Figure 2.6), and most of them would like to see more 
landowners put conservation easements
13
 on their land (see Figure 2.7).   
 
The response of landowners with greater than ten acres to the question of whether they 
would like to see more conservation easements in the town closely matches that of 
respondents overall, with fifty-three percent saying Yes; thirty-four percent saying 
Maybe; nine percent saying No; and four percent saying that they don‘t care.   
                                                 
12
 The survey describes sprawl as a situation where there is ―so much dispersed residential and 
commercial development outside of village centers that the natural environment and rural atmosphere 
are threatened.‖ 
13
 The actual phrasing of the question summarized in Figure 7 is:  ―A conservation easement is a 
voluntary legal agreement between a landowner and a land trust which permanently limits what may be 
done with a piece of land.  Some property owners in [the town] have donated or sold conservation 
easements to protect their land from future development.  Would you like to see more landowners in 
[the town] do this?‖ 
55% 
31% 
11% 
4% 
Yes  Maybe  No  Don't care
Figure 2.7  Would you like to see more conservation easements in the town? 
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 When people were asked whether they would be willing to donate money to a 
fund that supports the purchase of conservation easements, however, the distribution 
of responses shifts conspicuously toward the negative (see Figure 2.8); and despite the 
interest on the part of most landowners in seeing more conservation easements in 
general, most of them are either hesitant or unwilling to donate easements themselves 
(see Figure 2.9).   
When asked what would make them more willing to place a conservation easement on 
their land, the leading answer was ―more information‖ (sixty-two percent).  The 
second and third most common answers were a mutual agreement with other 
landowners
14
 (forty-five percent) and financial compensation (forty-three percent).  
Only three percent of respondents indicated that public recognition would make a 
difference to them (see Figure 2.10).   
                                                 
14
 The actual phrasing of that response category is ―An agreement with a large number of other 
landowners who have all promised to donate easements on their land if I do on mine.‖   
31% 32% 
38% 
Yes  I would but I can't afford to  No
Figure 2.8  Would you donate money to support more conservation easements? 
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If the views of those who responded to this survey are even approximately 
representative of the population as a whole,
15
 the Conservation Commission may well 
have concluded after this phase of the research that most people in the town already 
care a lot about the landscape and are worried about its future.  It would appear that 
most people want to see development limited in some way and wildlife habitat 
protected.  Most of them indicate at least a latent willingness to contribute to habitat 
preservation.  Some landowners say that they would be more willing to commit to 
conservation in exchange for financial compensation—a requirement that it may be 
possible to satisfy, since a large percentage of respondents indicated that they would 
be willing to donate money to this purpose.  The most significant finding, however, is 
that it matters to landowners what other landowners‘ intentions are when they are 
considering conservation commitments, and that this appears to be even more 
important than money.    
 
                                                 
15
 Based on comparison with the 2000 census data for the town, older people of higher income and 
higher education are slightly over-represented on the survey.   
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Figure 2.9  Would you consider donating a conservation easement? 
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ACT II:  CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 
 Following completion of the survey, a public meeting was held at the grange to 
present the results along with some background information on land use trends in the 
area and to provide a forum for public discussion.  The meeting was attended by about 
two hundred people.  After the presentation, people broke into three different groups 
to discuss recreational access, wildlife conservation, and development.  Those 
interested in continuing to work on these issues were asked to put their names on a 
contact list; but efforts to organize working groups failed to gain any momentum due 
to a lack of participation.
16
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 See Appendix for a description of these efforts. 
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Figure 2.10  What would make you more willing to conserve your land? 
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 Not long after my public presentation of the survey research, the Planning 
Commission began a public hearing process for the draft proposal of a new town plan.  
This new plan was very conservation-oriented and included a number of significant 
changes from the old plan.  Among these were the specification of maximum 
densities, such as one unit per twenty-seven acres in the newly redrawn conservation 
areas; the identification of wildlife travel corridors; and the decrease of commercially 
zoned land along a major roadway.  In light of the difficulties encountered organizing 
voluntary working groups, the question presented itself whether the public planning 
process might be a solution to problems of collective action around land use, 
containing as it does numerous opportunities for public discussion and a mechanism 
for mutual commitment in the form of zoning bylaw.   
 At the time the survey was being written, board and commission members who 
were in on the process predicted that although many people might be in favor of 
conservation and opposed to sprawl, most would certainly be against any regulatory 
measures for dealing with these issues.  Survey responses, however, indicate that 
people in the town are more accepting of regulation than public officials think.  In 
response to the question ―Do you think that residential and commercial development 
should be regulated by the town to prevent sprawl,‖ sixty-nine percent of respondents 
answered Yes; twenty-three percent said Maybe; and only eight percent said No.  
Responses to the question ―What would you think of the town regulating land use in 
order to promote habitat preservation and connectivity‖ were a little more mixed, with 
thirty-six percent saying that they were ―definitely in favor‖ and thirty-eight percent 
saying that they were ―maybe in favor.‖  Fifteen percent said that they were ―probably 
against‖ the idea; and eleven percent were ―definitely against‖ it.  Based on these 
results, one might expect that the new town plan would be generally well received.   
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 Any optimistic expectations, however, were in for some bruising.  At the first 
public hearing, about a hundred people showed up, many of whom were strongly 
opposed to the plan.  One long-time landowner was nearly in tears as he voiced his 
concern that he wouldn‘t be able to build houses on his land for his children.  A 
lawyer threatened that the town would be faced with ―takings‖ lawsuits; and several 
people complained that the town cared more about salamanders than about people.  
Even the zoning administrator asserted that it was a violation of people‘s civil liberties 
to tell them where they can or can‘t build their houses.  Many people had only recently 
become aware of the new town plan and were upset not to have been involved in its 
creation.  They wanted to know why the Planning Commission hadn‘t talked to them 
about it earlier.  ―Pick a time and a day and I‘m there,‖ said one landowner.  ―Let me 
in on the game and I‘ll play ball.‖  Exasperated Planning Commission members 
explained that over the past several years they had organized numerous meetings and 
working groups in an effort to encourage public participation in the planning process.  
Asked why they hadn‘t gotten involved earlier, people said they didn‘t know it was 
important at the time and that they don‘t have time to go to many meetings.   
 After receiving written comments and discussing each part of the proposed 
plan over the course of several public meetings, the Selectboard sent it back to the 
Planning Commission with a long list of suggested changes and things that they 
thought the Commission should reconsider.  The Planning Commission in turn 
organized a series of work sessions to which the public were invited in order to 
reexamine each part of the proposed plan.  Attendance at these sessions and at regular 
Planning Commission meetings was good, with a dozen to two dozen people coming 
to regular meetings that were previously unattended by non-Commission members, 
and between a hundred and two hundred people at the public hearings that were to 
follow.  Despite this increase in participation, and despite the fact that most of what 
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people said they didn‘t like was removed from the plan (e.g., any reference to 
minimum lot sizes), opposition only grew.   
 At the next public hearing, opposition to the plan gravitated from specific 
grievances, many of which had been addressed, to a more general antipathy.  Some 
speakers thought that the town should get rid of planning and zoning altogether.  ―You 
can‘t tell people what to do on their own land,‖ one woman said.  ―It‘s not right.  It‘s 
just not right.‖  Prolonged applause followed another speaker‘s assertion that ―to take 
even one landowner‘s rights away from him is wrong.‖  Many people insisted that the 
new plan should not be any more restrictive than the old plan.  Some said they relied 
on their land to provide for their retirement, and that they had long been expecting to 
be able to sell parts of it for residential or commercial development.  They felt that to 
restrict their ability to do this where it had previously been allowed is tantamount to 
robbery, depriving them of much of their land‘s value.  Others claimed that they have 
no intention of developing their land and don‘t see why they need to be told what to do 
by the Planning Commission.  In the words of one man, ―You are saying to the 
landowner, we don‘t trust you to do the right thing.‖  Another man at a different 
meeting made the same complaint, ―What this plan is saying is that the Planning 
Commission doesn‘t trust the landowners.‖  Some landowners felt insulted by the idea 
of restrictions which seemed to imply that the Planning Commission, instead of 
honoring them as good stewards of the land, was casting them as a threat.  Some 
owners of large undeveloped areas also resented what they perceived to be an 
asymmetrical transfer of benefits.  Those people who went ahead and developed their 
land in the past not only get to retain the benefits of that decision, but are more likely 
to be allowed additional development; while those who have refrained from 
developing are now targeted for restrictions.  ―I don‘t tell other people what to do with 
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their land,‖ one farmer said, ―what right do they have to tell me what to do with 
mine?‖   
 Believing that the Planning Commission had run amok, or at least overstepped 
its bounds, a regular crew of residents and landowners began attending meetings in a 
watchdog capacity.  ―It‘s not until the people show up with pitchforks,‖ one woman 
declared, ―that the Commission will do what the people want.‖  In the year following 
the first public hearing, several seats on the Planning Commission turned over, and 
one of them went to a leading organizer of opposition to the proposed plan.  He and 
others circulated a petition calling upon the Selectboard to throw out the proposed plan 
and to readopt the old one from 2004.  They gathered almost two hundred signatures; 
and at public meetings it was spoken of as common knowledge that everyone in town 
was against the plan.  As the Planning Commission prepared to submit their revised 
version of the plan to the Selectboard, one of the selectmen made it clear that the 
board would not be comfortable approving it in the face of so much community 
opposition.  When it was pointed out that the known opposition represented only about 
fifteen percent of households, the selectman explained that the board cannot suppose 
the existence of a silent majority in favor of the plan.  They can only go by the 
statements they receive in public meetings and during the period for submission of 
written comments; and it was their impression that the majority of these were in 
opposition to the plan.  The Planning Commission decided to submit the revised plan 
anyway and a Conservation Commission member circulated an email telling those in 
favor of the plan that their active support was needed.  At the next public hearing, 
support for and opposition to the proposed plan seemed more balanced, at least in 
terms of numbers, although the opponents were more vocal and impassioned.  Rather 
than passing the proposed plan, the Selectboard decided to make more changes and to 
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schedule another public hearing.  As of this writing, the old town plan has long since 
expired and the new one has not yet been approved.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 What makes the destruction of Vermont‘s landscape a tragedy is that it is 
happening as a result of Vermonters‘ own decisions and despite their professed desire 
to protect it.  Most Vermonters say that they value the working landscape and that they 
are concerned about over-development (Council on the Future of Vermont 2009; 
Smart Growth Vermont 2009), but on the whole their public and private choices fail to 
reflect this.  During the 1980s, the amount of newly developed land per new resident 
was more than twice the national average, higher, for example, than in either New 
Hampshire or Colorado (Olson and Olson 1999).  And yet, in a comparison of voter-
approved tax and bond measures, Vermont has one of the lowest levels of public 
spending for the preservation of open space—only ten cents per person for the period 
2001-2003, compared to $32.55 per person in New Hampshire and $174.35 in 
Colorado (Kline, Alig, and Garber-Yonts 2004).  While Vermonters say that they are 
concerned about automobile-oriented development and want to see more compact 
settlement patterns (Smart Growth Vermont 2009), per capita car use in Vermont has 
risen much faster than in the rest of New England or even California (Johnson 2005).  
When highway construction expenses in Vermont set a new record in 2010, the 
governor and other officials hosted a ―paving celebration‖ (Reformer 2010).  If 
Vermonters are sincere in the love they claim to have for the landscape and in their 
desire to protect it, why do they each make choices that contribute to its destruction?  
Why do they fail to collectively take measures for its protection?   
56 
 It is clear that in the community where my case study takes place most people 
do care about the landscape.  In 2002 a Planning Commission survey identified 
―natural beauty‖ and ―rural atmosphere‖ as the town‘s two leading assets; and ninety-
two percent of respondents said that they would like to see large undeveloped tracts of 
land in the town protected.  In the survey I conducted in 2009, more than half of 
respondents said that they are ―very aware‖ of habitat loss as a problem, and more 
than three-quarters of them care ―a lot‖ about it.  More than two-thirds said that they 
are ―definitely in favor‖ of all native animal and plant species having the habitat they 
need to live in the area.  Thus there does not appear to be a lack of awareness or a lack 
of caring on the part of most people regarding these issues; and since this is not the 
sticking point, an educational campaign is not likely to have much effect on people‘s 
behavior.  People are already in favor of conservation, and many of them indicate a 
latent willingness either to donate money or to commit to conservation on their own 
land.  The question is: why don‘t they?  And what would get them to actually do it?   
 The sticking point appears to be the incentives faced by individual people 
when they consider whether or not to undertake actions that if taken collectively 
would lead to mutual gains.  In the absence of any mechanism for mutual 
commitment, most people appear to be unwilling to take initiative or to risk acting 
unilaterally.  When landowners were asked about their reasons for not committing to 
habitat preservation, only five percent said that they don‘t know how to go about it, 
and only five percent said that they don‘t care.  More than three-quarters said that they 
don‘t want to limit their freedom of choice.  When asked what would make them more 
willing to commit to habitat preservation, the most common answer by far was a 
mutual agreement with other landowners (see Figure 2.5).  This idea of mutual 
commitment turned out to be a much more important incentive even than financial 
compensation.  When people were asked specifically about placing conservation 
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easements on their land, a mutual commitment with other landowners ranked only 
slightly higher than financial compensation as an important incentive.  In both 
questions it is clear that it matters to landowners what other landowners‘ intentions are 
when considering conservation commitments.  It seems equally clear therefore that 
promoters of landscape conservation need to work with groups of landowners together 
rather than with individual landowners one-at-a-time—and that in order to get more 
landowners to commit to conservation, some mechanism of mutual commitment is 
needed.   
 In ―The Tyranny of Small Decisions,‖ economist Alfred Kahn describes how 
many small decisions taken over time by many people can add up to outcomes that 
none of those people would have voted for had that outcome ―ever been presented for 
their explicit consideration.‖  In this way, ―the consumer can be victimized by the 
narrowness of the contexts in which he exercises his sovereignty‖ (Kahn 1966: 24).  
The ability to present land use outcomes for people‘s explicit consideration is one of 
the chief arguments in favor of planning.  In the case-study community, the occasion 
of updating the town plan presented the opportunity for people to engage in a dialog 
about the future of the landscape and to commit to a common vision—one to which 
they would be bound by zoning bylaws enacted through their mutual consent.  This 
would seem to be the perfect opportunity for them to achieve the landscape 
preferences that most of them expressed on the survey.   
 Instead, the proposed revisions provoked an angry backlash that brought the 
planning process to a halt and, as of this writing, has left the town without any plan 
currently in effect.  This backlash was entirely unexpected by the Planning 
Commission and continued to gain momentum even as its demands were being met.  
Many residents were mad at the idea that anybody could tell them what to do with 
their own land.  The very mechanisms of mutual commitment that could enable them 
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to achieve their shared goals came to be seen by many as restrictions on their liberty, 
imposed on them by some outside force.   
 Many public hearing attendees echoed the views of one man who asked, ―Why 
should I be in favor of anything that restricts what I can do with my land?‖  He and 
others didn‘t seem to appreciate the reciprocal nature of these restrictions or see any 
way in which they might benefit from them.  Many people complained that regulation, 
any regulation, would lower their property values by limiting what they could do on 
their land.  It did not appear to be understood that regulation is intended protect 
people‘s property values by limiting what their neighbors can do.  The difference in 
perspective described here is not a question of selfishness versus public-mindedness, 
but rather a matter of seeing how one‘s own interests may be intertwined with those of 
others.  To understand how land use regulation can be beneficial to landowners—
indeed, to understand how agreeing to the regulation of any kind of behavior may be 
beneficial—people need to shift from asking ―What does it mean for me if I have to 
follow rule x?‖ to asking ―What does it mean for me if everyone has to follow rule x?‖ 
 Another thing that did not seem to be appreciated was that the community can 
take ownership of the planning process and use it to achieve shared goals.  Instead, 
there was a widespread perception that planning is a tool for the government to impose 
its interests on the community.  While this has often been the case (Scott 1998), it is 
not an apt description of planning in a small Vermont town.  Nevertheless, at the very 
first public hearing, one opponent of the proposed plan stood up and told the Planning 
Commission (on which he would later take a seat) ―You need to stay out of our lives.‖  
This and other similar statements express and serve to reinforce the idea that the 
planning process is a conflict between the Planning Commission and landowners, a 
conflict in which the Commission is pursuing interests of its own and in which 
landowners are bound to lose something if the Commission achieves anything.  The 
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unfortunate effect of this discourse is that it obscures the fact that there are naturally 
conflicting interests between landowners, which it is the purpose of planning to 
resolve.  Once the landowner-versus-government dichotomy took hold in people‘s 
minds, it became difficult for them to see the planning process as a way for neighbors 
to come together to resolve their conflicts and to pursue mutual gains.   
 Another reason that some people perceived the planning process as an 
antagonistic intrusion on their lives is that they were not involved in it early on and it 
took them by surprise.  One positive result of organized resistance to the proposed 
plan is that the number of people attending planning meetings increased dramatically.  
Often this was the result of opponents of the plan making rounds of phone calls prior 
to meetings to solicit attendance.  There was also an increased interest on the part of 
opponents in volunteering for the Commission.  Both meeting attendance and 
participation on the Commission, however, were done in a watchdog capacity: trying 
to put the brakes on the process and to whittle down the plan, rather than trying to 
understand the land use problems that the plan was attempting to deal with and to craft 
better solutions to those problems.   
 There was a clear perception on the part of the public that it is the job of the 
Planning Commission to author the plan, and that the purpose of public meetings is for 
community members to complain about parts of the plan that they don‘t like.  The 
Planning Commission tried, apparently inadequately, to get the message across that 
the plan is meant to be the product of a process of public engagement and that people 
are expected to show up to planning sessions in order to work constructively on 
something that is understood to be a work in progress.  A frequent exchange at 
planning meetings involved one or another community member standing up and 
threatening to attend every meeting from then on—followed by a Commission 
member trying to explain that this is exactly what was wanted.  There is some ironic 
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humor in a group of citizens showing up at the town clerk‘s office to protest 
government and not realizing when they get there that the only government is them.  
In the long run, this heightened level of civic engagement will surely be a good thing.  
In the short run, however, the increase in participation doesn‘t seem to have increased 
satisfaction, as most new participants don‘t feel that they have anything to gain from 
the plan, but are only trying to protect themselves from losing something because of it.   
 One important role for education might be to give people a better 
understanding of planning and why it is sometimes necessary to cooperate in large 
groups.  Almost every survey respondent indicated an understanding that what their 
neighbors did could have an effect on them.  What may not be so well understood is 
that while contracts, litigation, and legislation can solve some of the problems that 
arise when our interests and actions extend beyond our property lines; there are other 
problems and aspirations that require sitting down as a community to talk and make 
agreements.  If, for example, I wish that my neighbor would cut down some of her 
trees so that I may have a better view, I can make a contract with her to that effect and 
simply pay her to do it.  Alternatively, if she is doing something that impairs the use 
and enjoyment of my property, I could try taking her to court.  Both contract and 
litigation, however, in order to be useful tools, require that it is within my neighbor‘s 
power to either create or withhold the harms or benefits with which I am concerned.  
This is not always the case.  Many harms and benefits are cumulative, resulting from 
the combined actions of many people, none of whom are capable of either halting or 
guaranteeing the outcome.   
 If a particular action is always harmful and there is never any reason why it 
might sometimes be desirable, then the state legislature can simply prohibit it.  We 
don‘t need planning for this.  Likewise, if there are actions that we want to limit 
overall, but it doesn‘t matter when or where they occur to the permitted degree, these 
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too can be regulated by the state—for example, auto emissions.  Yet there are other 
land use outcomes we might wish to pursue or avoid that have more to do with the 
spatial arrangement of uses than their overall degree.  People want both houses and 
factories and wild spaces, but arranged such that each can perform its function best 
and without interfering with other land uses.  If people want walking or bike paths in 
their community, it is necessary for them to sit down to discuss with each other where 
they want the paths go, and to negotiate as a group with all the landowners whose 
property they would run through.  Not only is this type of project beyond what 
markets and legislation can provide, neither is it something that a group of planners 
can do on their own.  In order to have a clear idea what people really want, what they 
are willing to contribute, and how a proposed project is likely to affect people, it is 
necessary to have a process of public deliberation.   
 One thing that became clear in the case-study community was that in order to 
have a successful public planning process, people have to be open and receptive to that 
process and willing to participate.  This means that the Planning Commission needs to 
structure the process to be as inclusive and participatory as possible.  Being open to 
the process does not mean that people have to share the same goals.  It is to be 
expected, for example, that landowners will have concerns about how a path across 
their property will disturb them; and they will have demands about how much 
compensation they will want, et cetera.  Addressing these kinds of concerns is just 
what such a process is for.  Where things fall apart is when some people, for fear of 
having other people‘s interests imposed on them, either refrain from participating or 
try to halt the process.  And this is of course what people will do if they don‘t trust that 
the process is going to respect their interests.  In the case-study community, people 
rallied to prevent the passage of a proposed town plan not because they disagreed with 
the vision it expressed, but because they were afraid that they wouldn‘t like the means 
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for achieving that vision.  The selection of means is supposed to happen later during 
another participatory public process when the zoning bylaw is written and other non-
regulatory measures are considered.  But opponents never wanted to get to this stage 
without first making sure that nothing they cared about would be on the table.  The 
reason for this was frequently expressed:  They didn‘t trust that the process would 
respect their interests. 
 The unexpected thing that needs explaining is why a community would fail to 
grasp—even vigorously reject—the opportunity to mutually commit themselves to 
goals that on a survey they expressed strong agreement with.  So far I have discussed 
resistance to the proposed town plan in terms of cultural antagonism to regulation and 
as a failure to understand the role of planning; but there are a few other angles from 
which this resistance might be considered.  First, before speculating about the apparent 
discrepancy between the survey results and public reaction to the proposed town plan, 
it is worth revisiting the numbers.  A likely estimate is that those who are actively 
opposed to the plan—that is, those who signed the petition or showed up to speak 
against it at public meetings—represent about sixteen percent of households.  This 
percentage fits within the percentage of survey respondents that either didn‘t care 
about habitat loss or only cared a little, and easily fits within the thirty percent that did 
not think that sprawl could become a problem in the town.  Eight percent of survey 
respondents were against the town regulating land use to prevent sprawl, and twenty-
three percent were unsure about this.  Since fifteen percent of respondents were 
―probably against‖ the town regulating to preserve wildlife habitat, and eleven percent 
were ―definitely against it,‖ there is not necessarily any inconsistency in the objections 
of those who signed the petition or expressed their discontent at meetings.  What we 
do not know is whether opposition to the plan is limited to this minority.  Most people 
have not publicly expressed their opinion one way or the other.   
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 An interesting feature of the debate is that, because the voices of opposition to 
the proposed plan appeared to be in the majority out of those who attended the 
hearings, it came to be widely assumed that an equally large majority of the whole 
town shared their views.  This not only gave a great deal of momentum to their 
movement (whose members frequently express themselves on behalf of ―the people of 
this town‖), it also had a substantial impact on the deliberations of the Selectboard, 
which was reluctant to approve the new plan without community support.  Thus 
perception of public opinion had a major influence on the process.  Perception, 
however, is the operative word.  After the most recent public hearing, for example, 
even supporters of the proposed plan came away with the impression that most 
everybody in the room had been opposed to it, which was indeed what the newspaper 
reported as well.  Of the thirty-six people who spoke, however, sixteen were in favor 
of the plan and fourteen were against it (with six merely asking a question or telling a 
story).  At the previous meeting, nineteen people had spoken in favor of the plan and 
ten in opposition.  The reason why most people‘s sense of these meetings was so 
different than this tally is that many opponents of the proposed plan stood up to speak 
multiple times, spoke with passion, and were answered by loud applause.  Most of 
those who were in favor the proposed plan spoke only once and were generally more 
subdued in their tone and in their applause.   
 We do not know whether there are many people who are anti-sprawl and who 
want there to be adequate wildlife habitat in the town but who are also against the 
proposed town plan.  It is probable that there are some, and so it is worth considering a 
few possible explanations why this might be the case.  Based on the concerns people 
have expressed in public meetings, the leading reason for opposition is probably the 
considerable loss of potential income that could result from future zoning changes, the 
burden of which would not be spread equally throughout the community.  A person 
64 
who at some time in the past purchased land with the explicit understanding that they 
would be allowed to subdivide it and to build a few more houses, and who paid a price 
reflecting this understanding, is going to feel that they are giving up a lot of the value 
of their land if they agree to a regulation that prohibits them from building or 
subdividing.  For many in the case-study community, this loss of value would have a 
major impact on their lives, including their ability or their children‘s ability to remain 
in the community.  Even those who would be willing to give this value up in the 
context of a mutual agreement must perceive that the enactment of zoning bylaw does 
not spread the burden of sacrifice evenly.  Some parcels of land will bear greater 
restrictions depending upon their size, location, and attributes.  Worst of all, people 
who went ahead and developed their land in the past retain all the benefit of having 
done so, while people who didn‘t develop are now called upon to forego that 
opportunity.  There has been no discussion during the planning process of any 
mechanism for compensating those who will bear the burden of greater restrictions.  
Consequently, those people feel that they are being robbed and it is no wonder that 
they are upset.  It seems possible that the proposed plan might have been better 
received had it included the provision that property value losses would be shared by 
the whole community.   
 Another explanation for resistance to restrictions on development might be that 
thirteen percent of survey respondents are unaware of habitat loss being a problem and 
thirty percent of them don‘t believe that sprawl will be a problem in the town.  Each of 
these respondents might therefore believe that if they go ahead and develop their land 
they will be the only ones to do so.  If they are sure that nobody else will defect, as it 
were, in the absence of restrictions, they would want to retain the ability to do so 
themselves in order to get the most optimal outcome possible.  The risk in this strategy 
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is not very great since they have an easy exit: if the town does become more 
developed than they like, they can always sell their property and move elsewhere.   
 A final obstacle to planning for the future might be the short timeframe of 
people‘s lives compared to the long timeframe in which the benefits of planning or the 
consequences of a failure to plan take effect.  Although seventy percent of survey 
respondents say that they will remain in the town for the rest of their lives, more than 
sixty percent of respondents with greater than ten acres are fifty-six or older, and more 
than a third are sixty-six or older.  It is hard to apply the wisdom of making short-term 
sacrifices in exchange for long-term benefits to those who, due either to mobility or 
age, will not be around to reap those benefits.  Thus, while it is all too often the case 
that future generations are saddled with the costs of decisions made by present 
generations for short-term gain; it may be appropriate to find ways to pass the costs of 
landscape protection on to future generations if this is what is required to make it 
happen, since they are the primary beneficiaries.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The survey portion of the research described in this paper confirms the 
expectation with which it was undertaken: that most people in the study community 
already care about the landscape and are well aware of the threats it faces.  Education 
on these points, therefore, does not seem to be what is most needed in order to get 
people to contribute to landscape protection.  There are, rather, problems of collective 
action that come in between people‘s preferences and their personal choices.  The 
incentives faced by individuals acting unilaterally are quite different than those faced 
by people making mutual commitments in a group; and many survey respondents 
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indicated a greater willingness to commit to conservation in the context of a mutual 
commitment with their neighbors.  The organization of mutual commitments in a 
group, however, is no easy task.  Even getting individuals to participate presents 
collective action problems of its own.   
 All of this would seem to suggest a good rationale for public planning, which 
can provide both a forum for public discussion and a mechanism for mutual 
commitment in the form of zoning bylaw.  That some citizens are deeply skeptical of 
planning is hardly surprising, for it has been different things at different times.  
Planning can be a bureaucratic, administrative process by which a central authority 
imposes rational order on the built environment; but it can also be a participatory, 
democratic process that brings people together to discuss and plan for the future of 
their community.  The challenge for planners is to make this second vision of planning 
a reality.  To do this, they will have to overcome deep-seated cultural opposition to the 
idea of regulation and help people to understand the important role of land use 
planning in solving problems that are beyond the reach of markets, courts, and 
legislatures.   
 In order to be an effective tool for overcoming problems of collective action, 
the planning process needs to be participatory.  But the more that it becomes so, the 
more opportunity there is for people to obstruct it.  In the case-study community, the 
leading obstacle to constructive public participation was the idea that the process was 
a contest between landowners and the Planning Commission, in which any restrictions 
on land use would be a loss to landowners.  Planners need to help people to understand 
that there are inherent conflicts of interest between different types of land use, and to 
help people see the planning process as a place for landowners to work out these 
conflicts for their mutual advantage.   
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 To facilitate this process, new mechanisms may be needed to distribute the 
costs and benefits of land use restrictions more fairly.  Zoning is most easily applied 
when it reinforces existing land use patterns; but it is a very poor form of planning that 
is incapable of altering current patterns when it is perceived that these will cause 
problems in the future.  The difficulty is that changes in the zoning bylaw distribute 
benefits and costs unequally across the population.  Those who stand to lose a lot have 
a great deal of incentive to expend effort trying to block the changes, while those who 
are the recipients of more widely spread public benefits have comparatively less 
incentive to actively support the changes.  All of this contributes to maintaining the 
status quo and, even were fairness not a consideration, suggests the need for a more 
equal distribution of the losses and gains resulting from the impact of public regulation 
on property values.   
 Efforts to mobilize Vermonters in response to the threats facing their landscape 
need to take into account that the problem is not a lack of awareness or caring, but a 
failure of the civic processes that would enable cooperation around shared goals.  Just 
as the incentives for unilateral conservation efforts are inadequate, so too are the 
incentives to participate supportively in collective efforts.  The challenge for planners 
is not so much to arouse people‘s sympathy for conservation, but rather to structure a 
process that provides adequate incentives for people to engage with other members of 
their community in negotiating their commitments to a shared vision of the future.    
 
 
APPENDIX 
  
One of the efforts to organize working groups in the study community had to 
do specifically with hunting access.  Vermont‘s tradition of open recreational access to 
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private land is on the decline as more and more landowners ―post‖ their land with 
signs that either forbid any trespass or that just forbid hunting.  Eighteen percent of 
survey respondents are hunters, and many of them feel that the diminished availability 
of places to hunt is a problem.  It would appear from the survey that this is a 
resolvable problem.  The two leading reasons given by landowners with greater than 
ten acres for limiting access are ―to prevent property damage or litter‖ and ―personal 
safety.‖  Fifty percent of them are also concerned about liability.  When asked what 
would make them more willing to allow access to their land, almost three-quarters said 
―a well-understood code of responsible conduct among the users.‖  About a third said 
that a mutual agreement with other landowners would make them more willing; and 
about a third said that they would be more willing if access could be restricted to local 
residents.  Only five percent indicated that financial compensation would make a 
difference to them.  Based on these responses, the idea of a local hunting club was 
suggested, in which membership would be restricted to residents, as well as non-
resident landowners.  Members of the club would adhere to a well-publicized code of 
conduct emphasizing safety and respect for property; and landowners would be 
encouraged to allow club members to hunt on their land.  The club would also make 
landowners aware of the extent to which Vermont statutes protect them from liability.  
Two preliminary meetings were held with leading members of the local hunting 
community who expressed interest in this idea and who said that they would contact 
others who might be interested.  Numerous follow-up phone calls, however, were 
unproductive of any further meetings and the idea was dropped.   
 The Conservation Commission put somewhat greater effort into the 
organization of neighborhood groups to cooperate around conservation.  The 
consulting naturalist who created the biodiversity inventory report for the Commission 
identified five areas in town as being the most important from a conservation 
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perspective.  For each area, a list was created with the names of all the major property 
owners.  The original idea was that within each neighborhood a conservation-minded 
landowner would host a meeting at which neighbors could discuss their conservation 
goals and practices, look at a map of the entire area to see how each of their parcels 
fits into a larger landscape mosaic, and agree on ways to coordinate their conservation 
practices in order to achieve functional patterns at a larger scale.  Members of the 
Commission expressed a concern at this stage that not too much should be said about 
easements or other forms of commitment, for fear of scaring people off.  Some initial 
conversations were held with a few interested landowners, but the neighborhood 
meetings never happened.  About a year went by, during which time it was decided 
that although the idea of getting landowners to cooperate across property boundaries 
in their habitat management sounds good, there is not in fact anything that they really 
need to do to manage habitat in most cases except to refrain from ruining it.  This 
means that an avoidance of discussion about long-term conservation commitments 
leaves little of importance for landowners to talk about.  A better tack, it was decided, 
would be to try to identify those landowners in each neighborhood who really care 
about conservation (even if they have reservations about what they would be willing to 
commit to), and to bring them together to talk about a conservation plan for their area.  
Part of this conversation would be to explore the idea of mutual commitments of some 
sort.  At the time of this writing, the project of organizing neighborhood groups is 
being revitalized, partly by the added incentive of a small grant for mapping. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In a landscape of fragmented private ownership, the need to coordinate game 
management across large areas presents special challenges for farmers and nature 
management agencies alike.  This paper describes how a unique Norwegian 
institution, the jaktvald (hunting management area), achieves landscape-level 
management while maintaining a tradition of local control.  These two seemingly 
contradictory imperatives—coordinating wildlife management across large areas while 
keeping benefits and control in the hands of local resource users—are resolved 
through a nesting of management institutions and the devolution of decision-making to 
the lowest possible level.  The state in this case serves to facilitate inter-local 
cooperation.  Information about jaktvald was gathered through interviews with staff at 
the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management, with wildlife management 
officials at the municipal level, and with hunters between the fall of 2007 and the 
spring of 2008.  The bulk of the information about how jaktvald are organized at the 
local level comes from a case study in central Norway. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 When natural landscapes are fragmented into many privately owned parcels, 
the management of wildlife and their habitat is made difficult by the need to 
coordinate decision-making amongst numerous stakeholders.  This is especially 
challenging in the case of species such as moose that range over very large areas.  The 
issue of scale lies at the heart of two apparently conflicting trends in wildlife 
management today.  At the same time that ecologists are calling for nature 
management to happen at larger scales, there is also a growing movement in favor of 
decentralizing management by putting more control into the hands of local resource 
users.  In this paper we explore how these two seemingly contradictory imperatives 
can be resolved in the case of moose management.   
 In Norway, hunters play a very active role as managers, and there is currently a 
trend toward strengthening the authority of local actors over wildlife resources 
(Daugstad, Svarstad, and Vistad 2006).  At the same time, there is a desire to increase 
the spatial scale at which management planning is done.  Recent changes in the 
organization of Norwegian jaktvald, or hunting management areas, attempt to combine 
multiple hunting-grounds into larger management areas without taking control away 
from local hunting teams.  How can wildlife management be coordinated across larger 
areas while still keeping benefits and control in the hands of local resource users?  In 
our description of how this works we seek to identify the role of each of the 
institutions involved and to understand both the procedures and the incentives that 
bring them to work together.  We also consider the role of culture and social capital in 
facilitating cooperation.   
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The need for landscape-level management 
 Forested landscapes provide, or have the potential to provide, a wide variety of 
benefits other than timber.  These include aesthetic and cultural values; rural economic 
development; and vital ecosystem functions such as watershed maintenance and the 
conservation of biodiversity.  In the forestry literature, the term ―ecosystem 
management‖ is being used to place a greater emphasis on forest ecology.  The term 
became widely used by the early 1990s, reflecting both improved scientific 
understanding and changing public values (Cortner and Moote 1999).  Definitions of 
ecosystem management stress the importance of ecological integrity and privilege the 
maintenance of conditions, including biological diversity, over outputs (Grumbine 
1994).   
 Highly fragmented patterns of landownership are clearly problematic for 
managing ecosystems as an integrated whole.  Where the land is divided into many 
private holdings, each may be too small for the landowner to achieve his or her 
management goals when making decisions in isolation.  Many important ecological 
functions, from hydrology to habitat, need to be managed on a large scale (Forman 
and Godron 1986; Dramstad, Olson, and Forman 1996).  Likewise, many of the 
challenges that landowners face, such as invasive plant species, are nigh impossible to 
manage on one property in isolation, due to their mobility across property lines (Fiege 
2005).  Small parcels are poorly insulated from the effects of surrounding land use 
decisions.  The difficulty of managing the content of natural areas without any control 
over the context suggests the necessity of landscape-level conservation strategies 
(Noss 1987).  Patterns of land use also matter.  The contents of a landscape, such as 
woods, fields, and roads, will function differently or have different effects depending 
on how they are arranged in relation to each other (Olson 1999). Adverse effects of 
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local resource use on large ecosystems may not be immediately apparent at the local 
level (Herring 1990); and practices that may not seem very harmful in isolation can 
add up to serious threats when enough people engage in them (Freyfogle 2003).   
 For these reasons, it is often desirable for private landowners to cooperate 
across property boundaries.  The possibility of such cooperation, however, is 
threatened by problems of collective action.  Because many of the benefits of good 
forest and wildlife management cannot be internalized on small parcels of land, there 
is a temptation to free ride on other people‘s stewardship by stinting on one‘s own 
conservation efforts.  Recognition that these benefits have the nature of public goods 
has led some scholars to suggest that they be managed as commons (Uphoff 1998; 
Glück 2000).  It is interesting to note the reversal here, from the suggestion that 
privatization may be necessary to avoid a ―tragedy of the commons‖ (Hardin 1968; 
Smith 1981), to a recognition that where it is impossible to internalize the effects of 
decision making, some mechanism of cooperation needs to be established in order to 
avoid a tragedy of fragmentation resulting from privatization.  
 
The need for community-based management 
 Because so many aspects of nature need to be managed at a landscape level, it 
may at first glance seem easiest simply to have a superior authority dictate how land 
and wildlife should be used (Ophuls 1977).  In practice, however, the interests of a 
leviathan tend to differ from those of local communities (Scott 1998); and putting too 
much power in the hands of the state can lead to a decline of local management 
institutions and result in the degradation of natural resources (Pretty and Ward 2001; 
Wittman and Geisler 2005).  In the estimation of Mark Baker and Jonathan Kusel, 
―There is a broad consensus that the dominant [state-centric] paradigm of forest 
management… with its associated bureaucratic and technocratic structures, has, for 
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the most part, failed to steward forest ecosystems and maintain vital communities‖ 
(Baker and Kusel 2003: 2).  In response to this, proponents of ―community forestry‖ 
are calling for more local and democratic management.  According to Robert Lee and 
Donald Field, ―A new paradigm for managing forests is forming.  State-controlled 
forestry is in decline and community control of woodlands is on the rise‖ (Lee and 
Field 2005: 4).   
 The two leading arguments in favor of community-based natural resource 
management are that it provides better environmental stewardship (Brosius, Tsing, and 
Zerner 1998; Uphoff 1998; Rice 2001; Vedeld 2002; Bryden and Geisler 2007), and 
that it creates opportunities for local economic development (Gunter and Jodway 
2000; Treue and Nathan 2007).  These two arguments are tied together by the idea that 
local benefit is a necessary condition for sustainable local management:  to effectively 
devolve control over a resource, local users/managers need to have enough right to 
benefit from the resource that there is an incentive for them to manage it sustainably 
(Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio 2004; cf. Murphree 2009).  The application of this 
principle is exemplified by Zimbabwe‘s wildlife policy.  ―As long as wildlife 
remained the property of the State,‖ Simon Metcalfe explains, ―no one could invest in 
it as a resource.  Consequently, management effort on commercial and communal 
rangelands was being put into domestic livestock‖ (Metcalfe 1994: 2; see also G. 
Child 1996).  Following the devolution of wildlife management, revenues went to 
local communities (B. Child 1996) and the decline of both animals and habitat was 
either halted or reversed depending upon species and location (Taylor 2009).   
 Local compliance with large-scale planning efforts is likely to be greater when 
localities can participate in the planning process than when a plan is imposed by the 
state (Geisler and Martinson 1976).  Scientific expertise is not enough.  The ecosystem 
management literature recognizes that management choices are embedded in a 
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framework of human values and stresses the need for a participatory approach at the 
community level (Grumbine 1994; Cortner and Moote 1999).   
 In Norway, at the same time that nature management officials are trying to 
increase the scale at which some wildlife species are managed, they are also 
promoting more local involvement in game management.  This latter policy is based 
on a recognition that landowners, whether they are recognized as managers or not, are 
the ones whose decisions most affect wildlife, (e.g. through forestry and hunting), and 
that they therefore need to have a more actively responsible role.   
 Although local control is increasingly presented as a solution to the failures of 
the state, attempts to devolve resource management face a number of challenges and 
have often been unsuccessful (Shackleton et al. 2002; Wittman and Geisler 2005; 
Fabricius and Collins 2007).  Perhaps the most serious criticism of devolution is that a 
myopic focus on local conditions and interests will ignore the effects of local decisions 
on other areas and generally obscure how localities are interconnected in larger 
systems (Herring 1990, 2001). 
 
“Nesting” different levels of management 
 We see that there are compelling reasons why many aspects of woodland 
management should happen at scales large enough to encompass multiple private 
ownerships; while at the same time a growing number of scholars are cautioning that 
management should not be put in the hands of the state, but rather left principally 
under local control.  At the local level this problem may be solved through the 
cooperative management of resources.  The literature on common property regimes 
provides a wealth of examples of successfully managed local commons (Bromley and 
Feeny 1992; Burger et al. 2001; Eggertsson 1993; McCay and Acheson 1987; Netting 
1981; Ostrom 1990; Stevenson 1991).  But what if the scale at which a resource needs 
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to be managed encompasses multiple localities?  Scaling up the commons presents 
something of a puzzle.  On the one hand, Brian Child advises, management units 
should be ―small enough that all households can participate face-to-face‖ (B. Child 
1996: 377).  On the other hand, expressing his reservations about local management, 
Ron Herring observes that ―overlapping/overarching commons situations… 
necessitate larger scale cooperation than is possible in the face-to-face communities 
that are conducive to cooperation‖ (Herring 1990: 88).   
 To resolve this problem it has been suggested that local institutions should be 
―nested‖ or ―layered‖ in larger structures that can coordinate their activities (Berkes 
2008; McKean 2000; Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2004; Rose 2002; Turner 2007).  
Margaret McKean explains, 
Institutions for managing very large systems need to be layered with considerable 
devolution of authority to small components to give them flexibility and some control 
over their fate.  Some forests, grazing areas, and irrigation systems may have to be 
managed in very large units, but at the same time the persons living near each patch or 
segment of the resource system need to have substantial and secure rights in the 
system to have the incentive to protect the portion near them.  …The need to manage 
a large resource system as a unit would seem to contradict the need to give each of 
that resource system's user communities some independence. Nesting different user 
groups in a pyramidal organization appears to be one way to resolve this 
contradiction, providing simultaneously for independence and coordination (McKean 
2000: 48). 
The best known examples of nested institutional management for a common pool 
resource are irrigation schemes, such as the Spanish huertas (see Ostrom 1990), but 
the literature on nested institutions for wildlife management is sparse.  The following 
case study of moose management in Norway is intended as a contribution to this 
literature, and serves to illustrate how such nesting or layering of institutions can 
satisfy both the need for landscape-level management and the need for local control.  
Our study describes the Norwegian system and seeks to identify the critical elements 
on which its functioning depends. 
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METHODS 
 
 Because this study sets out to answer a ―how‖ question—how the jaktvald 
works—a case-study method was selected and data was gathered via loosely-
structured in-depth interviews with key informants.  These included staff members at 
the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management; wildlife management officials at 
the municipal level; judges from the land consolidation court (Jordskifteretten); and 
hunters.  Interviews took place between the fall of 2007 and the spring of 2008.  Most 
of the information about how jaktvald are organized at the municipal level comes from 
a single case study in central Norway.   
 The moose hunting tradition is most strongly rooted in the northeastern valley, 
the Agder region of southern Norway, and the Trøndelag region of mid-Norway.  
These areas are where the adult men participate most in hunting—more than thirty 
percent—and where the culture of moose hunting is strongest.  This is where you find 
―moose towns,‖ where moose hunting dominates all aspects of life for at least the first 
two weeks of hunting season (Flø 2008).   
 For our case study we selected a municipality in Trøndelag that was the first 
one anywhere to restructure their jaktvald in the way described.  Because they were 
the first, and not simply copying someplace else, we hoped to more clearly discern the 
causes behind the restructuring.  Being the oldest, they have also had the longest 
amount of time for difficulties to surface and to reflect on how well their system 
works.  The management system in this municipality is widely regarded as successful 
and has served as a model for other municipalities.  Interviews in other locations and 
with state officials confirm that this case is typical in its organizational structure.  We 
therefore hope it will make a good point of departure for future research.   
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 The following pages are divided into two main sections.  In the first section we 
describe the landscape, laws, and practices that form the basis of moose hunting in 
Norway, followed by a description of how the modern jaktvald, or hunting 
management area, came into being and how it is organized.  In the second section we 
attempt to identify some important factors that undergird how the jaktvald works.  
This section is divided between institutional factors and cultural factors. 
  
 
THE CASE OF NORWEGIAN JAKTVALD
17
 
  
Norwegians will understand what we mean if we say that this paper deals with 
outfield management; but for others this term may require some explanation. The 
Norwegian farm is divided into two spheres of activity, the infield (innmark) and the 
outfield (utmark). The infield is the area closest to the house and farm buildings. It is 
intensively managed and receives the most investment. It is typically composed of 
fenced fields with planted crops. The outfield, on the other hand, is less intensively 
managed and receives less investment. It is usually composed of rough hill grazing or 
forest. To the urban gaze, the outfield may appear as scenic wilderness, but to the 
farmer it is very much a part of the farm. It contains important resources and its 
appearance is the result of centuries or millennia of human management.  
 The infield is a private sphere; but the outfield is less so, both in terms of 
ownership and activity.  Its exact legal status can vary. In some parts of Norway the 
outfield is owned collectively by local farms. In other places, the outfield is owned by 
the state but managed collectively by local farms who share use rights. In still other 
places, ownership of the outfield is divided amongst individual farms. Yet even where 
                                                 
17
 The word jaktvald, like moose, is both singular and plural. 
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ownership of the outfield is divided, it is common for farmers to cooperate in 
management, e.g. by letting their animals graze together. No matter who owns the 
outfield, recreational access (which includes hiking, for example, but not hunting) is 
unrestricted. In the area where our case study is located, the outfield is mostly forested 
and is divided amongst numerous private owners. 
  
 Hunting rights in Norway belong to the landowner, and may be leased but not 
sold (Viltloven 1981)—i.e., although the hunting rights may not be alienated from the 
property, landowners may sell hunting permits, and this is often an important source of 
income.  It has long been common for landowners to share hunting opportunities with 
local people who don‘t own land.  Large areas of state-owned and common land are 
also available to the general public to hunt for a fee.  Although hunting rights belong 
to the landowner, wildlife itself belongs to the state as a public trust.  Permits for 
shooting specific numbers and types of animals are allocated to landowners on an 
annual basis.   
 All hunters, including landowners, must pass a hunting proficiency test and for 
big game an annual shooting test, as well as pay an annual hunting license fee.  Each 
of these requirements must be met in order to hunt legally, but they do not confer the 
right to hunt on any piece of land—for this one must have a permit from the 
landowner.  Additionally, there are laws related to firearms and ammunition, the use 
of dogs, open and closed seasons, and other hunting-related matters.   
 There are four levels of governance in Norway that relate to hunting: the 
Ministry of the Environment; the Directorate for Nature Management; the County 
Governor‘s office, which is the representative of the state at the regional level; and the 
municipality.  Power is currently being shifted downward through these levels, as will 
be described a little further on. 
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 Moose hunting in Norway is a social activity.  While hunters of red deer on the 
steep slopes of the west Norwegian fjords, and reindeer hunters on the high mountain 
plateaus of southern Norway epitomize the idea of the lone hunter, moose hunting in 
the deep forests of central and southeastern Norway is done in groups, where 
cooperation is necessary for success.  There is a certain amount of regional variation in 
how the moose hunt is done, but typically hunters are organized into teams, called 
jaktlag, of five to fifteen hunters and at least one or two dogs.  Hunters take up posts 
in agreed upon locations and the moose are driven toward them with the aid of a dog.  
The Norwegian moose dog (elghund) is usually kept on a leash.  Once the dog picks 
up a moose‘s trail, the dog and handler drive the moose toward the shooters who are 
waiting at their designated posts.  Today, members of a hunt often use radios or 
mobile phones to communicate.  In the event that there are multiple moose in a drive, 
being able to communicate the age and sex of any that are shot lets the other hunters 
know how many are left in the quota.  The practice of hunting in teams is an old one. 
  
 The area in which one team hunts is called a jaktfelt.  The term jaktvald refers 
to a hunting management area.  It used to be the case that a jaktvald was the same area 
as one jaktfelt, or one team‘s hunting ground, which generally covered several 
adjacent properties belonging to team members.  Today, a jaktvald may encompass 
half a dozen jaktfelt, although the number of teams, each hunting in their own separate 
area, remains about the same.  The difference is that these teams must now cooperate 
in making a unified management plan for the larger area.   
 The old jaktvald were defined by the bearkrets—the area within which 
everyone would traditionally be invited to a wedding or other major social event.  This 
and other social considerations, rather than any biological criteria, defined the old 
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vald.  After the Second World War, landowner cooperation was formally 
institutionalized by a new act on hunting and game management (Jaktloven 1951).  
This act established a system of permits and defined how many hectares a jaktvald 
needed for each moose permit.  Since most properties were too small to be eligible for 
a moose permit, the new act had the effect of pushing landowners who were not 
already cooperating to form jaktvald.  Some jaktvald became larger as previously non-
participating farmers joined, and those that satisfied the minimum size were registered 
and could apply for permits.  The newly formalized jaktvald were still the same size as 
one team‘s hunting area.  During the past ten years, however, the state has been 
encouraging jaktvald to combine into larger units.  Figure 3.1 shows the size of an 
average jaktfelt in our study area compared to the size of the new jaktvald.  It may be 
seen that the new management areas contain, on average, the hunting grounds of four 
teams.  There are twelve such management areas within the municipality. 
   
 
Average private landowner's parcel size 
 200 hectare = 2 sq km = 494 acres 
 
Average jaktfelt (area used by one hunting team) 
 800 hectare = 8 sq km = 1,977 acres 
 
Average modern jaktvald (management area)   
 3200 hectare = 32 sq km = 7,907 acres 
 
Area per which a single moose permit is allocated   
 100 hectare = 1 sq km = 247 acres 
 
Private parcels in our study area are a bit larger than the average for Norway.  The 
municipal Forestry and Environment officer for this area says that every jaktfelt has to 
be between 5 and 10 km
2
 to be „effectively‟ hunted, depending on topographical 
conditions. 
     Figure 3.1  Average size of jaktfelt in study area compared to that of jaktvald. 
 
 86 
 Possibly as a result of new hunting legislation, the moose population began to 
rise after the Second World War (Rysstad and Gåsdal 1999), and interest in moose 
hunting also increased, both among land owners and the non-landowning rural 
population.  The value of the meat is significant, both culturally (Brottveit 1999) and 
as a part of people‘s diets (Aagedal 1999).  As landowners became more aware of 
moose as a valuable resource, they began to think more about moose management. 
 The need to manage moose at scales much larger than individual properties 
creates the need for cooperation between landowners and turns the moose population 
into a commons.  The practice of managing moose as a commons at the local level is 
an old one.  What is new, beginning in the late 1990‘s, is the effort to weld local 
commons into larger ones.  The Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management wants 
to encourage larger management areas and through their criteria for allocating permits 
is creating the incentives to make this happen.  As the scale of management increases, 
new forms of organization are required for sharing information and making decisions.  
What follows is the story of how these changes came about in one municipality.  The 
municipality in question was the first to reorganize their moose management in this 
way and has served as a model for other municipalities. 
 
 Back in 1984 the fylkesman (the office that represents the state at the county 
level) in our study area decided to establish a ―deer region‖—not necessarily as a 
management area, but as a geographical area of reference for discussion.  This was 
done in response to a perceived need for better communication about deer 
management across administrative boundaries within the county, i.e., between 
municipalities.  In 1992 the municipality in which our case study is located took the 
initiative to reorganize their jaktvald.  Working with the forest owners‘ association 
they organized a course on making forest management plans, which was directed at 
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private landowners.  This course put a great deal of emphasis on moose management 
and the idea that a forest is more than just trees.  Landowners were made aware of the 
importance of moose as a resource; and just after the course, some landowners took 
the initiative to merge their jaktvald for more effective management.  
  In 1990 there were 53 jaktvald in the municipality, about the same as the 
number of hunting teams.  Today there are 12 jaktvald, even though the number of 
teams hasn‘t changed.  Figure 3.2 illustrates how these hunting teams (jaktlag) are 
organized into larger jaktvald and how these relate to the municipality and to state-
level organizations.   
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Figure 3.2  Organizational structure for moose management in study area. 
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 It is common practice for each hunting team to elect an official leader, 
generally the person who leads the team in actual hunting activity.  This person is 
normally that team‘s representative to the jaktvald steering committee.  Every jaktvald 
is governed by a steering committee made up of one representative from each team 
within that vald.  In our case study, the representative is always a landowner, but this 
could be different elsewhere.  Each jaktvald steering committee has a chair who 
communicates with the municipality.  The municipality has a ―forestry and 
environment‖ officer whose job it is to communicate with the jaktvald steering 
committees.  In our particular case study, there are four municipalities that cooperate 
in a regional arrangement which manages much more than just hunting, e.g., farm 
regulations, forestry, wildlife, and other land use related issues.  Under this 
arrangement, the forestry and environment officer has responsibilities spanning all 
four municipalities.  This cooperation in governance is pursued because low 
population levels in these municipalities make it more cost-effective.  On the steering 
committee for this cooperative arrangement are two representatives from each 
municipality‘s governing board. 
 In addition to encouraging larger jaktvald, the Directorate for Nature 
Management is also encouraging longer-term planning.  Both of these things reduce 
the administrative burden.  In exchange for their willingness to cooperate in the 
formation of larger jaktvald and the making of multi-year plans, hunters receive a 
larger number of permits and greater decision making powers.  Long-term planning 
allows them greater flexibility in their management from year to year, and the process 
gives them considerable leeway to shape herd characteristics according to their 
preferences. 
 Even though the actual hunting still takes place in small groups and within 
each team‘s hunting area, now the teams cooperate in their management planning and 
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application for permits at the expanded jaktvald level.  Each jaktvald makes their own 
management plan and submits it to the municipality.  The municipality approves the 
plan in accordance with general criteria set by the Directorate for Nature Management 
and issues permits to the jaktvald for the number of bulls, cows and calves specified in 
the plan.  The jaktvald then distributes these permits amongst its several teams, and 
each team hunts within their own area (jaktfelt).  Toward the end of the season there 
may be some trading of permits between jaktfelt within the same vald.  This ability to 
redistribute quotas spatially in accordance with how the animals are actually 
distributed in the landscape is part of the increased flexibility that hunters appreciate.   
 Hunters in Norway play a very active role as managers.  Every hunting team 
gathers and reports information on the size, weight, age, sex, and locality of each 
moose that is shot, as well as reporting any ―seen moose.‖    The leader of the hunting 
team submits this information to the municipality.  Habitat conditions, browsing 
damage to the forest, and other data are also reported by the landowner.  The 
municipality enters all this information into a database, which is accessed by the 
Norwegian Institute for Nature Research.  The research done by the Institute informs 
the Directorate for Nature Management as they formulate the guidelines by which the 
municipalities approve jaktvald management plans.  Each jaktvald writes a statement 
at the end of the hunting season regarding the health of the moose herd and suggesting 
any changes they think should be made to the 3-year management plan.  Thus there is 
a two-way flow of information.  The hunters gather the data that is needed to do the 
science that informs their own management planning.   
 Higher-level government agencies meanwhile have shifted to serving as a 
resource that facilitates local and inter-local management.  The need for jaktvald to 
have their management plans approved in order to get permits gives the state and the 
municipality a certain amount of control.  The intention behind this control at the 
 90 
national level is to set the basic parameters of good stewardship that protect wildlife as 
a public trust.  At the municipal level the intention is to encourage cooperation for 
effective management.  Most of the decision-making and management activity is still 
left to the hunters.  In this way, benefits from the resource (and thus the incentive to 
manage it responsibly) remain in the hands of local user groups whose activities have 
the greatest effect on the resource; while at the same time, the nested institutional 
structure provided by state and local government facilitates the cooperation of local 
user groups at large spatial scales in order to achieve more effective management.   
  
 
UNDERSTANDING THE JAKTVALD: UNDERLYING FACTORS 
  
A central tenet of community-based natural resource management is that 
cooperation depends on close social ties and shared values.  These community 
attributes and their importance in this context are often captured by the term ‗social 
capital‘ (Pretty and Ward 2001; Pretty 2003).  Agrawal and Gibson dismiss the 
importance of community in this respect, directing us instead to focus on institutional 
design.  Most communities of resource users, they claim, are better characterized by 
multiple and conflicting interests than by shared norms and values; and for this reason 
their success depends on the formal rule structures governing resource use (Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999).  The most valuable point raised in this regard is that shared norms 
and values, even where they do exist, do not by themselves ensure cooperation.  From 
Olsen (1965) to Ostrom (1990), this recognition of the problems facing collective 
action justifiably directs our attention to how incentives are structured as we seek to 
understand the choices facing individual actors.  But this does not mean that we should 
dismiss the importance of community.  There are more incentives in life than those 
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defined by formal rules; and it is a weak definition of moral community that places the 
focus merely on shared norms and values rather than on the social relations that steer 
people toward compliance with shared norms and values.  Cooperative behavior might 
be expected to increase when the activity in question is embedded in dense networks 
of social engagement that foster trust and reciprocity (Axelrod 1984; Putnam 1993); 
that bring informal social rewards and sanctions into effect; and in which meanings 
and identities are created that shift the nature of certain actions from rational 
instrumentality to being ends in themselves.  To the extent that identical institutional 
arrangements may vary in their performance from place to place, our understanding of 
institutional success must take more than just formal rule structures into account.  The 
following analysis is therefore divided into two parts: first, a discussion of formal 
institutional factors; and second, an attempt to identify some of the cultural factors that 
support how the jaktvald works.   
 
Institutional factors 
 Before commenting specifically on the institutional structure of jaktvald, it is 
worth taking a brief look at the national political context in which recent changes to 
wildlife management have taken place.   As part of a general trend in Norway to 
strengthen local responsibility and authority for managing natural resources, the state 
has devolved much of the responsibility for nature management and conservation to 
local government with the aim of generating increased local involvement (Falleth & 
Hovik 2009).  Part of the motive for this seems to be the great success welfare policy 
has had decentralizing social service delivery.  In the late 1990s, the Directorate for 
Nature Management began promoting more local involvement in game management, 
and in 2002 produced new regulations for the management of moose, deer, and beaver 
(Direktoratet for Naturforvaltning 2002).  These provide guidelines for organizing 
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sufficiently large management areas and for cooperation between landowners and the 
different hunting teams in making management plans and organizing the hunt.  
 It was not only the Directorate for Nature Management that wanted to 
reorganize outfield management, but also the agricultural ministry and the farmers and 
forest owners. The decline of small-scale agriculture has led to calls for 
diversification, including agritourism.  Consequently, the idea of utilizing the fish and 
game resources in the outfield as a source of income for landowners has come 
increasingly to the fore.  In order for this to happen it seemed clear that something had 
to be done with how landowners organized themselves (St.meld. nr.19 1999-2000: 119). 
Together, the agricultural ministry, the farmers union (Bondelaget) and the forest 
owners union (skogeigerlaget) started several projects to address how the management 
of outfield resources is organized, and this included thinking about the commercial 
development of game resources. In just a few years, hundreds of new jaktvald were 
established and many of the old ones reorganized to fit the new regime. 
 It has been stressed that nested management systems need to be based on a 
principle of subsidiarity (McKean 2000; Marshall 2008).  This means that decision-
making power should be decentralized to the lowest possible level, and that resource 
users at this level should have enough right to benefit from the resource that there is 
sufficient incentive for them to undertake responsible management.  At least in the 
case of our study community, Norwegian jaktvald meet these criteria.  The 
institutional relationships illustrated by Figure 2 and described in the section above 
may aptly be described as a nested management structure characterized by 
subsidiarity.   
 Yet there is another institutional factor not mentioned in the chart.  At the heart 
of the Norwegian system is a division of property rights that sets up a balance of 
interests between landowners and the state, compelling them to work with each other.  
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As we have mentioned, landowners are the sole holders of hunting rights; but the 
exercise of these rights is dependent on permits issued by the municipality according 
to guidelines determined by the state, which holds wildlife in public trust.  This 
division of property rights creates a legal basis for both the private and the public 
interest to be expressed regarding wildlife. 
 When asked why landowners should have any role in game management, 
wildlife professionals in Norway uniformly replied that landowners are the only ones 
who can manage wildlife, and for that reason they ought to be the ones that do.   Wild 
animals graze and shelter on the landowner‘s property.  All of the land use decisions 
that the owner makes have an effect on the herd, whether intended or not.  It is 
therefore important that landowners make these decisions with responsible purpose.  
Norwegian wildlife officials expressed perplexity as to how the state can manage 
wildlife on private land in a place like the northeastern United States where 
landowners control both habitat and hunting access but don‘t have any incentive to 
provide either.   
 The incentive for Norwegian landowners to manage wildlife responsibly stems 
from the mix of property rights mentioned above.  Because hunting rights are tied to 
landownership and include the right to profit from the sale of hunting permits, 
landowners have a strong incentive to manage wildlife as a resource.  Yet because 
landowners need to apply on an annual or semi-annual basis for permits in order to 
exercise these rights, the state and municipality are in a position to influence 
management.  This is done chiefly with the aim of getting landowners to work 
together at larger spatial scales and to manage within the bounds of sustainability.  The 
state in this instance is not taking away local benefits or control, but rather providing 
needed information and a structure, including incentives, for local groups to cooperate 
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for their mutual benefit on a scale at which problems of collective action might 
otherwise be insurmountable.   
 
Cultural factors 
 Moose management is embedded in dense networks of social interaction that 
affect the choices people make.  Moose hunting teams are comprised primarily of 
local residents and often include non-landowners.  Non-local team members generally 
have some connection to the community, such as having grown up there or being 
related to one of the landowners.  Current attempts to commercialize moose hunting 
sometimes come into conflict with tradition and can stress the relationships between 
hunters, especially between landowners and non-landowners (Hompland 1999; 
Gunnarsdotter 2005; Flø 2008).  These relationships are revealed in May Britt 
Hovland‘s discussion of how tradition can stand in the way of commercialization.  
Hunting, she claims, ―has a social basis in local communities.  The implicit social 
contract often receives higher priority than the economic value of selling hunting 
rights‖ (Hovland 2002:1).  A large percentage of men in moose hunting areas are 
hunters (SSB 2009), and participation in the hunt can be an essential part of masculine 
identity formation and connection to place (Bye 2003, 2009).  In particular 
communities, more than 80 per cent of men may participate (Aagedal 1999; Flø 2008).  
Even amongst non-hunters, the hunt is widely regarded as a special occasion and is the 
topic of excited conversation for months beforehand.  The way the meat is distributed 
varies from team to team, but it commonly follows a pattern of social ties extending 
beyond the circle of hunters and landowners (Brottveit 1999; Aagedal 1999).   
 Social relations at the level of the team play an important role in governing 
hunters‘ behavior.  There is a strong tradition of hierarchical organization in the team, 
at least in our case study area.  When hunting, the leader decides where to hunt, which 
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animals will be shot that day, who will take what posts, when to stop, et cetera.  Prior 
to the hunt these things are discussed by the group, but once the hunt is in progress the 
leader says what to do.  The leader‘s ability to lead effectively depends heavily on his 
social standing.  Typically the leader is one of the most respected and experienced 
hunters on the team.  Skills and knowledge however are not the only important 
elements in the jaktlag hierarchy.  Landownership is also an important factor.  Some 
jaktlag have rules requiring that the leader be a landowner.  Another important 
element is ownership of a dog.  A well trained dog is an essential part of the successful 
hunt, and having one can do much to strengthen a hunter‘s position in the hierarchy.  
Yet none of these things are as important as interpersonal skills and leadership ability.  
As one hunter put it, ―He can be as skilled a dog handler as he wants, and he can own 
as much land as any, but in the end everything boils down to his ability to gain trust 
and handle small conflicts and make decisions.‖   
 Beginning around 1990 there seems to have been an increase in consciousness 
amongst the hunting teams regarding ethical hunting behavior.  Respondents were not 
sure what the reasons for this are, but several hunters and administrators mentioned it, 
and a closer examination of this change would be a worthy topic for further 
investigation.  The following story illustrates how social sanctioning enforces this 
burgeoning ethic and also highlights the important role played by the team leader.  A 
hunter told about something that happened to him several years previously. He had 
been posted along the edge of an open boggy area when he saw a moose almost 200 
meters away.  This was a very long shot, but he was confident in his marksmanship 
and took it.  Luckily, he hit his mark; but during the evening supper at the cabin the 
team leader made a speech in which he made it clear that he and the rest of the team 
thought the shot was too long.  ―I was extremely disappointed,‖ the hunter recalled.  ―I 
was waiting to be praised, and instead they told me that I had jeopardized their day by 
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taking too high a risk.‖  By sanctioning the hunter, the team leader also gave a 
warning to other potential long-shooters that the jaktlag would not accept such 
behavior.  Sticking to the quota, only taking animals of the right age and sex, also 
seems to have become an important virtue, the exercise of which requires a great deal 
of self-control.  According to one hunter, ―It is the shot you hold back that makes you 
a man, not the shot you fire.‖ 
 As much as social relations at the team-level exert an important influence on 
individual hunter behavior, good working relationships between hunters, 
administrators, and researchers seem to be an important part of scaling management 
up to regional levels of integration.  The simple organizational structure depicted in 
Figure 3.2 could not function without high levels of trust between individuals at 
different levels.  Hunters, for example, need to be trusted to report accurate 
information; and to do this they need to trust that the researchers are doing important 
work and acting in their interests.   
 When we asked the municipal forestry and environment officer in our study 
area what percentage of missed shots and wounded animals he thought actually got 
reported (as is required), he replied, ―one hundred percent.‖  Pressed upon this point, 
he said that he was sure he could trust the hunters in his jurisdiction completely.  One 
of these hunters, a jaktvald leader, said of this same administrator, ―He is easy to like, 
and always willing to listen to our views.‖  This hunter was also pleased by his 
interactions with NINA researchers.  ―They are good about sharing their knowledge 
with us, and they listen to us when we don‘t agree with them.‖  Several interviewees 
commented on how good the NINA researchers are about getting out and interacting 
with hunters.  For the jaktvald leader quoted above, government research is nothing 
remote from his own interests: ―We have always wanted to be involved and to take 
part in it.  …For the farmers, the knowledge that the researchers at NINA have is just 
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as important as the knowledge that the people at Ås [the agricultural university] have.  
The game resources are a part of the farm just as much as the cows are.  And today it 
seems like these resources are becoming even more important.‖   
 For Norwegian farmers, cooperation in outfield management is nothing new.  
For centuries they have managed grazing areas collectively.  In some cases these areas 
are actual commons, but in many cases they are areas of adjacent private property that 
farmers manage as if they were commons.  It seems likely that experience with these 
management traditions contributes to the ease with which private landowners in 
Norway have taken to cooperating around moose management.  These cooperative 
traditions, and the embedding of management structures in personal relationships that 
foster trust, seem to play an important role in facilitating how the modern jaktvald 
works. 
   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The main point of this paper is that it is possible to reconcile local control with 
the need for management at scales encompassing multiple localities.  As the example 
of Norwegian jaktvald illustrates, these two seemingly contradictory imperatives may 
be resolved through a nested management structure, which is facilitated by certain 
institutional and cultural factors. 
 Because game is a mobile resource, landowners readily perceive the need to 
cooperate with their neighbors in management.  There is a long tradition in Norway of 
managing outfields collectively.  Hunting is just one of many activities around which 
landowners cooperate.  Others include grazing, irrigation, forestry and fencing.  
Cooperation at the level of the lag/felt would happen without the state—and did in 
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fact—as a natural result of landowners, many of whom already manage common 
resources, seeking to manage yet another resource in common.  The value of the 
state‘s role emerges in the attempt to put together larger-scale management areas.  
Various authors have claimed that this may be done without compromising local 
control, by ―nesting‖ or ―layering‖ local institutions in larger structures, provided that 
a principle of subsidiarity devolves benefits and control to the lowest possible level.  
Our study supports these claims and discusses some of the structural and cultural 
factors that contribute to the success of this model.   
 The inter-local cooperation required to scale management up to greater 
geographic spaces is the product of a division of property rights that leaves local 
hunters with sufficient interest and control to take responsibility for carrying out 
management activities, while at the same time compelling them to work together in 
their management planning.  They are compelled to do this by their need to get 
permits from the municipality based on the submission of their joint plan.  Personal 
relationships play an important role both in governing individual hunter behavior at 
the local level and in generating the trust necessary for cooperation between levels of 
management.   
 The organizational structure that we have described is fairly standard for 
Norwegian jaktvald, at least as far as moose hunting goes, but to really understand 
how cultural and other factors affect management success it would be beneficial to do 
a multiple case study comparison of jaktvald throughout Norway.  It may be that some 
jaktvald work better than others; and whether this is due to differences in local culture, 
demographic factors, slight institutional variation, or other variables remains to be 
seen.  
 Something that has been mentioned only briefly in this paper is the 
commercialization of moose hunting.  As noted earlier, part of the motivation for 
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reorganizing outfield management is to facilitate the commercialization of hunting so 
that game resources can provide an additional stream of income to farmers and 
woodland owners.  As was also noted, commercialization has the potential to create 
tensions within the jaktvald—especially between landowners, who benefit, and non-
landowners, who may lose hunting opportunities or be obliged to pay.  So far, the 
commercialization of moose hunting has been minimal; but since social relationships 
appear to be of central importance to how jaktvald function in practice, the potential 
disruption of these relationships by markets for the hunting experience is something to 
keep an eye on.   
 Questions of land use involve a balancing of private rights and the public 
interest.  The field of community-based natural resource management continues to 
expand as professionals recognize the need for local resource users to take greater 
responsibility in management and to enjoy greater benefits.  As we also become 
increasingly aware of the need to manage natural resources at larger scales, there will 
be a growing tension between calls for devolution and the need to scale up 
management.  The case of the Norwegian jaktvald makes it clear that it is possible to 
resolve this tension by nesting local management groups in larger structures that 
facilitate inter-local cooperation.  Future research should aim to improve our 
understanding of factors affecting how well such nested structures work. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Why Community Ownership? 
Understanding Land Reform in Scotland 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In 1999, the Scottish Parliament convened for the first time in almost 300 
years, and during their first session passed the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003.  The 
most striking feature of this Act is the community-right-to-buy provision.  In response 
to long-standing popular discontent regarding highly concentrated land ownership in 
the highlands and islands, this Act enables communities to buy out the large estates 
where they are located.  Transfers of this sort have also been happening prior to 2003 
and outside the provisions of this Act, enabled by both private fundraising and the 
Scottish Land Fund. 
 A central feature of Scotland‘s land reform is the transfer of land into 
community ownership.  This is remarkable in light of the fact that so much of the 
international development literature and policy related to land reform emphasize the 
importance of diffuse private ownership and the need for landowners to hold fairly 
complete bundles of property rights.  Therefore it behoves us to take a close look at 
the Scottish land reform and to ask, ‗why community ownership?‘ 
 That question is answered in this paper based on interviews with members of 
nine communities where land has been transferred into community ownership.  These 
interviews are supplemented by interviews with staff members of the government 
agency responsible for helping communities to buy land.  Interviewees were asked, 
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among other things, what their community‘s goals are and how community ownership 
is expected to help them fulfill these goals.   
 Land reform in Scotland is neither concerned with agricultural efficiency nor 
does it touch greatly upon either the division of the soil or the tenure security of small 
holders.  It is best understood as an expansion of rural democracy—enabled by the 
transfer of large estates, where people live as tenants, from concentrated private 
ownership to community ownership.  Community ownership is intended not only to 
encourage the development of resources that private investors might otherwise ignore; 
but, more importantly, to make sure that development happens in a way that benefits 
the local community.  Whereas increased private entrepreneurship might generate 
increased wealth but not necessarily benefit the local community; community 
ownership aims to make sure that wealth generated from the land remains within the 
community; that the benefits of development are evenly spread; that needed services 
are provided; that the population is maintained; and that resources are managed for the 
long-term benefit of the community.   
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INTRODUCTION: Land Reform and Rural Development 
 
“In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being 
the question upon which all revolutions turn” (Aristotle, The Politics: 1266a37-
1266b3). 
 
 Since Aristotle penned these words in the 4
th
 century BC, thinkers of all 
political stripes have continued to regard property relations as central to the civic and 
economic character of society.  Consequently, as Aristotle suggests, attempts to 
generate change often focus on the distribution of property rights.  The term ―land 
reform‖ is used to refer to any sweeping change in the distribution of rights regarding 
land.  Usually land reform means the breaking up of large estates and the distribution 
of land to peasant farmers, either by giving them each their own private parcel or 
through the creation of collectives to capture economies of scale.  The reason for land 
reform is ostensibly to improve the lives of peasants by throwing off the yoke of 
landlord oppression and by stimulating economic development through more intensive 
land use.   
 Although there is a growing appreciation for the value of traditional tenure 
systems and community-based land distribution, the dominant philosophy of land 
reform in academic and policy circles has long been one that advocates the creation of 
widely held private ownership (Deininger and Binswanger 1999).  The early American 
political tradition considered diffuse private ownership of land fundamental to a 
healthy democracy (Goldschmidt 1978; Schwarz 1997; see also Aristotle The Politics 
1266b15, 1296a14-1296a18).  Today it is chiefly advocated as an economic 
development strategy.  Large landlords often underutilize their property, either by 
using it extensively (as opposed to intensively), e.g. for grazing, or by disregarding it 
altogether.  Small farms, on the other hand, are regarded as efficient producers 
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(Binswanger et al. 1995; Prosterman and Hanstad 2003) and a source of rural 
employment.   
 Reforms do not always involve land changing hands.  In some cases it may be 
a matter of altering or simply clarifying the rights of those already using the land.  
Improved security of tenure is supposed to encourage farmers toward long-term 
investment, and clear title is expected to gain them greater access to credit.  The 
combination of clear title and alienability is intended to facilitate efficiency-enhancing 
transfers (Deininger and Binswanger 1999; The World Bank Group 2001).  Simply 
put, when the rewards and costs of land use decisions are brought home to the 
decision-making owners, and when ownership may be freely traded, it is expected that 
resources will gravitate to the most efficient users, resulting in greater wealth creation 
overall (Anderson and McChesney 2003; O‘Driscoll Jr. and Hoskins 2003).  This 
market-based philosophy of land reform places great emphasis on the importance of 
property rights that are not only clear and secure, but also private and represent a 
sphere of unfettered control.  It is argued that individuals should hold complete 
bundles of property rights because complete control allows for greater entrepreneurial 
activity; and that people who hold ―thin bundles‖ are less likely to invest in property 
or to take good care of it (Boudreaux 2005).   
 There is far from complete agreement however that the foregoing model of 
private property rights is the best one.  It is not always efficient for property rights 
bundles to be kept whole.  The multiplicity of interests in land are often better served 
by markets for ―partial interests,‖ such as timber and grazing rights, or the sale of 
development rights for conservation (Wiebe and Meinzen-Dick 1998).  In places 
where highly fragmented use rights to the same piece of land already exist, it may be 
better to devise a system for documenting these than to try to gather them all into one 
ownership bundle (Pienaar 1999).  Common property regimes have been well-
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defended in the development literature (Bromley and Cernea 1989; Runge 1986) and 
market-based land reform has been attacked for failing to lead to increased investment 
(Thiesenhusen 2001); for failing to provide farmers with secure tenure (Binswanger et 
al. 1995) or access to markets for land (Ghimire 1999); and for being generally unable 
to improve the lives of small farmers in the absence of technical assistance, access to 
markets, affordable credit, public infrastructure and social services (Ghimire 1999; 
Lappé et al. 1998; Pontifical Council 1998).   
 In light of these debates, the community land movement in Scotland should be 
of special interest.  On the surface, the reasons for land reform seem typical enough: 
highly concentrated ownership of rural land, a history of injustice at the hands of 
landlords, and an acute need for economic development.  But when one considers the 
tenure security already afforded to crofters by reform legislation in 1886 and 
subsequent amendments, and when one inquires into the specific aspirations of 
communities that have acquired land, the Scottish land reform reveals itself as having 
relatively little to do with agriculture.  ―Land to the tiller‖ is hardly an apt description 
of tenure changes in Scotland today.  Contemporary reforms in Scotland involve not 
only farmers, but entire communities.  And the most conspicuous aspect of these 
reforms is the transfer of land to community ownership, such that the community 
organization becomes the landlord.  The relationship that farmers and shop keepers 
used to have to the laird is now the relationship that they have to the community 
organization.  The significant difference, in principle, is that the landlord is now a 
democratic organization of which they are members.  Because this stands in such stark 
contrast to the emphasis that so much of the land reform literature places on the 
importance of private property, we are led to ask of Scottish land reformers, ―why 
community ownership?‖ 
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BACKGROUND: A short history of rural tenure in Scotland including the recent land 
reform and the academic discussion surrounding it. 
 
Historical background 
 In order to understand the land reform movement in Scotland today, one needs 
to know the origins of crofting tenure and how land ownership in the highlands and 
islands came to be so concentrated.  The key points in this story are the demise of the 
clan system; the rise of sheep farming; the highland clearances; the decline of sheep 
farming; the rise of sporting estates; and the legislation and continuing unrest that 
followed the Napier Commission.  Knowing this story is important, not because the 
land reform movement is backward-looking—which it isn‘t—but because the forces 
that have shaped rural Scotland‘s history are still in motion today, and it is to these 
forces that land reformers must respond.   
 The Scottish clan was, in principle, a large extended family of which the chief 
was patriarch.  The chief allocated land to his inferior family members in exchange for 
their loyalty and for rent which might be paid in kind.  These tacksmen, as they were 
called, in turn sublet most of this land to lower ranking clansmen, likewise in 
exchange for service and rent.  This system was never designed to provide the chief 
with very much money, since agricultural production was oriented more toward 
subsistence than toward markets.  Tenure arrangements under the clan system formed 
the basis for military organization, not for business.  The land occupied by the clan 
was not seen as the chief‘s private property, but rather as the common heritage of all 
clan members; and his power was that of a sovereign rather than that of a landlord.  
The chief was responsible for the welfare of his ―children,‖ the clan members, and the 
honor that he and his tacksmen enjoyed was based on this responsibility.   
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 By the early 18
th
 century clan society was changing.  Often the sons of chiefs 
were educated in Edinburgh and England; they married lowland or English women 
who were accustomed to fine dresses and drawing rooms; and when these sons 
became chiefs they wanted houses in the city and all the fine things that the people 
they associated with had.  Compared to the English gentry, and even to the rising 
merchant and professional class, they seemed very poor indeed.  Many clan chiefs 
became absentee landlords and began to see their clansmen as tenants.  They looked to 
their lands as a source of income, which they were eager to increase.  The clan system 
was finally eliminated in 1746 after the Jacobite rebellion met defeat on Culloden 
Moor.  In the year following the battle, the British government passed a series of 
parliamentary Acts designed to crush highland culture.  The wearing of kilts and 
tartans became illegal, and the military basis for clan society was eliminated as clan 
chiefs were stripped of all their powers except the right to collect rent.  Thus it was 
under the force of both cultural and legal change that the relationship between chiefs 
and clansmen shifted from one of familial responsibility to a landlord-tenant 
relationship.  A late 18
th
 century traveler to the highlands observed that the landlords, 
―to support their dignity squeeze everything out of [their tenants] they can possibly 
get, leaving them only a bare subsistence.  Until this evil is obviated,‖ the traveler 
declared, ―Scotland can never improve‖ (Prebble 1963: 18). 
 Because the collection of rents does not require the intermediate ranks on 
which military organization depends, the role of the tacksman became obsolete.  
Leases for tacks that had long been considered hereditary were put up for competitive 
bidding and many tacksmen left for North America, often taking their people with 
them.  The desire of landowners to maximize income from their land led to the 
employment of professional estate managers.  The price of wool was very high, but in 
order for sheep farming to be profitable, it needed to be done on a large scale.  
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Southern sheep farmers were eager to rent land in the highlands and it was soon 
realized that a great deal more rent could be collected with less trouble from a small 
number of sheep ranches than from thousands of subsistence farming tenants.  Valleys 
that once held several townships and numerous small farms would come to be 
occupied by a pair of shepherds, their dogs, and thousands of sheep.  The landlord‘s 
need to get rid of the highland people led to what has come to be known as the 
Clearances.   
 The early clearances did not involve the forced emigration that later became 
emblematic of this period.  On the contrary, landlords were at first eager to prevent 
emigration and succeeded in getting Parliament to pass an Act to this purpose (Hunter 
2000).  At the same time that the price of wool was rising, the price of kelp was too; 
and the kelp industry in the Hebrides and on the northwest coast needed a large labor 
force.  Proprietors wanted the people whom they evicted from the fertile inland valleys 
to settle along the coast and to take up work harvesting seaweed or in the nascent 
fishing industry.  Small plots of land were allocated along the rocky shore, each of 
which was deliberately too small to provide a family with subsistence.  This, in 
combination with high rents, was intended to force people to work in the new 
industries (Bangor-Jones 2001).  This allocation of land created the holdings that make 
up today‘s crofting communities.   
 When the price of kelp fell in the second decade of the 19
th
 century, forced 
emigration began.  Transport ships were sent to coastal communities, and in some 
cases men and women who tried to hide or flee were hunted down and taken aboard in 
chains (Prebble 1963).  Eye-witness accounts of evictions during the clearances testify 
to their brutality, with the recurrent image being that of the factor and his men turning 
families and elderly people out of their houses, often in harsh weather, and then setting 
the thatched roofs on fire (MacKenzie 1883).  While these events seem to have 
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proceeded for the most part without resistance, there were several instances when 
crowds of women tried to block the distribution of eviction notices.  On one of these 
occasions they were horrifically beaten with clubs by the police (Prebble 1963).  In the 
end, the glens were emptied and the highlanders found new homes in the forests of 
Canada; the hills of Appalachia; the deserts of Australia; the slums of Glasgow; and, 
for those who remained, along the rocky coastline in what are the crofting 
communities of today. 
 Many clan chiefs sold their land, either to other gentry or to wealthy 
businessmen.  Some of these lands changed hands rather quickly.  The  Isle of Barra, 
which had been home to the MacNeils for forty generations, was sold twice in one 
year—first to a speculator, and then to Colonel Gordon of Cluny who forcibly 
expelled most of the population (Prebble 1963).  In the 1880s wool prices dropped 
precipitously and sheep farmers were no longer willing to pay high rents.  Fortunately 
for landowners at this time, the shooting of grouse and deer was becoming extremely 
popular sport among the upper classes.  Highland estates were let, sold, and 
increasingly managed specifically for these activities.  By 1893 sporting rents 
contributed, on average, 44% of the rental income on highland estates (Jarvie and 
Jackson 1998).  The highlands were becoming less a site of agricultural production 
and more an upper-class recreational area where the imagery of clan society added 
romantic flavor to a landscape viewed as scenic wilderness.  The lives of most people 
living in the highlands and islands however continued to be ones of poverty and 
hardship, and toward the end of the 19
th
 century there were increasing incidences of 
rural unrest.   
 In response to crofter agitation and growing public awareness of persistent 
poverty in the region, the Napier Commission was appointed 1883 to conduct a public 
inquiry into the conditions of crofters and cottars in the highlands and islands.  
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Hearings were held in many locations and people were finally able to make their 
voices heard.  The testimony of one Angus Mackay speaks for the views of many: 
The land our forefathers lived upon…is now under deer and sheep…while we are 
huddled together in small townships on the seashore…  We want more land, security 
against eviction, compensation for improvements, and fair rent (Willis 2001: 97). 
Each of these demands except the first was satisfied.  The Crofters Act, passed in 
1886, guaranteed crofters a fair rent, ownership of the improvements on their crofts, 
and protection from eviction.  An amendment to the Act in 1891 formalized crofters‘ 
rights to common grazing land.  Thus modern crofting tenure is a result, first, of 
settlement patterns created by the clearances and, second, of subsequent legislation 
for the protection of crofters.   
 What the Crofters Act did not do was to address the need for more land to be 
made available.  In the decades to come, land shortage was the primary grievance 
driving widespread unrest in the highlands and islands.  Cottars, who had no formal 
access to land, were especially unsatisfied by the Crofters Act.  Land-raiding, rent 
strikes, and clashes with police occurred throughout the Hebrides.  In some cases, 
crofters and cottars occupied land from which their parents or grandparents had been 
evicted (Hunter 2000; Willis 2001).  Although troops were dispatched to keep the 
peace, public opinion was on the side of the crofters and the government was now 
more interested in helping than in suppressing the crofting population.  In the 1890s 
the government began investing money to promote economic development and to 
make more land available, but progress was slow.  Unrest continued through the 1920s 
as men returning from WWI demanded the land to which they had been given reason 
to believe their service would entitle them (Leneman 1989); and a steadily declining 
fishing industry and falling stock prices continued to exacerbate the plight of cottars 
and crofters alike.   
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 Although more than 2,000 new crofts were created during the first half of the 
20
th
 century (Hunter 2000), most land in Scotland to this day remains concentrated in 
large estates.  Going by figures collected in 1996, it has been calculated that 57% of 
all private land in Scotland is owned by one hundredth of one percent of the 
population (Bryden 1996).  Half of the privately owned rural land is divided amongst 
343 individuals in parcels of 7,500 acres and larger; and one quarter is owned by 66 
landowners in estates of 30,700 acres and larger (Wightman 1999, 2009).  The 
association of this highly concentrated pattern of land ownership with a lack of rural 
development (e.g. Bryden 1999) has been the source of persistent calls for land 
reform. 
 As early as the end of WWI, the redistribution and resettlement of land where 
Clearances had taken place ―was almost universally admitted to be the only real 
solution to Highland problems;‖ and in 1917 the British government declared, 
―Everyone is agreed that the people of the Highlands must be placed in possession of 
the soil‖ (Hunter 2000: 255,265).  And yet it was not until the late 1990s, with the 
prospect of political devolution and Scotland again having her own parliament, that 
sweeping changes in land ownership seemed possible.  In 1997 a Land Reform Policy 
Group was established to examine land ownership in Scotland; to assess possibilities 
for land reform; and to make recommendations for action on this issue to the new 
Scottish Parliament, which in 1999 convened for the first time in almost 300 years.  
During its first session the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 was passed.  The most 
remarkable feature of this act is the Community Right to Buy, which allows 
communities of fewer than 10,000 persons to register an interest in land and thereby to 
have a preemptive right to buy that land should it come up for sale.  Crofting 
communities may force a sale without waiting for the land to come onto the market 
(for details see OPSI 2003).  In order to register an interest in land, communities have 
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to meet a number of requirements, including the formation of a community 
organization that is a company limited by guarantee
18
 with a board of directors elected 
by the members.  In communities taking advantage of the act, all residents have the 
right to be members.  Several interviewees and correspondents emphasized to me that 
the community land movement does not center entirely on this legislation.  A number 
of community buyouts occurred prior to 2003 and others outside the provisions of the 
land reform act.
19
  
 
Academic discussion in the lead-up to land reform 
 ―The vision for land reform,‖ as expressed by the Land Reform Policy Group 
in their recommendations for action to the Scottish Parliament, ―is to remove the land-
based barriers to the sustainable development of rural communities‖ (LRPG 1999).  
While this statement has been criticized for being vague (Wightman 1999) it does at 
least make clear that the goal of land reform is rural development, and that current 
patterns of land ownership are viewed as an obstacle to this goal.  Yet even if there is a 
general consensus on the need for development and on the centrality of land to this 
process, it remains an open question what form this development should take and what 
sort of property relations are best suited to bringing it about.   
 The need for land reform is frequently framed in economic terms, sometimes 
with minimal reference to social justice.  Macmillan (2000), for example, claims that 
                                                 
18
 A company limited by guarantee is a form of corporation in the UK that does not have shareholders.  
Instead, it has members, who are protected by limited liability.  A company limited by guarantee does 
not distribute profits, but rather must put any surplus toward its mission, which will be defined in its 
articles of incorporation.  This is a very typical form of incorporation for not-for-profit organizations in 
the UK.   
19
 In all cases, financial and technical assistance for communities who wish to acquire land is available 
from the community land unit of Highlands and Islands Enterprise, the government‘s economic 
development agency for the region.  Funding to assist with community buyouts originally came from 
the Scottish Land Fund, a division of the national lottery; but the availability of future funding is in 
doubt (heraldscotland 2009).  Community efforts to buy land have at all times had to rely heavily on 
private fundraising efforts. 
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government interference in property relations is justified when market failures occur; 
and he lays out a case for land reform in Scotland based on the need to correct market 
failure.  Large landowners have been criticized for a lack of concern with economic 
development, either failing to grasp or actively suppressing development 
opportunities.  Tenants are often either prevented from taking initiative, or else lose 
their incentive due to the landlord‘s ability to capture their gains (Bryden 1996).   The 
first consultation paper of the Land Reform Policy Group reported that the current 
system of land ownership in Scotland inhibited enterprise (LRPG 1998). 
 Bryden puts an interesting twist on this point, and one that bears closely upon 
the question of why community ownership.  ―We have paid too much attention to the 
growth of individual enterprises,‖ he says, ―and too little to the development of the 
public goods on which the development of enterprises and communities both depend‖ 
(1996).  These public goods might be tangible facilities and services, or they might be 
intangible social relationships.  Following Putnam (1993), Bryden suggests that the 
clientelist social relations stemming from concentrated landownership undermine the 
social capital necessary for community development.  Bryden and Geisler claim that 
the land reform movement in Scotland responds to this by placing community front 
and center, making community-building and the generation of social capital a primary 
goal (2007).   
 Land reform in Scotland might be as much about democracy as economics.  
―The issue today,‖ says Dewar, ―is still power: power to control the lives of others‖ 
(1998).   MacGregor also frames the development case for land reform more in terms 
of democracy in rural planning than in terms of economics per se. 
The impact of the land tenure system goes far beyond land use. It influences the size 
and distribution of an area's population; the labour skills and the entrepreneurial 
experiences of the population; access to employment and thus migration; access to 
housing; access to land to build new houses; the social structure; and the distribution 
of power and influence. In many areas of rural Scotland, large land owners play a 
crucial role in local development: they are the rural planners (MacGregor 1993). 
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Francis and Anderson (2003) also blame concentrated land ownership for ineffective 
local planning.  
 The assertion of rights to land is often bound up with claims of ability to 
exercise good stewardship (Bryden and Hart 2000), that is, an ability to take good care 
of the land in the interest of others.  Taking care of the land is also understood to mean 
taking care of the folk who are a part of the land (Bryden and Hart 2000; McCrone 
1997).  As the last vestiges of feudalism fall away from the Scottish landscape, there is 
concern that land will be treated only as a commodity—as something with no public 
value, but only private value; as something with no special meaning and requiring no 
special treatment (Mather 1999).  To counter this, Hunter argues that ―land ownership 
should be conditional on the observation of a land use code‖ that requires owners to 
comply with social and environmental standards (1995).  The justification for such a 
code is argued by MacGregor (1993) in his comparison of two perspectives on 
landownership:  the individual rights perspective, according to which an owner‘s 
freedom to do as he likes with his property is unlimited by anything but the property 
rights of others; and the social rights perspective, according to which an owner‘s rights 
may be circumscribed by society for the public good.  He argues in favor of the second 
perspective on the grounds that property rights are created by society to suit the needs 
of its members; and as these needs change over time, property rights must also change.  
Bryden (1996) adds to this the observation that many rural development opportunities, 
and thus land values, are based on public goods created by society; thus society should 
be able to capture at least part of this value. 
 Stewardship discourse can tend toward the paternalistic, and in so doing fails 
to address the root issue of power.  Even the assertion that the public has a right to 
some say about how private land is managed, as well as a right to capture the publicly 
created value of that private land, doesn‘t say anything about who the public is and 
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what their agency should be.  Bryden (1996) warns that ownership of land by the state 
is ―just as likely to create new forms of oppression as to remove the old ones,‖ a 
sentiment in keeping with much of the literature on community-based natural resource 
management (Brosius et al. 1998; Rice 2001; Uphoff 1998; Vedeld 2002).
20
  Land 
reformers in Scotland today want to create a new alternative to concentrated private 
ownership—one that avoids the pitfalls both of state ownership and of what 
MacGregor terms the ―individual rights perspective.‖  Bryden and Hart (2000) argue 
that land reform is fundamentally ―a change in the balance of power between 
individual property owners, communities and the state,‖ the goal of which should be 
―the extension of democracy and democratic practice.‖  Land reformers in Scotland 
today believe this goal will be achieved by shifting more power to communities.  Two 
ways that this shift might happen are through increased community ownership and 
through increased community involvement in participatory rural planning processes 
(LRPG 1999).   
 The Scottish Land Reform raises a myriad of questions.  Why community 
ownership instead of fragmented private ownership?  Why community ownership 
instead of state ownership?  Why a community trust instead of local government?  
Why community ownership instead of just increasing the democracy of land use 
planning?  How significant can land reform be given the declining role of agriculture 
as a means of livelihood?  If a private landlord can‘t turn a profit on a sporting estate, 
how can this be a valuable asset for the community?  Is land reform really an 
important path to rural economic development, or is it primarily about correcting 
historical injustices?  I will give consideration to all of these questions, but the central 
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 Recognizing the tendency for a divergence of interests between the state and local communities 
(Scott 1998), the community forestry movement, for example, calls for more local and democratic 
management.  ―There is a broad consensus that the dominant paradigm of forest management [by the 
state]… with its associated bureaucratic and technocratic structures, has, for the most part, failed to 
steward forest ecosystems and maintain vital communities‖ (Baker and Kusel 2003: 2).   
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focus of my inquiry is guided by the debate in the land reform literature regarding the 
importance of private property rights for economic development.  Accordingly, I am 
asking why community ownership should play such a central role in this land reform.  
The foregoing discussion provides a sampling of what Scottish academics have said 
about land reform.  The rest of this paper concerns itself with the perspective of 
Scottish people who have been active in community land purchases and why they 
think what they are doing makes sense.   
 
 
METHODS 
 
 It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt an evaluation of how successful 
land reform efforts in Scotland are.  Not only is it too early for such an endeavor, it is 
also the case that these efforts may be frustrated by any number of factors independent 
of whether or not they are a good idea.  This paper therefore seeks not to evaluate, but 
to make sense of community ownership as a type of land reform.  The purpose of my 
inquiry is to understand, from the perspective of those involved in community 
acquisition of land, why community ownership makes sense for them given their goals 
and circumstances.  Why, in contrast to so many other land reforms, do we have a 
push for community ownership in Scotland?  What lessons can be drawn at this point, 
either for Scottish land reformers or regarding community development in general? 
 To answer these questions I conducted loosely-structured, in-depth interviews 
in nine communities where land has been transferred to community ownership.  These 
interviews took place in the spring of 2007 and late summer 2008.  Interviewees in 
these communities were all either involved in the buyout at the time it happened or 
were working for the community organization at the time of the interview.  These 
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interviews are supplemented by interviews with staff members at the government 
agency responsible for helping communities to buy land.  In addition to these formal 
interviews, on which my analysis is based, my understanding has been greatly 
enhanced by numerous informal discussions with crofters, community development 
workers, and natural resource managers, as well as by the many helpful responses I‘ve 
received to email enquiries directed to government agency staff and to people 
involved in community buyouts.   
 The communities where my interviews took place represent a variety of 
community ownership situations.  In two locations, ownership of the estate passed to 
the local community in the early 20
th
 century.  In each of the other cases, community 
ownership came about in the 1990s or later.  Thus out of the more recent cases, some 
of them are pre- land reform legislation, and some of them are post.  In one of these 
more recent cases, membership in the trust is open only to crofters.  In all other recent 
cases, membership is open to everybody in the community.   The geographic location 
of these communities is the northwest coast of Scotland and the islands that lie west of 
this coast.  The one exception is a community near the central east coast.   
 In my analysis I identify trends that emerged across cases.  In reporting these 
trends, it would be misleading for me to write that respondents in four out of six 
communities identified such and such a problem; for to do so might imply that 
respondents in the other two communities do not feel that this thing is a problem.  
Interviewees were not presented with a list of yes/no questions, but rather spoke at 
length in response to open-ended questions.  The fact that interviewees in certain 
communities made a particular statement, and that others elsewhere did not, does not 
mean that the others hold an opposite view.  If they do, I report that separately.  They 
might agree with the statement if asked about it specifically; or it might not be relevant 
to their case.  The diversity of cases means that not all questions are relevant to all 
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cases.  Instead of reporting the ratio of responses as if they were survey results, I have 
opted for simply reporting what was said in each community on a particular topic.  
Because I had the opportunity to conduct more and longer interviews in some 
communities than in others, thus allowing for more things to be said, the sorting of 
statements was done by location and not by interview.  When I say that a particular 
view or concern is ―common,‖ I mean that it surfaced in interviews in at least three 
different communities.   
 Interviews were not tape-recorded, and my notes do not in all cases reflect the 
exact wording used by interviewees.  When reporting statements made during 
interviews, I use quotation marks to indicate an exact quote.  In places where 
statements are reported without quotation marks, it is almost an exact quote.  During 
the course of interviews I frequently repeated significant statements to interviewees 
for verification and further comment.  In many cases I made follow-up contact with 
interviewees, often in light of subsequent interviews, in order to verify and to get 
additional information on significant information.   
 
 
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS: a description of the trends and differences among a 
number of community ownership cases, as well as the respondents‘ perspectives on 
these 
 
Precipitating events and community goals 
 Although the general goals of community organizations in this study are all 
very similar, the immediate catalyst for forming an organization and taking steps 
toward community ownership of land has varied from place to place.  Some of the 
events that have precipitated this move include the threat of an estate being broken up 
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by private sale; the passage of the land reform act; a perceived need for planning; the 
lure of funding opportunities; and the desire to pursue various economic development 
projects.    
By far the most commonly stated goal for community organizations in this 
study is to manage the land for the long-term benefit of the community with an 
emphasis on economic and social development.  The other two commonly stated goals 
are environmental conservation and the retention of population, especially young 
people, through the creation of increased employment opportunities and affordable 
housing.  
 
The role of community ownership in achieving these goals 
 Communities face the double challenge of both generating development and 
making sure that the benefits of development are captured by the local community.  
One crofting community bought their land because they wanted to do a forestry 
project that the landlord refused to approve.  Another community wanted to set up a 
community wind farm.  In the latter case, the landlord wasn‘t against the project, but 
without community ownership it would be the landlord rather than the community that 
would benefit.  In both of these cases interviewees emphasized that their community 
wants to be able to invest in the common grazings and to be able to capture the 
benefits of that investment.  It was said that, whereas in the past crofters‘ rents were 
never re-spent on the estate, now this money would be reinvested for the common 
good.  In a third community I heard a similar description of how community 
ownership is supposed to affect development:  The benefits derived from any 
development will remain within the community.  Money won‘t leave and it won‘t be 
dispersed as dividends.  It will be reinvested.   
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 In one interview, the development possibilities enabled by community 
ownership were contrasted with those of national economic development policy.  
National policy, the interviewee said, doesn‘t affect all areas equally.  Community 
ownership, on the other hand, helps to create economic development policy that is 
relevant for a particular area. 
 Another interviewee explained that community ownership is also necessary in 
order to develop resources that outside investors wouldn‘t find worthwhile.  Such 
neglected resources might not necessarily be unprofitable, only less profitable than 
other investment opportunities elsewhere.  A local community might want to develop 
these resources in order to generate employment, to create a multiplier effect in the 
local economy, or to provide needed services to community members.   
 Even, and perhaps especially, where resources are valuable enough to attract 
outside investment, community ownership may be wanted in order to steer how 
development happens.  Here is how one community has structured their relations with 
private investors in the context of a particular project.  This community has an 
ambitious plan to develop their waterfront with the construction of housing, additional 
wharfage, a fishing pier, and a fish processing plant.  This development would be 
carried out by private developers who would lease the land, and whose activities 
would be subject to restrictions in their leases.  The land is owned by a community 
trust, which is a company limited by guarantee, governed by a board of directors 
elected by the members.  By owning the land, through their trust, the community can 
initiate this development and control how it happens.  They will also benefit by taking 
partial ownership in the new businesses.  The businesses will pay rent to the trust.  The 
trust is set up like this:  There is a holding company that owns assets, such as the land.  
This company is owned by the trust‘s membership, which is open to everyone in the 
community (annual membership fee £1).  There are also a number of trading 
 130 
companies owned by the trust, which are for-profit businesses.  Thirdly, the trust 
wants to start an investment company to receive all the profits and to invest them in 
new businesses.  People would be encouraged to invest in the company, and the 
company would seek to make productive loans.   
 
 In several communities, buyouts were motivated in part by a concern about 
ownership becoming fragmented.  In one case, the estate was going to be broken up 
and sold to multiple private landlords.  In another case, there was concern that land 
reform legislation would lead to multiple smaller-scale buyouts, and that fragmenting 
the estate in this fashion would undermine its development potential.  A third 
community wanted to make sure that the benefits of development would be spread 
evenly throughout the community.  In one place, tradition was also mentioned as being 
important:  ―It‘s been a whole estate for a long time.‖ 
 The asset most frequently mentioned as needing to be kept whole is the 
sporting, i.e., the hunting rights and the ability to manage game.  Also important are 
the common grazings, of course, and the ability to effectively manage drainage and 
carry out pest control.  Some assets such as wind power could effectively be 
developed in one spot; but, without community ownership, the benefits wouldn‘t be 
evenly spread, although many of the detriments would.  Having all assets held together 
is supposed to discourage the development of some resources in ways that would 
devalue others.  Where multiple small buyouts were a possibility, there was a concern 
that these areas would be set against each other in competition for development. 
 
 If not the most frequently mentioned concern, the need for affordable housing 
was perhaps the most passionately spoken of, usually with specific reference to young 
people.  Affordable housing and employment opportunities are bound together in 
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people‘s perception as the two things that are needed to maintain the rural population.  
This is a concern because when the population gets too low, rural communities begin 
to lose services.  Without enough people, there will be no shops, no post office, no 
school, no doctor, and diminished public transportation.  Hence the concern among 
local people that holiday home buyers don‘t outbid young families who want to stay in 
the community.  In one case, maintaining housing affordability for young people was 
given as the chief reason for community ownership of land.  In this case, when new 
housing is built, they plan to create new crofts.  In another community, new housing is 
going to be rental housing, reserved for needed workers rather than vacationers.  In the 
case where an estate was bought by a government-funded agency and divided into 
multiple small holdings, the central purpose was to facilitate the ability of young 
families to stay on the island.  According to one staff member at Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise, places with community ownership experience greater population 
retention. 
 The issues of housing and population retention are tied in part to the issue of 
absenteeism on crofts.  Interviewees complained that many crofts go unworked while 
people who want a croft can‘t get one.  When the active crofter population falls below 
a certain point, there may be too few people for gathering sheep, to support needed 
services like a veterinarian or feed store, or generally to maintain a vibrant crofting 
community.  For this reason, one community expressed a desire to have more control 
over the sale, lease, and assignation of crofts.  But the powers of a community trust as 
landlord are circumscribed in the same way those of a private landlord are.   
 
 Several communities mentioned the importance of community ownership for 
long-term planning.  In one community there had been tension between county-level 
planners and local farmers over the location of new houses.  The planners wanted to 
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condense housing, but this would have meant putting houses on arable ground.  
Community members wanted to locate new houses on land unsuited to agriculture, 
following a more dispersed settlement pattern.  ―We didn‘t set out to become 
community owners,‖ an interviewee in that community said.  ―We wanted to be able 
to do long-term planning; but without having control of the land, we tended to focus 
on crops and cattle, not community development.‖   With community ownership, the 
interviewee said, the neighborhood could make a vision for their future and try to set 
up a situation that is conducive to crofting in the long-term. 
 Several interviewees stressed that whereas private investors tend to look for 
short-term gain, the community trust looks at the long-term.  One example of this is a 
community trust that has refused to accept one-time payments for utility way-leaves, 
insisting instead on annual payments.   
 
 It was apparent from talking to people in communities where buyouts had 
occurred that the land is important not only as a basis for economic development, but 
also as a tie of belonging to place and a source of identity.  The reaffirmation of this 
connection with the land and its cultural meaning has, according to community 
members, generated a substantial increase in civic engagement and enthusiasm for 
community projects.   
 Speaking of community development in the context of a community buyout, 
one interviewee said that it feels worth making the effort when you own it.  ―There‘s a 
bit more pride in it.‖  Another member of that same community said that the buyout 
released a great deal of community energy.  With community ownership, he said, you 
get communities coming together a lot more.  Before, each crofter only dealt 
individually with the landlord.  Now they have to come together and a lot of new ideas 
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come out.  ―A lot of people are a lot more interested in what‘s going on now than 
when we had a private landlord.‖ 
 ―There is a feel-good factor,‖ I was told in another community.  It‘s really 
something to be involved in something on your own doorstep, to feel like you can 
make a difference.  The buyout also generated more interest in crofting:  At that time 
some crofts were changing from father to son. The sons hadn‘t been so interested, but 
the buyout got them more interested.  It sparked a little more community spirit and 
interest for the future.  The only communal things we did before were the gathering 
and shearing.  The buyout helped to bring people together.   
 One staff member at Highlands and Islands Enterprise said that feelings of 
ownership and belonging are greater in places where there is community ownership; 
and this opinion was shared by a community interviewee who said that a lot of the 
new buyouts have generated renewed enthusiasm about living in the places where they 
have taken place.  Another HIE staff member said they see a stronger sense of 
cohesion and empowerment when communities control their own assets.   
 While community ownership has generated a great deal of excitement in some 
communities, not all community members are equally swept up in it; and in two 
communities such excitement has either stalled or been lacking altogether.  These two 
cases will receive special attention in the Discussion section below.  Among the other 
cases, one of them is unusual in that only crofters can be trust members.  This was one 
of the earliest community buyouts, occurring prior to the Land Reform Act.  Where 
more recent buyouts have occurred, the entire community has a right of membership 
in the community landowning organization.  Even so, interest among non-crofters has 
sometimes been lacking.  In the largest community ownership case, the trust has 750 
members out of a potential 3,100.  I was told that there was some confusion about who 
is eligible for membership.  Many members of this community mistakenly believe that 
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only crofters are eligible; and many non-crofters have not paid much attention to the 
buyout, perhaps because they feel that it doesn‘t affect them.  In another community, 
although membership here too is open to all residents, so far only crofters have joined.  
Again, it was said that non-crofters probably don‘t feel affected; although a strong 
desire was expressed to engage the non-crofting part of the community.  In a 
community with a more recent buyout, 60% of the population are members of the 
trust, including some people from non-crofting households.
21
   
 
 It is easy to summarize why respondents believe that community ownership is 
an important strategy for achieving these goals.  Six things were commonly 
mentioned.  The two most common were to keep the benefits of development local 
and to ensure reinvestment in the community.  Community ownership of land is also 
seen as necessary in order to prevent fragmentation of assets; to keep housing 
affordable; to enable long-term planning; and to instill pride and generate civic energy.   
 
Why a community trust instead of local government? 
 Coming from a place like Vermont, where direct democracy is practiced at the 
town-level and where towns collect taxes, provide services, and own land and other 
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 The population of the estate is 2000, and trust membership stands at 1,200.  The number of crofts is 
617; but some crofters own more than one croft.  I estimate the number of crofters to be 600, since I am 
told that 70% of the population are non-crofters.  It is important to note that a crofter is a person who 
owns a croft—his or her spouse does not count amongst the crofting population even though she or he 
is living a crofting lifestyle.  Thus, in the case of this community, the trust membership of 1,200 could 
easily be composed entirely of people living on crofts, since there are 600 crofting households, each of 
which might furnish two or more members.  I only know that this is not the case because I have been 
told that there are fewer than 1,200 people living on crofts in this community.  I do not know the 
number of non-crofting households or the number of people who are not living on crofts, except that the 
latter figure is something more than 800.  I am using this example to point out some of the complexity 
that must be borne in mind when looking at crofting figures and generalizing about ―the crofting 
population.‖   If half the population of a town are crofters, it may yet be the case that nearly all of the 
households are crofting households and nearly everyone may be living on a croft.  Also, the number of 
crofts will not correspond exactly to the number of crofters, since multiple crofts may be held by one 
person.  The active crofting population might also be smaller than the number of crofts due to high rates 
of absentee ownership. 
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assets, I had to ask why the community land movement in Scotland should all but 
reinvent local government in the form of community trusts, and where the actual local 
government was while this was going on.  Interviewee responses to this line of 
questioning were unanimous in saying that the smallest level of government, the 
community council, is completely powerless.  The next level up, the regional 
council,
22
 was said to be too remote to be either democratic or to be a proper venue for 
local people to deal with local issues.  Because taxes are paid to the regional council, 
community councils are without money; and I was told that there is no precedent for 
them to own land.  Some people said they felt that they could participate more 
effectively in the community trust than in local government; and it was also said that 
the government was viewed as something apart.  People wouldn‘t feel like they really 
owned the land if the government owned it; and then the pride of ownership that was 
generating increased civic activity would disappear.   
A staff member of Highlands and Islands Enterprise also pointed out that there 
is an emerging desire on the part of public bodies to transfer the ownership of land to 
community organizations, with the expectation that these organizations should be 
companies limited by guarantee.
23
   
 
Crofting and community ownership 
 The centrality of agriculture to land reform in other parts of the world prompts 
the question of what agriculture has to do with land reform in Scotland.  The answer is 
not clear cut.  For one thing, agriculture is rapidly disappearing as a way of life in 
                                                 
22
 This was the term used by some interviewees.  The Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 
replaced regions and districts with ―unitary authorities.‖  The area that the interviewees are referring 
to—the entire Highland area, for which there is one council—was not significantly altered by this 
legislation.  There is also one council for the Western Isles.  A short description of how local 
government is structured is provided in the discussion section.   
23
 The Forestry Commission, for example, which is the largest landowner in Scotland, has programs for 
promoting community ownership (see Forestry Commission 2008, 2009). 
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Scotland.  It frequently came up in interviews that many or most crofters in a given 
area were not actively grazing.
24
  In one community I was told that fewer than half the 
crofters had any stock.  In another community it was said that much of the commons is 
never grazed and that the number of active crofters had dwindled to such an extent that 
in one township
25
 there was but a single grazer.  On another estate I was told that each 
of the common grazings had only a couple of people on them, and that some of the 
townships had neither grazing committee nor clerk.  People just grazed without 
discussion.  Taking a closer look at one of these townships, I found that out of twenty 
crofters with rights to the commons, only two to three people were actively grazing.  
Each of these remaining grazers had many more sheep on the common than the 
number they were each officially allowed (called their souming).  The soumings were 
said to be far too small to provide any significant income.  ―Why is the government 
promoting crofting?‖ one shepherd asked, ―It‘s a practice that‘s disappearing.  The 
prices are so low it doesn‘t make sense anymore.‖  He went on to say that when the 
subsidies stop, the gates will close on the estate and it will grow up to brush.  The 
most common complaint of shepherds was about the lack of local slaughter and 
finishing facilities.  Two people also complained about predation.  Many interviewees 
spoke of their concern for the future of crofting and for the vibrancy of the crofting 
community, which they saw to be threatened by absenteeism and the decline in 
agricultural practice.   
 Despite the apparent decline in crofting as a form of livelihood, it remains 
central in many people‘s minds to the community land movement.  (One cannot speak 
of land reform and Scotland without thinking of the crofters‘ war, the Napier 
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 This finding agrees with the loss of salience described by Brown and Slee (2002). 
25
 Estates are typically composed of multiple small townships, and grazing is organized on a township 
basis.  Thus, typically, there is not one commons for an entire estate, but rather multiple commons, each 
associated with a particular township and the crofts of that township.  Each township has its own 
grazings committee and a grazings clerk to administer its commons. 
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Commission, and the Clearances.)  As mentioned above, non-crofters tend to be less 
actively involved in community buyouts than crofters.  The land, one crofter 
explained, has more than just economic value; it is also a tie of belonging to place.  In 
one crofting community I was told that even non-grazers take an active interest in the 
commons through their grazing committee.  They participate in forestry grant 
schemes, maintain peat roads, control bracken, and maintain fences.  The main thing 
that drives participation, I was told, is people‘s feeling about the land.  And it must 
also be remembered that the reason why some communities have bought their 
common grazings is so that they can put them to other use than grazing.  One 
community bought so that they can pursue a wind power project.  Another community 
did so to be able to plant trees.  This second community is also interested in wind 
power, and hopes that these sorts of projects will attract the interest of non-crofters.  
Two other communities are also considering wind power, and one has restored an 
historic golf course located on the commons.  Several are developing the sporting 
rights as a business.  The commons have many potential uses; and while agriculture 
may be in decline, there are other ways that communities hope to benefit from the 
land‘s resources. 
 When I first conceived this research, the main thing I wanted to learn was how 
community ownership would support local agriculture.  Because many of the benefits 
of small-scale agriculture have the nature of public goods (for example, scenic cultural 
landscapes) they are unrewarded by markets and require other forms of support.  The 
importance of these non-commodity benefits has received growing recognition 
(Europa 2008; Shucksmith 2008); and at the same time, Scotland‘s local food 
movement has also been gaining momentum.  It seems to be an auspicious time for 
revitalizing small farm agriculture; and community ownership of land may be 
uniquely well-suited to this purpose due to its ability to internalize the ―positive 
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externalities‖ of small farms.  For these reasons, and considering the high multiplier-
effect of small farms (Grubinger et al. 2005; Hoffer 2000), I would expect to see 
agriculture high on any rural development agenda.  In my study, however, this turned 
out not to be the case. 
 There were two questions that I asked in every community regarding 
agriculture.  The first of these was ‗how does community ownership encourage 
sustainable land use on the part of crofters?‘  The answer to this was the same 
everywhere:  The crofter‘s obligation to maintain his or her croft in good condition 
comes from the Crofters Commission, not from the community-as-landlord.  The 
second question I asked was ‗how will community ownership benefit agriculture?‘  
Interviewees mentioned the ability to reinvest rents and to capture the value of 
alternative uses for the grazing commons (such as wind power); they said that it would 
be easier to balance conflicting interests such as grazing, deer management, and 
forestry; and they spoke of increased enthusiasm for the future.  But in most cases 
these answers followed an interval during which interviewees said ‗hmmm‘ and 
furrowed their brows in thought.  It seems in fact that community ownership does very 
little at this time to promote agriculture directly; and there is little effort either to 
connect local consumers to local producers or to promote a local food system.   
 During an interview at Highlands and Islands Enterprise, the point was made 
that community ownership helps crofters by generating the economic development 
necessary to create jobs.  It was emphasized that there is no expectation that crofting 
should be a complete source of livelihood; and that this is why the focus is more on 
the provision of supplemental employment than on increasing the viability of 
agriculture.   
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Challenges and prospects for the future 
 Because each of the people I interviewed in communities were either involved 
in the buyout when it happened or were working for the community organization at 
the time of the interview; my observations must be understood as limited to how those 
who are actively involved with community ownership feel about it as a strategy for 
achieving their goals, and what difficulties they have encountered in pursuing this 
strategy.  Challenges that were mentioned include absenteeism amongst croft owners; 
inadequate funding; a lack of developable assets; the declining importance of grazing; 
a lack of public participation; and a lack of agreement in the community.    
A staff member at Highlands and Islands Enterprise who works with land-
owning community organizations talked about what he sees as their biggest 
challenges:  generating enough revenue, coping with volunteer burnout, overcoming 
community apathy, and being able to afford a manager.   
 In all of the case study communities except for two, interviewees were very 
positive about the future of their community and about the future of community 
ownership generally.  Out of the two communities where positive energy was lacking, 
one had recently experienced frustration on the road to community ownership but still 
had hope for the future.  The other was completely negative.  These two exceptional 
cases will be discussed further in the following section 
 
In sum, while local events leading to a decision to pursue community 
ownership have varied from place to place, the stated goals of community 
organizations are all very similar: to manage the land for the long-term benefit of the 
community, with an emphasis on economic and social development.  Community 
ownership is seen as necessary in order to keep the benefits of development local; to 
ensure reinvestment in the community; and to prevent the fragmentation of assets.  
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The creation of community organizations (companies limited by guarantee) for the 
purpose of owning land and serving as a venue for community decision-making is a 
necessary alternative to local government fulfilling this role because local government 
does not exist in Scotland, at least not at the same level that the community buy-outs 
are taking place.  Lastly, land reform in Scotland is unusual in that it seems to have 
little to do with agriculture.  The size of agricultural holdings is left unchanged and 
there is little effort at present to increase opportunities in the agricultural sector.  The 
aim instead is to generate rural economic development and in that way to expand 
employment opportunities more generally.  Buy-out communities face a number of 
challenges; but, with exception of two cases that will be discussed below, they are 
optimistic about their own futures and about the future of community ownership.   
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 
 Traditionally, land reform has meant a redistribution of the agricultural land 
held in large private estates, in order to improve the lives of rural poor by providing 
them with access to land as a means of livelihood.  In 19
th
 century Britain, the 
argument for land reform as a means of alleviating hunger was very strong. 
To look over the fence of [a] famine-stricken village and see the rich, green solitudes 
which might yield full and plenty spread out at the very doorsteps of the ragged 
peasants was to fill a stranger with a sacred rage and make it an unshirkable duty to 
strive towards undoing the unnatural divorce between the people and the land (Hunter 
2000: 252). 
There is frequently an expectation that the redistribution of rights to land will result in 
an intensification of production and a concomitant rise in living standards (Prosterman 
and Hanstad 2003).  When the question is one of small farms versus extensive grazing 
or private hunting grounds, the link between redistribution and productivity is clear—
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so long as productivity is not equated with the ability to return a profit.  But by the 
start of the 19
th
 century, agricultural economists were already talking about ―the 
advantages of committing the cultivation of the soil to the hands of a few‖ (Mackenzie 
1810: 126); and it was the profitability of sheep grazing that led to the clearances.   
 A focus on increasing production (or worse, profitability), rather than on 
increasing rural peoples‘ ability to claim a share of what is produced, fails to get at the 
root of rural poverty—a point starkly illustrated by the numerous famines that have 
occurred alongside massive food exports (Ponting 2007).  The adoption of high-yield 
crops in the 1960s, which many believed would put an end to hunger in the third 
world, went hand-in-hand with more concentrated land ownership, leading to greater 
rural poverty and the persistence of hunger (Lappé et al. 1998).
26
  Because the pursuit 
of greater agricultural productivity may not only be divorced from, but harmful to, the 
improvement of rural well-being, it seems best to keep the issues of farm productivity 
and rural livelihoods separate;
27
 and in so doing to acknowledge the possibility that a 
land reform with little apparent effect on agricultural production may yet be valuable 
to small farmers and to rural people generally.   
 The preconception with which I approached this research was that land reform 
in Scotland was, at least in part, intended to help small farmers—or more precisely, 
small farm agriculture, which is what I thought crofting was.  Consequently, I was 
perplexed by what little effect community buyouts have on agriculture and crofting 
tenure.  The reason for this seems to have partly to do with the gains that crofters 
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 Strains of wheat were developed in Mexico, and later rice in the Philippines, which put more growth 
into the grain rather than the stalk, greatly increasing the potential yield per acre.  These new 
developments, hailed as the Green Revolution, came with a number of strings attached.  The new high-
yield varieties depended on a great deal of input, such as careful irrigation and the regular application of 
fertilizer and pesticides.  The credit to obtain these things was beyond the reach of many small farmers, 
who were driven off their land as increased production made prices fall and farmers who invested in the 
new technologies sought to expand (Lappé et al. 1998).    
27
 Even while acknowledging that small farms may often be more productive than large ones 
(Binswanger et al. 1995; Bray 1994; Prosterman and Hanstad 2003; Rosset 1999).  
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already made at the end of the nineteenth century, and partly to do with the real nature 
of crofting and crofters‘ needs, which are not exactly as I had supposed.   
 One classic goal of land reform is to encourage investment by providing 
farmers with secure tenure.  The relationship between these two things, and indeed 
their mutual absence in the highlands, was already a source of comment in the early 
nineteenth century (e.g. Laing 1837).  The truth of this relationship seems to have been 
born out when, shortly after the Crofters Act of 1886 guaranteed fair rents, protection 
from eviction, and ownership of improvements, a royal commission in 1895 observed 
that this had ―led to vigorous efforts towards improvement,‖ both in regard to cropland 
and to housing (Hunter 2000: 247).  Does this mean that the provisions of the Crofters 
Act of 1886 were sufficient; or should crofters have been given full ownership of their 
crofts?  It appears, at least in terms of tenure,
28
 that the provisions of this act were 
sufficient; as is evidenced by crofters‘ lack of interest in owning their own crofts when 
this option was extended first to some of them by the Congested Districts Board in the 
early 20
th
 century (Hunter 2000) and then to all crofters by the Crofting Reform 
(Scotland) Act 1976.  The rights that crofters have are so close to those of full 
ownership that most see little reason to change their tenure status.  Indeed, by doing so 
they fear they would lose certain advantages, such as the ability to apply for grant 
money available only to crofters.  What is more common is for crofters to remove just 
their house site from crofting tenure in order to obtain a mortgage or, somewhat less 
often, for an additional house site to be carved off and de-crofted, either for sale or to 
provide housing for family.   
 Given the security of tenure already provided by the Crofters Act and 
subsequent legislation, which crofters have apparently found satisfactory, one might 
                                                 
28
 It has been mentioned above how the failure to make more land available led to prolonged unrest 
among both crofters and cottars. 
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wonder what more there was for land reform to accomplish.  But in the late 20
th
 
century the Highlands were still regarded as a backward region in need of economic 
development (Carter 1974).  It has been argued that the fragmentation of farmland into 
so many tiny crofts exacerbates this problem by standing in the way of more efficient 
farming techniques (Gillanders 1968).  This argument comes off sounding similar to 
those made by the ―improving‖ landlords responsible for the clearances; but that 
doesn‘t mean that it is wholly untrue.  The claim that crofts should be amalgamated 
into economically viable units is given some weight by the tendency for active crofters 
to hold multiple tenancies, or at least to work multiple crofts by means of various 
informal arrangements; as well as by the wholesale abandonment of agricultural 
activity by many crofters.  At the end of the 19
th
 century the original Crofters 
Commission actually recommended that the majority of crofters should be ―gently‖ 
removed from the land so that the smallest crofts could be combined into 
economically viable units (Hunter 2000).  Had this recommendation been heeded, 
agricultural production might have been improved; but it is difficult to say that the 
displaced population would have been better off.  The example of the Green 
Revolution, or that of agriculture in California (see Walker 2004), should make us 
wary of equating increased agricultural production with improved rural wellbeing.  
Even before modern agriculture could give us such examples as these, a Scottish 
writer in the 1830s commented that while it is 
…a favourite and constant observation of our agricultural writers that these small 
proprietors make the worst farmers; [it is also true that] a population may be in a 
wretched condition although their country is very well farmed… (Laing 1837: 36-37). 
 This writer (and former Scottish landlord), Samuel Laing, was impressed when 
traveling in Norway with how much better-off the Norwegian farmers were; and he 
attributed this specifically to the widespread ownership of private property.  Here, he 
said, were ―the highland glens without the highland lairds‖ (1837: 36).   
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The common sense of the majority of mankind would apprehend … that the forty 
families in these two or three [Norwegian] highland glens, each possessing and living 
on its own little spot of ground and farming well or ill as the case may be, are in a 
better and happier state …than if the whole belonged to one of these families … while 
the other thirty nine families were tenants and farm servants (Laing 1837: 38).    
It is interesting to see that the question of appropriate farm-size, judged in terms of 
rural development rather than merely by output, is much older than Goldschmidt‘s 
(1978) classic treatment of it.  But in pursuing this question at such length I am 
leading us a little bit off the mark; for I have been talking about crofts as if they were 
nothing more or less than small farms.   
 Now it is time to make the point that so many people had to make to me before 
it finally sunk in: that ―small farms‖ is not a very apt description of what crofts are or 
were ever meant to be.  As explained above in the description of how crofts came into 
existence, they were never intended to be commercially viable small farms.  On the 
contrary, they were deliberately designed to be incapable of providing a family with 
more than a bare subsistence, if even that.  Government assistance to crofters in the 
latter half of the 20
th
 century, coming as it did in the form of agricultural improvement 
grants, betrayed ―a lack of insight into this central reality of crofting life‖ (Hunter 
2000: 284).
29
  What crofters need are jobs.  This sentence was uttered by almost every 
person I talked to who was in any way connected to crofting life.  Agricultural 
modernization and the consolidation that goes with it would run counter to this need; 
and any measures that reduce the number of people on the land would exacerbate the 
problem of dwindling population and the consequent loss of services.  This, then, 
explains why the community land movement today touches very little upon agriculture 
and leaves the tenure of individual crofters virtually unchanged—why its primary 
                                                 
29
 The Committee of Inquiry on Crofting reminds us in their final report that ―Crofting is so much more 
than simply agriculture.‖  On average, 70% of a crofter‘s household income is from non-croft based 
activities (Shucksmith 2008: 41).  Accordingly, the Committee‘s vision for the future of crofting 
acknowledges that ―most of their incomes will tend to come from non-agricultural activities‖ 
(Committee of Inquiry 2008: 3).   
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emphasis is on generating economic development that will supplement rather than 
enhance farm income.   
  
 Once agriculture has been removed from center stage, we are left with the 
question of why land reform, and why community-ownership in particular, are 
regarded as the means to economic development.  To have control over real estate is to 
have control over the opportunities for economic development—the power not only to 
stifle or encourage development, but also to claim whatever benefits it produces.  By 
taking ownership of the land, communities hope to encourage the development of 
land-based assets and to capture the benefits of this development.  This does not 
always mean making money.  It is important to keep in mind that development is 
ultimately about the provision of needed goods and services, which is something that 
does not always go hand-in-hand with opportunities for profit.  This brings us to the 
question of why economic development should, at least in part, be a community 
project and not just an outcome of private entrepreneurship.   
 There are two classes of benefits provided by a business such as a village shop.  
It generates profit for the owner and it provides needed goods and services for the 
people of the village.  Classical economic theory tells us that the desire for profit leads 
people to provide needed services to others, and that the opportunity to pursue profit in 
the context of a market should be sufficient to ensure that people‘s needs get satisfied.  
Under this philosophy, civic-mindedness becomes unnecessary because ―in selfishly 
pursuing only his or her personal good, every individual is led, as if by an invisible 
hand, to achieve the best good for all‖ (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1992: 40).  It was a 
Scotsman who became the father not only of a new science, but of a whole new 
ideology for the organization of society when he wrote, 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command.  It is his own advantage, indeed, 
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and not that of the society, which he has in view.  But the study of his own advantage 
naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most 
advantageous to the society (Smith 1776: Book IV, Chapter II). 
Fewer than 20 years after Adam Smith penned these words, profit-seeking landlords 
began the process of displacing Scotland‘s rural population to make way for sheep.  
Nevertheless, the philosophy that Smith expressed went on to become a guiding force 
behind rural development and land reform, such that the promotion of widely held 
private ownership became the norm (Deininger and Binswanger 1999).  
 The proviso that private property be widely held is an important one in order 
for it to function the way it is supposed to.  The functions of private property, as 
mentioned in the introduction, include enabling democracy through citizen 
competency and independence (Schwarz 1997) and fostering economic development.  
Economists argue that private property does two things to promote the efficient use of 
resources.  First, investment and conservation are encouraged when the rewards and 
costs of decisions are brought home to the decision-making property owners; and 
second, the right of alienability enables trade, which causes resources to gravitate to 
whoever can use them most profitably, resulting in greater wealth creation overall 
(Anderson and McChesney 2003).  Unfortunately, the elegance of this model doesn‘t 
carry over to real life, due to imperfect markets and the inability to control 
externalities; and its application in the context of land reform has been widely 
criticized (see introduction).  While neither I nor anybody that I spoke to in Scotland is 
against private property, it became clear that other forms of ownership are also 
necessary in order to efficiently develop assets in a way that meets communities‘ 
needs.   
 Let‘s return to the example of a village shop.  From a development point of 
view, the important function of a village shop is to provide needed goods and services 
to people in the area.  If the profit that such a shop might generate for a private owner 
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is sufficient to maintain the shop‘s existence, all is well.  But village shops and other 
amenities are closing all over rural Britain, a circumstance that is especially hard on 
people in remote areas.   In 2009, four hundred village shops closed their doors 
(Davies 2009); while in the same year, pubs were going out of business at a rate of 39 
per week (Brignall 2009).  The closure of a local establishment, sometimes upon the 
owner‘s retirement, is not necessarily due to an absolute lack of profitability; but may 
result simply from the business being less profitable than other investment 
alternatives.  An individual ―exerting himself to find out the most advantageous 
employment for whatever capital he can command‖ is not going to keep a remote 
petrol station open merely for the convenience of the people who rely on it if he can 
instead open one in a much busier area.  The government operates on a similar plan.  
Between 2007 and 2009, the Post Office‘s Network Change Programme resulted in the 
closure of 2,500 Post Office
30
 branches (Post Office 2010b), despite public outcry 
(Drury 2009; Harrison 2009)—a move that one MP said would be the death knell for 
many communities (BBC News 2007) as the loss of postal customers could lead to a 
loss of business for the village shops where branches are located.  The number of post 
office branches has fallen from 25,000 in 1960 (Shankleman 2007) to about 12,000 
today (Post Office 2010a).  Thus the issue of maintaining services in rural 
communities is not a question of private enterprise versus public ownership, but one of 
local communities looking after their own needs.  And this is exactly what is 
happening, as shops, pubs, and petrol stations are increasingly coming under 
community ownership in an effort to keep them open and serving the communities that 
rely on them (Brignall 2009).  Today there are more than 230 community-owned 
                                                 
30
 “Post Office Ltd is a wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Mail Group Ltd and operates under the Post 
Office® brand. Managing a nationwide network of around 12,000 Post Office® branches, we are the 
largest Post Office network in Europe and the largest retail branch network in the UK handling more 
cash than any other business” (Post Office® 2010a). 
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shops in the UK, including fifteen in Scotland, most of which have opened since the 
year 2000 (The Plunkett Foundation 2010; see also 
http://www.communityretailing.co.uk).   
 Not only do community land-owning organizations in Scotland want to 
encourage the development of resources that outside investors might not find 
worthwhile, they also want to make sure that the community can control how 
development happens and that the benefits of development stay in the local 
community.  There are two ways that the mobility of capital can adversely affect poor 
communities:  the constant hemorrhaging of surplus leaves communities without 
adequate capital to invest in development (Gunn and Gunn 1991); and the consequent 
need to woo outside investment leads communities to orient themselves toward the 
creation of an attractive business climate rather than the pursuit of community 
development goals (Shuman 1998; Stoecker 1997).  The first of these two points is 
something of which communities where I conducted interviews are very much aware.  
Interviewees in most of these communities spoke specifically about how community 
ownership would allow them to re-invest rents, wind farm revenue, or other income 
back in the community.  Several interviewees pointed out that this could and 
sometimes did happen under ―a good landlord,‖ but that having such a landlord was a 
matter of luck and not design—thus making community ownership necessary sooner 
or later.  Particular business ventures, as for example, those that might be involved in 
the case of the community that plans to redevelop their waterfront, might be privately 
owned and managed; but community ownership of the real estate enables the 
community to guide the development process and to capture some of the income that 
will result from public investment.  This is especially important in recognition of the 
fact that although tourists may only be spending their money in a hotel at the 
waterfront, they are probably coming to an island or highland area to hike through and 
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photograph the crofting landscape, which they have a statutory right to do free of 
charge (OPSI 2003).  This observation highlights the interconnectedness of different 
development opportunities (e.g., how would wind farm development affect tourism?) 
and the need to take a holistic perspective in managing development.  In the case 
where a large community buyout was spurred on by a desire to prevent multiple 
smaller buyouts, there was concern about making sure that some assets not be 
developed in ways that could conflict with the development of other assets.  
Interviewees in other communities spoke of the importance of being able to develop 
assets that are landscape scale and can‘t be fragmented (such as the sporting), and the 
need to make sure that the benefits of development are spread evenly throughout the 
community.   
  
 In the lead up to land reform legislation, increased community involvement in 
participatory rural planning processes was spoken of as a possible means of achieving 
land reform goals (Dewar 1998; LRPG 1999).  The foregoing discussion makes one 
reason clear why more participatory planning cannot be a substitute for changes in 
ownership:  local communities want not only to guide how development happens, but 
also to capture the benefits of that development.  There is also reason for skepticism 
regarding the likelihood of improved democracy in the planning realm, and this has to 
do with the shortcomings of local government in Scotland.  Interviewees spoke of the 
powerlessness of their community councils, and of the remoteness of the lowest 
effective level of government.   
 Local government in Scotland has undergone a number of changes during the 
20
th
 century.  In 1890, thirty-three county councils were created, which remained in 
place until 1975.  Parish and town councils were eliminated in 1929 when their powers 
and responsibilities were transferred to larger subdivisions of the counties.  The Local 
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Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (effective 1975) replaced the county councils with 
nine regional councils and three island councils.  These regions were divided into a 
total of fifty-three districts, each with its own district council.  The Highlands were 
one region, composed of eight districts, and the Western Isles had their own council.  
Community councils were brought back into being at this time as a means of 
communicating local opinion to higher levels of government, but they were not given 
any power, responsibility, or resources.  The Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 
1994 (effective 1996) replaced regions and districts with thirty-two ―unitary 
authorities‖ or ―council areas,‖ of which the entire Highland area is one, and the 
Western Isles are another (ONS 2009).  The council area for the Western Isles is 
called Na h-Eileanan Siar.  Figure 4.1 shows the land area and population for each of 
these places. 
 
 Land Area Population 
All of Scotland 77,925 km
2
 5,168,500 
Highland council area 25,659 km
2
 219,400 
Eilean Siar (Western 
Isles council area) 3,071 km
2
 26,200 
 
Figure 4.1  Land area and population for Scotland, the Highlands, and the Western Isles 
(GROS 2009). 
        
 When people speak of local government in Scotland, they are referring to 
unitary councils such as that which serves the entire Highland area.  Community 
councils exist only to communicate local opinion to higher levels of government, not 
to govern in their own right (ONS 2004), which is something they have neither the 
resources nor the power to do.  Although community councils have been applauded as 
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an important feature of democratic life in Scotland, they have also been criticized for 
being non-representative; and on these grounds they have frequently been ignored by 
unitary authorities (McIntosh and et al. 1999; ONS 2004).  According to The 
Commission on Local Government and The Scottish Parliament, 
It could be said that Scotland today simply does not have a system of local 
government, in the sense in which many other countries still do. The 32 councils now 
existing are, in effect, what in other countries are called county councils or provinces; 
and there is no structure of local government in which individual communities have 
their own councils… (McIntosh and et al. 1999: Chapter 6, Line 155). 
Regarding this observation, the Commission writes ―We state that simply as a matter 
of fact. We see no merit in turning the clock back‖ (McIntosh and et al. 1999: Chapter 
5, Line 156); and indeed, the Commission recommended against re-establishing local 
government, principally on the grounds that it would be too much trouble.  In its 
response to the Commission‘s report, the Scottish Government expresses the opinion 
that the need for community councils has been diminished by the emergence of new 
ways for community members to make their voices heard, as well as by new avenues 
for social action, including community ownership (The Scottish Executive 1999).   
 Thus we see the convergence of several strands of logic.  The development 
aspirations of local communities and the challenges they face explain why some sort 
of public ownership of land is preferable to private ownership either fragmented or 
concentrated; while the nonexistence of local government at the community level 
explains why ownership and management of land is better placed in the hands of a 
community trust than those of the ―local‖ authority.  
  
 Two of the communities that I visited did not share in the excitement that land 
reform was generating elsewhere.  In one of these communities, positive energy is 
lacking altogether.  Here I was told that common ownership doesn‘t really do anything 
for anyone.  ―What I‘ve learned about community ownership,‖ one interviewee in this 
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community told me, ―is that it doesn‘t really work.‖  In the other community, the 
process seems merely to have stalled, and may be expected to regain a modest level of 
energy with a change in circumstances.  What is to be noted about both of these 
communities is that land tenure deviates significantly from the typical model of 
community ownership found in each of the other cases.   
 The more negative case is an estate that was purchased by the Congested 
Districts Board in the very early 20
th
 century, having been an area of acute unrest 
during the Crofters War.  The crofters were each offered the opportunity to buy their 
crofts, with the effect that they ceased to be crofters and became owner-occupiers.  
There is no landlord; and there is no community ownership of the land that the crofts 
sit on.  These ―crofts‖ are actually freehold private property; but they do come with 
rights to common grazings and a share in some common assets, which primarily 
include the estate farm (which is run by a manager) and a shooting lodge (which is 
generally under long-term lease).  Any profits from the management of these assets 
are distributed to shareholders as dividends.  It is permissible to have multiple shares, 
and in that way to have multiple votes.  Management of the estate is the responsibility 
of a committee that is elected at the annual meeting of shareholders.  Not everybody in 
the community is a shareholder.  If somebody breaks off a piece of their croft to sell as 
a house site, the new buyer does not get a share in the estate.  There are about fifty 
such people with no interest in the estate.  Out of 147 shares, only twenty to thirty 
people come to the annual meeting.  Most shareholders are absentee; and many of the 
houses are empty for much of the year, being used only as holiday cottages.  There is 
no community development agenda. 
 The community that I described as being stalled is the one where an estate was 
purchased by a government-funded agency with the intention of transferring it to 
community ownership.  The purchase happened amidst heated controversy and despite 
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a certain amount of local opposition.  Six small holdings have been carved out of the 
estate farm‘s inbye, four of which were occupied at the time of this research.  About 
six years after the purchase, a community trust was formed in order to take ownership 
of the estate.  Membership in the trust is open to all local residents, not just those who 
occupy the six holdings.  About four years after the trust was formed, there came a 
point when it seemed that ownership was finally going to be transferred to the 
community; but (according to interviewees) at the last minute the government 
wouldn‘t let the deal go through.  ―Frustrated‖ and ―feeling burned,‖ the trust and its 
board of directors decided to take a break.  At the time of my interviews the trust was 
inactive, although hope was expressed for progress in the indefinite future.  
Interviewees repeatedly stated that the whole process has been driven by the agency 
that purchased the estate.  ―The only kind of model that works,‖ one of them told me, 
―is one where an existing community has come together to pursue a common vision.‖ 
 The exceptionality of these two cases seems to underscore the importance of 
community, and to indicate that either too much state control or too much individual 
ownership may be deleterious to the civic processes that are expected to drive 
community development.  In the more recent case, it is a public agency rather than the 
community that has ownership; and the agenda has been focused more on providing 
affordable housing to a small number of families than on delivering broader 
community benefits.  In the older case, we find an actual example of the hypothetical 
situation that I posed to interviewees when asking them why there should be 
community ownership in the form of a trust.  ‗Why not just divide the estate up,‘ I 
asked, ‗making each crofter a freeholder on their own croft, with an undivided interest 
in the commons?‘  Interviewees said that while this may have been helpful prior to 
1886, it would be of little benefit to crofters today.  Worse, such an arrangement 
would tend to hinder rather than facilitate the pursuit of community development 
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goals.  I was told that whereas a trust is bound to look after the long-term interests of 
the community, individual freeholders just look after themselves.  In specific reference 
to the older case, I was told that people don‘t have a vested interest in the community.  
―The estate is just a commercial thing.  Most shareholders don‘t even live there.‖  The 
interviewee told me that this situation was avoided in his community by allowing all 
residents to be members and by requiring residency of all members.  A number of 
interviewees also pointed out that where there is a trust, community members don‘t 
receive dividends on shared assets—the money is reinvested in the community.   
 
 In one of the very first conversations I had about the community land 
movement in Scotland, it was suggested that community ownership is being pursued 
simply because ―that is what is on offer,‖ as per the land reform act.  This is clearly 
not the case.  Not only have a number of buyouts occurred prior to and outside the 
provisions of the land reform act;
31
 but the decision to pursue a community buyout is 
generally made with other tenure choices on the table.  The most important of these by 
contrast is the right of crofters to buy their own crofts for a nominal fee and to become 
owner-occupiers—a choice which relatively few crofters have taken.  In each 
community I visited save two, interviewees made it clear that the path of community 
ownership was deliberately chosen in order to help them achieve their community 
goals, and for reasons that made sense in terms of their circumstances. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 In one of my case studies, the pre-legislation buyout happened not only in the absence of public 
funding, but also without charitable support that might have been said to influence their choice of 
tenure.  The funding for the buyout came entirely from the crofters themselves, with the exception of 
some support from the local development agency for legal costs.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 When the clan chiefs turned into landlords and the Scottish landscape became 
private property, a tension was created with the old and deeply-held belief that the 
land was a common heritage (Hunter 2000).  Thereafter, the step from regarding land 
as a source of income to treating it as a commodity in itself may have been a small 
one, but the implications were far reaching.  Valleys that once had been places of 
belonging for members of a community became objects to be leased or sold to 
whoever could put them to the most profitable use.  The people, thus displaced from 
any claim to resources that would enable them to provide for themselves, were cast 
upon the emerging market for labor.     
 The term ‗improvement‘ seems to have had similar rhetorical value at the 
dawn of the 19
th
 century to that which ‗development‘ sometimes has today.  While 
implying such universal benefits as must accrue from advancement along a natural 
trajectory from worse to better, it specifically meant the orientation of land use toward 
markets in order to maximize economic productivity.  In the lowlands and in England 
this led to the modernization of agriculture; while in the highlands it resulted first in 
the extensive grazing of sheep, and then in the creation of sporting estates.  In both 
cases the benefits of improvement were not universal, accruing as they did mainly to 
property owners.   
 While it has been argued that highly concentrated ownership (MacMillan 
2000) and restrictive legislation (Gillanders 1968) have prevented the operation of 
market forces in Scotland; the case is also made that the history of Scotland, at least 
since the mid-eighteenth century, has been greatly shaped by these forces (Carter 
1974).  There is truth to both claims, and the student of Polanyi (1944) will be inclined 
to view the history of Scotland as a clash between those who have wanted to create 
 156 
free markets for land and those who have wanted to intervene in those markets.  That 
the commoditization of land has been destructive to rural communities is a recurring 
theme in the literature of Scotland‘s community land movement (MacAskill 1999; 
McCrone 1997; McIntosh et al. 1994).  Land reform in Scotland, however, is not, and 
does not purport to be, anti- private property.  What it does claim is that other forms of 
property are needed in addition to private and state property; and it makes a strong 
case for the importance of community property.   
 The case for community property has partly to do with encouraging the 
development of resources that are likely to be neglected by mobile capital in favor of 
better investment opportunities elsewhere; but mostly it has to do with making sure 
that development happens in a way that benefits the local community.  The celebration 
of private property as a driver of productivity can ignore how patterns of ownership 
affect both the distribution of wealth and the types of goods produced.  A land reform 
concerned only with increasing wealth from the land through the promotion of 
individual enterprise could easily fail to improve the general well-being of local 
communities.  For this reason, community ownership, rather than focusing narrowly 
on increasing wealth, aims to make sure that needed services are provided; that the 
population is maintained; that wealth generated from the land is captured by the 
community; that the benefits of development are evenly spread; and that resources are 
managed for the long-term benefit of the community.  In pursuing this agenda, 
community ownership organizations are not trying to stifle private enterprise, but 
rather to create conditions under which local enterprise that will benefit the 
community can flourish.  In doing so, they seem to be responding to the words of John 
Bryden (or at least to a shared perception of what he perceived) when he said, ―We 
have paid too much attention to the growth of individual enterprises, and too little to 
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the development of the public goods on which the development of enterprises and 
communities both depend‖ (1996).   
 Land reform in Scotland is interesting because it doesn‘t break up large estates 
or redistribute land.  The scale of management in most cases remains about the same.  
What is changing is the degree of local, democratic control over how land is used.  In 
the words of Bryden and Hart: ―The issue in land reform is the extension of 
democracy and democratic practice‖ (Bryden and Hart 2000: 8).  Community 
ownership, by establishing local democratic control over land use, is intended to 
enable communities to capture the benefits of development and to be in control of 
their own futures.   
 It was apparent from talking to people in communities where buyouts had 
occurred that the land is important not only as a basis for economic development, but 
also as a tie of belonging to place and a source of identity.  The reaffirmation of this 
connection with the land and its cultural meaning has in many places generated a 
substantial increase in civic engagement and enthusiasm for community projects.  In 
this way, community ownership represents not merely a shift in the distribution of 
benefits arising from land use, but redefines the meaning of land—away from being 
merely a commodity—and in so doing redefines people‘s relationship to each other, 
recreating community and resulting in an altered landscape of possibilities for 
development. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Community Commons in Norway 
The Role of Common Property in Outfield Management 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
 Forests have the potential to generate a wide variety of non-commodity 
benefits such as wildlife habitat, avalanche protection, local economic development, 
watershed maintenance, and scenic beauty.  The provision of these benefits, however, 
can be threatened by fragmentation of management and by the public goods nature of 
the benefits.  The research described in this paper uses the case of community 
commons in Norway to examine the proposition that common property can be an 
effective means of protecting the public benefits of forest and rough grazing land.  It 
finds that while common property does provide a good way for farmers to manage 
large areas of land as an integrated whole, the degree to which these commons will 
contribute to local economic development depends on whether they are locally owned 
and on the rules governing the use of surplus.  Particular attention is given to the role 
of the state, which appears to be more beneficial in its regulatory capacity than as a 
landowner. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 
 When we think about what forests and grazing areas provide for society, we 
may be apt to think about the timber, milk, wool, and meat that the people who 
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manage these areas can sell in the market place.  But there are other benefits as well.  
Naturally-vegetated landscapes protect air quality, assimilate waste, provide habitat 
for biodiversity, and maintain water quality and supply (Libby and Stewart 1999).  
Forests contribute to the prevention of flooding and erosion, and in mountainous areas 
are necessary for avalanche control.  The high multiplier-effect of small-farm 
agriculture makes it an important component of rural economic viability (Meter and 
Rosales 2001; Green and Hilchey 2002; Grubinger et al. 2005); and the scenic and 
recreational values of both forests and farmland contribute greatly to the quality of 
rural life (Willis et al. 2003; Hilchey et al. 2008).   
 Despite the high value that people place on these benefits (e.g. Willis et al. 
2003); we cannot be confident that they will continue to be provided.  Their provision 
is threatened by fragmented management and by the public goods nature of the 
benefits, both of which give rise to problems of collective action.  Fragmentation is a 
problem because most of the benefits mentioned above cannot be provided by any one 
farm in isolation, but rather are the combined product of many landowners.  Many 
important ecological functions, from hydrology to habitat, need to be managed on a 
large scale (Forman and Godron 1986; Noss 1987; Dramstad et al. 1996).  Likewise, 
many of the challenges that landowners face, such as invasive plant species, cannot be 
dealt with on small parcels independently, due to their mobility across property lines 
(Fiege 2005).  Patterns of land use also matter.  The contents of a landscape, such as 
woods, fields, and roads, will function differently or have different effects depending 
on how they are arranged in relation to each other (Olson 1999).  Adverse effects of 
resource use on large ecosystems may not be immediately apparent at the point of use 
(Herring 1990); and practices that may not seem very harmful in moderation can add 
up to serious threats when enough people engage in them (Freyfogle 2003).  For all of 
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these reasons, the fragmented and uncoordinated management of rural land can 
undermine many of its potential benefits.   
 The public goods nature of these benefits is also problematic.  Because there is 
no way to exclude people from enjoying scenic views or enhanced air and water 
quality, it is difficult to make people pay for these services in the market place.  
Consequently, there is little financial incentive for landowners to provide these 
services however much they may be desired.  Ecosystem management, for example, 
requires a shift of focus away from the production of commodity outputs and toward 
the maintenance of conditions that foster the integrity of ecological processes (Zinn 
and Corn 1994); but it is only the production of commodity outputs that the market 
rewards.  As land managers employ production methods that enable them to remain 
financially competitive, the non-commodity benefits of forest and grazing land decline 
(Olsson and Rønningen 1999; Selvik 2004).  In places where there is pressure on 
forest land for conversion to other uses it may be impossible for forests to continue to 
exist based on timber sales alone (Kline et al. 2004; D'Amato et al. 2010).  ―This gap 
between public good value and private profitability has become an increasing obstacle 
to the effective overall management of the private woodland resource. Unless the 
public good elements can be either given value in the market place or appropriately 
supported by policy, a continued reduction in public good values seems inevitable‖ 
(Slee 2006: 2).   
 The situation of a private woodland owner trying to decide whether or not to 
invest in the provision of public goods has been likened to a prisoner‘s dilemma game 
(Glück 2000), in which woodland owners are likely to be punished for acting 
unilaterally in the public interest unless there is some mechanism for mutual 
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commitment between them.
32
  While the intervention of an external authority may 
seem like the simplest solution (Ophuls 1977), in practice the interests of a leviathan 
are likely to differ from those of local communities (Scott 1998).  Putting too much 
power in the hands of the state can lead to a decline of local management institutions 
and result in the degradation of natural resources (Lynch and Alcorn 1993; Pretty and 
Ward 2001; Wittman and Geisler 2005).  In response to a perception that state forest 
management has ―failed to steward forest ecosystems and maintain vital communities‖ 
(Baker and Kusel 2003: 2), proponents of ―community forestry‖ are calling for more 
local and democratic forest management (Brendler and Carey 1998; Lee and Field 
2005).  In order to overcome the problems of collective action that inhibit the 
production of public goods, Glück (2000) suggests that forest resources might be most 
effectively managed as common property regimes (see also McKean and Ostrom 
1995; Gibson et al. 2000).  When large forested areas are managed as a single unit by 
local community members who share in the benefits and control, we might expect 
there to be improved opportunities for overcoming problems of fragmentation and for 
internalizing positive and negative externalities.  In this way, common property 
regimes may offer a way of achieving community-based forestry‘s aim of moving 
―beyond the polarization between commodity production and ecological goals‖ 
(McCarthy 2002: 1) without relying heavily on state intervention.    
 
  
                                                 
32
 There are two ways in which the woodland owner‘s investment might go to waste.  First, on a small 
property, the attempt to provide a public good may be ineffectual without similar efforts being made on 
neighboring properties.  Second, if the investment makes it impossible to compete with other forest 
commodity providers, the woodland may gravitate to other management or to other uses.  Thus we can 
begin to perceive the necessary scope of a mutual commitment among woodland owners.  First, it must 
involve enough land of sufficient contiguity that the public goods in question can actually be provided.  
Second, it cannot be so large that it becomes impossible to organize woodland owners or, significantly, 
to organize public commitment to protecting what are mostly local public goods.   
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BACKGROUND 
 
 In order to understand common property in Norway, it is necessary to 
understand how the Norwegian farm is organized spatially.  Typically, it is divided 
into two spheres of activity, the infield (innmark) and the outfield (utmark). The 
infield is the area closest to the house and farm buildings. It is intensively managed 
and receives the most investment. It is typically composed of fenced fields with 
planted crops. The outfield, on the other hand, is less intensively managed and 
receives less investment. It is usually composed of rough hill grazing or forest. To the 
urban gaze, the outfield may appear as scenic wilderness, but to the farmer it is very 
much a part of the farm operation.  It contains important resources and its appearance 
is the result of centuries or millennia of human management.   
 A farm‘s infield is generally a sphere of private ownership and private activity.  
Outfield, on the other hand, is often shared by multiple farms.  Much of this land 
might be termed ‗commons‘ if we define ‗commons‘ broadly to mean resources 
regarding which there are arrangements for shared use and management.  There are a 
variety of different ways in which ownership or use-rights in the outfield are 
organized.  Some of these arrangements are referred to as commons in Norwegian 
(allmenning), while others are not called commons but might still be considered as 
such under our broad definition.   
 Formal arrangements for managing outfield resources as commons have 
existed in Norway since the early Middle Ages, appearing in customary law in the 10
th
 
century and in statutory law during the 13
th
 century (Sevatdal 1998).  Since those 
times the commons have undergone many changes—in ownership, in the relative 
importance of the resources they contain, and in the laws governing their use—but 
they remain to this day a vital way of managing resources in the outfield. 
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 When approaching the study of Norwegian commons, it is essential to 
remember that the various rights regarding resource use on a piece of land can be 
divided amongst various parties—for example, one party might have the right to 
harvest timber, while another party holds the grazing rights—and that these use-rights 
do not depend on ownership of the land.  A farm with grazing rights in a particular 
area is not necessarily one of the owners of that area.  Thus, historically, the 
ownership of some commons has changed hands (passing, for example, from the 
Crown to wealthy merchants) while many of the use-rights have remained in the hands 
of local farmers.  The actual owner of a piece of ground has a claim to the ‗remainder‘, 
or whatever rights are left over after all other claims have been accounted for.  The 
value of this remainder can vary over time as new uses for land are discovered.  
 Three of the most discussed types of commons are—and this is by no means an 
exhaustive typology—state commons, community commons, and land owned in 
common between farms (see Sevatdal 1998; Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).
33
   
 In the case of state commons, the land, originally Crown land, is today owned 
by Statskog, a state-owned forestry company (Berge et al. 2002; Statskog 2007).  The 
grazing rights in state commons, and the right to both firewood and timber for on-farm 
use, belong to the local farming population.  Any commercial logging of surplus 
timber is done by Statskog, who also manages hydropower, commercial tourism, 
mining, or any other uses of the land that do not fall within the rights of the local 
community.  There are two types of locally-elected board for managing local use-
rights in state commons.  One of these is the Mountain Board, which is elected by the 
                                                 
33
 ‗State commons‘ is a direct translation of the Norwegian statsallmenning.  The term ‗community 
commons‘ is used here to refer to bygdeallmenninger, or bygd commons.   The word bygd means ‗rural 
community‘.  Sometimes this type of commons is referred to as a ‗parish commons‘ in English.  I have 
chosen not to use this term in order to avoid any implied association between these commons and either 
the local church or the local public administration.  ‗Ownership in common between farms‘ is a legally 
precise translation of sameige mellom bruk, which refers to a set of arrangements that are not called 
commons at all in Norwegian but which nonetheless fit our broad definition.   
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municipal council (Norwegian statute 1975 §3) to manage grazing and other resources 
that are predominantly above the tree-line (Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).  The other is 
a Commons Board, which is elected by and from among the use-rights holders to 
manage rights of common in the forest (Norwegian statute 1992b §1).  Hunting and 
fishing are managed by the Mountain Board for the benefit of the whole municipality 
(Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).  It is important to note that use-rights in the commons 
are tied to particular farms, and are spoken of as belonging to these farms rather than 
to particular people.  These rights cannot be alienated from the farm; but a farm must 
be in active agricultural operation in order for its owner or lessee to exercise that 
farm‘s rights in the commons (Norwegian statute 1975 §2; Norwegian statute 1992b 
§2).  Today there are 195 state commons in Norway, covering a total area of more 
than 26,600 square kilometers, in which approximately 20,000 farms hold use-rights 
(Sevatdal 1998).  Seven of these state commons are managed as if they were 
community commons (Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).   
 Community commons are owned by the local farming community.  It is not 
necessarily the case that all local farms have a share in the ownership;
34
 but they do all 
have use-rights similar to those enjoyed in state commons, as well as the right to 
participate in the governance of the commons.  Community commons are managed by 
a board that is elected by and from among the owners and use-rights holders 
(Norwegian statute 1992a §§3-1, 4-1).  The board is responsible for hiring a commons 
manager, and this person is generally a qualified forester (Norwegian statute 1992a 
§3-5).  As the foregoing citations indicate, much of how community commons are 
                                                 
34
 ―Bygdeallmenninger are commons where the ownership rights belong to at least half of the 
agricultural properties that from old times have use-rights in the commons‖ (Norwegian statute 1992a 
§1-1, translation mine).  Commons in which fewer than 50% of the local farms share in the ownership 
would be termed ‗private commons‘—an historical situation that is now ―mostly extinct‖ (Berge et al. 
2002: 10; see also Berge and Tretvik 2004).  In most cases today, community commons are jointly 
owned by all of the local farms. 
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organized and managed is guided by special legislation to this purpose, the 1992 
Community Commons Act (Norwegian statute 1992a).  As in state commons, use-
rights are tied to farms.  They cannot be sold or leased apart from the farm; and to 
exercise them a farm must be an active agricultural operation.  Use-rights are based on 
need, which in practice means that resources in the commons are for on-farm use only; 
i.e., a farm is entitled to as much firewood as it needs for its own use, but may not sell 
firewood from the commons.  Larger farms may therefore make greater use of certain 
resources than smaller farms.  Although farms might gather firewood on an individual 
basis after checking with the commons manager; all logging of timber is done on a 
collective basis (Sevatdal 1998).  That is to say, with the exception of some firewood 
harvesting, logging activities are not carried out by individual farms, but rather happen 
under the supervision of the commons manager, with the actual work being done 
either by employees of the commons or by a private contractor.  Many community 
commons have their own sawmill; and each farm‘s right to timber from the commons 
takes the form of a discount when buying lumber from the mill (Grimstad and 
Sevatdal 2007).  Because the land in a community commons is owned by local farmers 
rather than by the state, it is these farmers who have the right to benefit from the 
development of hydropower, the sale of surplus timber, tourism (e.g. the leasing of 
cottages), and other commercial land uses.  Profits from these activities go first toward 
the maintenance and improvement of the commons, and are not normally disbursed as 
dividends to the owners.  Surplus funds are often invested in new businesses that are 
owned by the commons; or they may be used for community projects, such as 
electrification or the building of a community hall (Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).  
Hunting and fishing are managed by the commons board for the benefit of the whole 
community.  There are 51 community commons in Norway, covering a total area of 
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5,500 square kilometers, in which approximately 17,000 farms have use-rights 
(Sevatdal 1998).   
 Land owned in common between farms (sameige mellom bruk) differs from 
community commons in a number of ways,
35
 the most significant of which is that use-
rights do not belong to all local farms, but only to those that are the owners.  Owners 
do not necessarily have equal shares (Sevatdal 1998).  As with the other commons, a 
farm‘s share may not be alienated from the farm; but in this case it is not necessary for 
a farm to be occupied or in agricultural production in order to maintain its rights.  
Farms that own property in common may choose to establish a board for the sake of 
management (Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).  Land owned in common between farms 
does not generally include productive forest, but more usually pasture and other 
resources above the tree line (Grimstad and Sevatdal 2007).  More than 50,000 farms 
have a share in commons of this sort; and in the mountainous regions of southern 
Norway this is the main form of ownership (Sevatdal 1998).    
 
 The research described in this paper makes use of two case studies.  One of 
them is a community commons, and the other one is a state-owned commons that has 
been managed since the late 1940s as if it were a community commons.  There are 
about four hundred farms with use rights in each of these commons. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Berge (1993; 1998) emphasizes the distinction between ‗joint ownership‘ and ‗ownership in 
common‘.  (See Berge 1998 regarding the significance of this distinction.)  What we are calling 
commons, i.e. allmenninger, are technically a form of joint ownership.   
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METHODS 
 
 In order to understand how community commons coordinate the use and 
management of outfield areas in Norway, and to understand the role they play in 
promoting conservation and community development, a case-study research method 
was used.  Semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out with forest managers, 
farmers, and local officials in two commons in eastern Norway during the spring and 
summer of 2008.   
 The choice of these two commons was based on the distinction between them, 
which is that of ownership and residual rights.  In the case of the community 
commons, the land is owned by local farms.  In the case of the state commons that is 
managed as if it were a community commons, local farms have specific use and 
management rights, but the land is owned by the state.  Community forestry advocates 
place a strong emphasis on the importance of local control; and the distinction 
between these two cases was intended to help me understand whether local ownership 
is important or if secure local rights to use and management are sufficient.   
 The community commons in this study turned out to be an unusual case in that 
only a slight majority of the farmers are owners, and not all of the owners‘ shares are 
equal.  In most community commons, all the farmers are owners and each of them has 
an equal share.  Also, most commons are not permitted to distribute profits.  Any 
surplus is supposed to be reinvested.  The community commons in this study, 
however, does distribute some profit to the owners; 
 
although it is emphasized that this 
is of secondary importance and that the main priority is stewardship of the rights-
holders‘ common assets.  The unusual nature of this commons was unintentional as far 
as the study is concerned, but it turned out to be helpful as a further illustration of how 
ownership matters.   
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 Some of the questions that I asked interviewees were about how the commons 
is organized.  This information is summarized in the section above.  Most of my 
questions were aimed at understanding what sort of benefits the commons provides 
and how it provides these benefits.  In order to avoid asking leading questions at the 
beginning, all interviews opened with general questions about management goals and, 
especially, why there should be commons at all.  Detailed questions came later.  A 
number of trends emerged from the responses to early questions; and these trends 
guided my analysis and provide an outline for the findings below.   
 The main questions posed by this paper are:  Do community commons protect 
natural resources; and how do they do this?  Do they generate economic development; 
and how?  Does ownership matter; and how does it matter?  What is the role of the 
state, and what effect does it have?  The answers to these questions add up to an 
evaluation of the proposition that collective local control over outfield resources is 
beneficial in terms of conservation and community development.  
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FINDINGS 
 
 Interviews in both locations made it clear that commons in Norway are not 
simply a hold-over from the olden days, but vital institutions for outfield management 
today.  The two main reasons given by all interviewees for having a community 
commons are efficiency of management and keeping benefits local.  What follows is a 
summary of what interviewees said about these two things, as well as their comments 
on stewardship, participation in commons management, and how the use of common 
resources is changing.    
 
Efficiency 
 For forestry, grazing, and hunting, interviewees told me that it is more efficient 
to manage large areas as a whole.  One forest manager said that if every farmer had his 
own share of the forest it would amount to twenty-three hectares apiece.  He said that 
cutting timber is too expensive to do on parcels that small and farmers would lose the 
economies of scale necessary to log profitably.  All logging in community commons is 
done collectively.  Attempting to divide the vast and rugged grazing land up with 
fences would also be extremely expensive and would interfere with the movement of 
wildlife.  Many game species cannot be effectively managed on small parcels of land; 
nor can hunting be easily commercialized in small areas.  This is a significant point 
because in one of my cases hunting has become the leading source of revenue. 
 Economies of scale in commons management apply not only to resource 
extraction, but to processing as well.  In one location where farmers set up their own 
sawmill and planer more than a century ago, I was told that such a project would not 
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have been possible without a formal commons:  Just a few farmers wouldn‘t have 
been able to afford it; and four hundred farmers would never be able to make decisions 
without a board.  Because a small sawmill can be uneconomic, several commons will 
sometimes share a larger one.   
 This tendency to cooperate is widespread and continuously manifesting itself 
in new projects.  Farmers in the community commons case have formed numerous 
cooperative ventures apart from the commons itself.  These include a cooperative 
slaughterhouse; a cooperative workshop for fixing machines; a cooperative pig 
breeding facility;
36
 and a local branch of the national dairy cooperative.  A number of 
dairy farmers have also pooled their cows into a single herd, which they keep in a 
highly modern facility, each taking the various responsibilities in turn—an expensive 
venture that might not earn them any more money in itself, but which does provide 
each of them with more time to devote to other activities.   
 The question of efficiency was nowhere in my interview guide, but nobody 
failed to mention it as an essential factor.  Forestry, grazing, and wildlife management 
would not only be inefficient if the outfield were not managed as a commons, they 
would be commercially infeasible.   
 
Keeping benefits local 
 A recurrent theme in the responses to questions about how the commons 
contributes to local economic development was the importance of local ownership.  
Several interviewees said that state-owned commons don‘t put any money into the 
local economy, but ―send it all to Oslo‖ instead.  Community commons, on the other 
hand, ―think more locally‖ and try to create jobs.   
                                                 
36
 Nine hundred sows are bred at this facility before being distributed to thirty different farms where the 
piglets are actually born.  At eight weeks of age the piglets are distributed to an even larger number of 
farms to be raised.   
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 The case of the state commons that is managed as a community commons 
occupies a middle ground between these two.  When it was managed as a state 
commons, the farmers each logged individually and were only entitled to firewood and 
building materials according to their needs for on-farm use.  The surplus was logged 
by Statskog.  Since it came to be managed as a community commons in the late 1940s, 
all of the logging has been done under the management of the commons board.  The 
timber gets processed at a mill that is cooperatively owned by the farmers; and the 
farmers get a discount when they buy from the mill.  Most of the lumber gets sold to 
the public and the proceeds get reinvested in the mill and other projects.  Managing a 
state commons as a community commons, however, does not provide a community 
with all the benefits of an actual community commons; and this is due to the 
difference in ownership.  In a community commons, income from hunting, 
hydropower development, cabins, and other resources goes to the community.  In a 
state commons this revenue goes to the state, even when the forest is managed by a 
local commons board.   
 According to a municipal official responsible for economic development, 
community commons work to keep benefits in the local economy through a 
commitment to local reinvestment.  The community commons in this study owns or 
has a share in several local businesses,
37
 including a sawmill that employs twelve 
people; a company that employs eighteen people manufacturing pre-fabricated cabins; 
and a company that sells tools and building supplies.   
 Some community commons, because they are not permitted to distribute 
profits, will not only offer discounts on building materials, but actually subsidize 
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 This highlights a difference between community commons and land owned in common between 
farms.  Community commons are incorporated as juridical persons that can own property and employ 
labor.  Land owned in common between farms is not recognized as an entity in itself for tax or cadastral 
purposes, which is why it is difficult to quantify this type of land tenure (Sevatdal 1998).  Each co-
owner‘s share in land owned in this way is counted as part of that owner‘s estate.   
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building and maintenance activities on member farms.  In one community commons 
for example, if a farmer builds a new fence (on his or her own farm) he or she can 
recover fifty percent of the cost from the commons; the installation of drainage pipes 
is reimbursed at thirty percent; and various other building and construction activities 
are each similarly subsidized at their own rate.  Such rebates and grants are only given 
for activities in keeping with the legitimate agricultural needs of the farm.   
 The two key points that continually came up in discussion of how community 
commons contribute to local economic development were, first, the statutory 
obligation of the commons to reinvest profits; and second, the ability of a locally 
owned commons to explore new uses for the outfield, which in a state owned 
commons is a right that falls to the state.     
  
Stewardship 
 It is difficult in Norway to evaluate how common property affects forest 
stewardship.  The reason for this is that regulation by the state has an equalizing effect 
on forestry practices across all tenure types.  All forest owners, for example, are 
required to have a management plan, the substance of which is partly determined by 
law.  It is also obligatory for all forest owners to deposit a certain percentage of timber 
sales revenue into a Forest Trust Fund, which they can later draw upon to pay for 
forest stewardship activities.  (See Norwegian statute 2005.)  Most questions put to 
commons managers about forest management goals or conservation were answered 
with reference to regulations from the state.
38
 
 Nevertheless, interviewees did speak about differences in management based 
on ownership.  Scale is recognized as being important, since it is easier to set aside 
adequate land for protection and to accommodate wildlife mobility when working with 
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 For a discussion of Norway‘s long history of forest regulation see Berge and Tretvik (2004).  
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large areas.  Proximity of the owner to the forest was also thought to be important; and 
some interviewees thought that the increasing degree of forest ownership by ―city 
people‖ resulted in worse management.  I was told that a community commons invests 
more in the forest than either private woodland owners or the state, and that this is 
because the commons has a different philosophy—one described simply as the 
farmer‘s imperative to leave the land in better condition than he finds it.  One forester 
told me, ―Wherever there is a community commons, the forest is better managed than 
in a state commons.‖  Asked if he knew of any research demonstrating this, he replied 
that such research is ―not necessary; it‘s obvious to all.‖   
 Of course one of the questions with which I approached this study was the 
Hardin-inspired one of how individual users are prevented from abusing the commons.  
In both cases I was told that there‘s never any problem in this regard.  The reason for 
this appears to be how little discretion individual rights-holders have regarding 
resource use.
39
  Both of the commons have a professional manager; forestry is heavily 
regulated by the state; and individual use of the forest is limited to cutting firewood 
with permission from the manager.  In both commons grazing intensity was not high 
enough to be a matter of concern.   
 
Participation in management 
 There are approximately four hundred farms with use-rights in each of the two 
commons where I conducted interviews.  Many of these farms are quite small.  
Because use-rights in the commons depend on a farm being in active operation, the 
number of rights-holders has been in decline as the changing structure of agriculture 
                                                 
39
 That said, it should also be noted, for example, how often in Norway one is trusted to leave money in 
a box for things like coffee or remote toll roads.  The persistence of such a practice suggests that theft 
and stinting are not significant problems—and, by extention, that responsible resource use in the 
commons might be due to cultural factors as well as a lack of individual opportunity for abuse.   
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has tended to squeeze small farms out of production in favor of fewer, larger 
operations. 
 In both case-study locations I was told that the main way that individual farms 
participate in management is by voting in the election of board members.  Most 
farmers are not directly involved in the formulation of management plans for the 
commons—a task which falls chiefly on the commons manager.  ―Some members are 
active and some aren‘t,‖ one manager told me.  Those that are active serve on the 
board, come to the annual meeting, and call on the phone more often.  ―Others I‘ve 
never seen in twenty years.‖ 
 Despite the lack of active participation on the part of most commons members, 
I was assured that they take a strong interest in management decisions and that they 
make themselves heard when there is something they don‘t like.  Occasionally an 
issue will cause a political flare-up, such as happened recently when the community 
commons imposed a fee for fishing and small game hunting, which had previously 
been free.    
 I mentioned that the community commons in this study is an unusual case in 
that only a slight majority of the members are owners, and not all of those owners 
have an equal share.  Also, there is some distribution of profits, which is not permitted 
in most community commons.
40
  Thus, although all the farmers have the same use-
rights and the same political rights in the commons, they do not in this case have 
identical interests.  This situation has occasionally created tension, with differences in 
opinion about management priorities split along owner/non-owner lines (the smallest 
shareholders aligning with non-owners).  Tension between owners and non-owners is 
supposed to revolve around whether money is distributed as profits or reinvested in the 
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 It was said (by an owner) that were it not for the hydropower lease, which provides a significant 
income to the owner farms, there would be little difference between owners and use-rights holders.   
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commons.  I say ‗supposed to‘ because this insight was expressed by interviewees 
outside of the commons we are talking about.  Those who were living in the case-
study community made some reference to past tensions, but did not seem to think that 
there was currently any problem in this regard.   
 It‘s important to note that some forms of cooperative resource use happen at 
scales smaller than the whole commons.  One farm that I visited shares a centuries-old 
irrigation system with three other farms.  Participation in maintenance activities 
happens intermittently when there is a need for it.  The farmer said that he only 
communicates with his neighbors about irrigation once or twice per year; although 
they would quickly be in touch were a problem to arise.  It was clear that the amount 
of cooperative activity that went into maintaining this system had declined somewhat 
compared to previous generations, partly due to the fact that the farmers can now 
pump water from the river.  I asked him if he thought that technology was putting an 
end to cooperation.  He didn‘t think so.  ―These dams were the cooperation of the 
nineteenth century,‖ he said.  ―Today we have the [cooperative dairy].‖  He patted the 
mobile phone in his pocket, on which he would be alerted the moment he was needed 
for anything at the automated dairy barn he shares with four other farms.  ―The 
cooperative spirit isn‘t dead; the projects just change over time.‖ 
 
Changes in how the commons is used 
 Timber in Norway is managed mostly in even-aged softwood stands that are 
harvested in small clearcuts and then replanted.  Recent decades have seen tremendous 
changes in the technology used for harvesting timber;
41
 and these changes have had a 
major impact on employment opportunities in the forestry sector.  Sixty years ago, the 
community commons in this study employed seventy to eighty people cutting timber 
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 Approximately ninety percent of timber harvesting in Norway is fully mechanized (LMD 2007). 
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in the winter.  By 1990 this number was reduced to fifteen; and today there are only 
three.  A similar decline has been experienced in the case of the state commons that is 
managed as a community commons.  In both cases this is due to increased 
mechanization in the harvesting process.   
 When asked why they would adopt technology that eliminates jobs, one forest 
manager told me that they had to in order to keep out of the red.  They were the last 
commons to adopt big machines; but the price of lumber was falling and the cost of 
labor was rising, making it impossible to compete.  Most of the lumber (sixty to 
seventy percent) gets sold outside of the commons.  I am told that in some commons, 
private contractors are used for harvesting and other management activities, and that 
―technology and economy are driving this outsourcing.‖  The mills are also employing 
fewer workers.  At the time of these interviews, one mill had recently cut its workforce 
from thirty or forty workers to somewhere between twelve and fifteen due to the high 
cost of employing labor.  At a different mill I was told that whereas in 1954 the value 
of one cubic meter of timber was equal to four days wages, today one cubic meter of 
timber will pay only two- to three-tenths of a days wage.   
 Interviewees did not think that there was any immediate need for generating 
more employment; but they were concerned about attracting more people to settle in 
the community, and were particularly worried about the loss of young people.  I was 
told that young women especially want to leave because there is less work for them in 
the primary sector, and that this in turn makes rural areas less appealing to young men.   
 In the state commons that is managed as a community commons, the most 
important use is grazing.  This commons provides pasture to several thousand sheep 
and hundreds each of cows, horses, and goats.  In the community commons, however, 
grazing is no longer of great importance.  Here the most important sources of income 
are hunting, cabin leases, and forestry, in that order.  It was frequently said that as 
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agriculture declines, the commons must find new ways to remain a valuable resource 
for the community.   
 
 The researcher who goes out upon these commons with a notebook and folding 
chair in order to see how use-rights holders respond when one of their number begins 
to overharvest a resource is going to be sitting there a long time.  To the extent that 
individual use of resources does occur, it is at the discretion of a professional manager. 
Timber extraction is carried out by either a private contractor or a small number of 
commons employees under the manager‘s direction; and in both cases it is according 
to a harvest plan strongly influenced by national legislation.  Just as most farmers are 
not actively involved in the day-to-day harvesting of resources from the commons, 
neither are they regularly occupied with management decision-making, which is 
something that falls to the professional staff and board of directors.  The collective 
nature of how the commons is managed is a large part of the rationale for its existence.  
In the case of forestry, individual harvesting of the shared resource would scarcely be 
more efficient than dividing it into separate parcels.  In other cases, such as game 
management, the harvesting may be carried out individually, but the management still 
needs to be unified.  The benefits of efficiency seem to accrue equally to both of the 
commons in this study.  What sets them apart is how the land is owned and the effect 
this has on opportunities for local economic development.  In the particular state-
owned commons featured in this study, local farmers are able to benefit fully from the 
forest resource; but because they do not own the land, they cannot make any claim on 
emergent uses such as cabin rentals or power generation.  The community-owned 
commons on the other hand is able to capture the benefit of any new uses for the land.  
The more that people‘s needs change, both locally and in the global market, the more 
valuable this flexibility becomes.  Finally, the requirement that surplus from the 
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community commons be locally-reinvested makes this institution an important driver 
of local economic development. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
  Norway, with its various types of common property, provides a fascinating 
example of how a country may have diffuse ownership of rural land without the loss 
of landscape function that might result from fragmented management.  Community 
commons in particular are able to provide integrated management for large areas of 
forest and grazing land belonging to hundreds of private farms in a way that 
maximizes the productivity of these areas while keeping the benefits of that 
productivity local.  This study‘s examination of cases where ownership deviates 
somewhat from the typical community commons serves to highlight the important role 
that ownership (vis-à-vis use-rights) plays in the distribution of benefits over time.   
 Common property of all kinds in Norway maximizes the benefit of outfield 
areas by combining enough land to obtain a scale at which landscape functions are 
preserved and resources can be managed efficiently.  The economies of scale achieved 
by community commons have enabled them to generate more income from forestry, to 
carry out more reforestation, and to spur the creation of more new businesses than any 
other type of forest tenure (Bjørkhaug 1999).  Hunting, which in my community 
commons case has become the leading source of revenue, would be nearly impossible 
to commercialize on individual small properties.  Because the management of big 
game needs to happen at large spatial scales, it is common in Norway even for 
individual private landowners to cooperate in neighborhood groups when making 
game management plans (see Hoffman and Flø 2010).  Similarly, even where grazing 
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land in the outfield is divided into individual private properties, farmers frequently 
manage this land as if it were a commons, letting their animals graze together rather 
than undertaking the trouble and expense of stringing fences across the rough terrain.  
This kind of passive cooperation can happen informally; but, as one interviewee 
emphasized when talking about the sawmill in his commons, getting several hundred 
farmers to invest in a large project requires a more formal mechanism of commitment, 
as well as a steering committee and a process for participation in decision making.  
Projects such as hydropower are interesting because, although the energy is generated 
at one particular location, the water necessary for this to happen drains from a much 
larger area.  By having this entire area under a single management regime, a suitable 
flow of water for power generation can be maintained, while ensuring that the benefits 
from the project get widely distributed—or would be widely distributed if ownership 
in the commons were widely shared.    
 While integrated management is important for maximizing the total benefit 
that can be obtained from outfield areas; the issue of ownership bears heavily on how 
that benefit is distributed.  Bjørkhaug (1999: 11) asks, ―To what degree is the 
dichotomy between local and non-local property owner relevant for value added to the 
local community where the property is situated?‖  Her research indicates that 
community commons generate the greatest amount of commercial activity; but she 
attributes this mostly to their size, leading her to suggest that individual private forest 
owners would do well to pool their holdings in some way.  This is likely true; but it 
appears that the form of ownership itself is also important.  In the study described in 
this paper, the case of the state commons that is managed as a community commons 
makes it clear that the question of ownership has a big effect on the distribution of 
benefits.  Having a commons board is an improvement over individual use, in that it 
enables both collective management of the forest and collective reinvestment in 
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projects like the sawmill; but so long as the ground is owned by the state, income from 
hunting, hydropower development, cabin leases, and other forms of development goes 
to the state rather than to the local community.  The perception is that it all ―goes to 
Oslo.‖   
 It has been argued that ―No other form of management has done more to create 
wealth and employment locally in the rural districts in relation to its resources and 
output than has that of the [community] commons‖ (Finsveen 2000: 5).  If this is true, 
it is easy to see why: wealth generated by community commons must be reinvested in 
the commons rather than distributed as dividends.  It is required by statute that 
sufficient funds must first be set aside for the protection and improvement of the 
commons, after which additional surplus may be invested in processing facilities and 
other projects for the benefit of the community (Norwegian statute 1992a §3-12).  
Even in the unusual case featured in this study, which does distribute dividends, such 
distribution is of secondary priority to reinvestment.  Businesses that are owned or 
partly owned by this commons play an important role in the local economy.   
 In each of my case studies, however, the ability of the commons to provide 
employment appears to be undermined by changes in technology, which in turn are 
driven by changing markets.  The mechanization of timber harvesting has nearly 
wiped out employment in the woods.  Interviewees did not perceive this as a problem, 
due to the steady decline in population; but it does highlight the hazard of participation 
in global markets, which reintroduce the dynamic of a prisoner‘s dilemma game.  The 
commons is now competing with other timber producers that do not share its 
commitments, in an effort to sell timber to a pool of buyers that have no interest in 
maintaining the local public goods that stewardship of the commons can deliver.  This 
situation suggests that common property as an arrangement between producers may 
not be enough.  Maintaining the full public benefit of the commons may also require a 
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commitment from the broader population of beneficiaries to either purchase or 
subsidize its products.   
 As times change, the relative values of different resources in the commons 
change as well.  Where timber and pasture were once the most important resources, 
recreational hunting, the lease of holiday cabins, and the generation of hydropower 
have become leading sources of revenue.  And as the value that society places on 
different resources shifts, the significance of ownership becomes more apparent.  
Community commons, because they own the land, are able to capture emerging new 
values.  Communities that only have use-rights in state owned commons don‘t have 
this same ability; and this limits the potential for these commons to contribute to local 
economic development.  The unusual case of the community commons in this study 
also illustrates how unequal ownership amongst commons members can result in an 
unequal distribution of benefits.  All members have equal use-rights in terms of 
grazing and timber; but the value of these rights is declining.  The revenue from new 
forms of resource use, such as hydropower generation, goes only to those farms that 
are the owners of the commons.   
 The symbolic importance of the commons was mentioned repeatedly during 
interviews with members of the community commons.  I was told that many farmers 
take a great deal of pride in the commons, and that membership can be an important 
part of a farmer‘s identity.  It was also said that the commons is tied to local identity 
and contributes to pride of place.  It was clear in both cases that the commons is not an 
outdated hold-over from the olden days, but an essential institution for managing the 
landscape today.  In the words of one farmer, ―If we did not inherit the commons from 
the past, we would have to invent it for the future.‖ 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In complete contrast to the suggestion that individual ownership of resources is 
necessary to avoid a ―tragedy of the commons‖ (Hardin 1968; Smith 1981), this paper 
affirms the view that because many of the benefits of good forest and wildlife 
management cannot be internalized on small parcels of land, it may be best to manage 
them as a commons (Uphoff 1998; Glück 2000) in order to avoid a tragedy of 
fragmentation.  At the very least it may be said that the joint ownership of forest and 
grazing land by a few hundred farms does not necessarily result in the over-use of 
these resources; nor does it stifle enterprise.  On the contrary, community commons in 
Norway have managed outfield resources sustainably for centuries, using the wealth 
they generate to foster the growth of local enterprises that add value to raw materials 
through processing.   
 In light of the community forestry movement‘s opposition to state control 
(Baker and Kusel 2003; Lee and Field 2005) it behoves us to make specific note of the 
significant role played by the Norwegian state in community commons management.  
The way that a community commons operates, from the election of its board to the 
ways it may expend revenue, is determined by statute.  The commons themselves were 
not created by statute—the law itself acknowledges that the use-rights of farms are 
founded on ancient custom—but they are today regulated by statute.  Forestry is also 
highly regulated everywhere in Norway; a fact that makes it difficult to compare the 
conservation practices of community commons to those of other tenure types, at least 
from a silvicultural perspective. 
 Regulation, however, is not the same thing as ownership; and one thing we can 
say is that the issue of state ownership versus community ownership makes an 
important difference in terms of community development opportunities.  This becomes 
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especially apparent over time as uses for the commons change.  In the state commons, 
the benefit of new uses goes to the state.  In the community commons, the local 
community is able to capture the benefit of new uses. 
 In sum, community commons accomplish two important things.  First, they 
provide integrated management for large areas of outfield, which is beneficial both in 
terms of efficiency and from an ecological perspective.  Second, they keep the benefits 
of resource management local through local ownership and a commitment to 
reinvestment.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Each of us has interests that are widely dispersed across the landscape.  The 
scenery that we enjoy is composed of many different people‘s private property and 
shaped by the decisions they make.  The deer on one person‘s land depend on the 
neighboring properties as well for food and shelter.  The river that flows through a 
valley and village finds its source in the forest above, where the rains are stored up and 
slowly released.  Were this forest to be removed, the once steady flow of clean water 
would fluctuate between destructive flooding and a trickle at the bottom of a dry 
stream bed.  Perhaps the people who live downstream and who depend on this river 
for their drinking water, for fishing, or to power their mills—perhaps they have never 
given a thought to the forest above.  Perhaps they have never given a thought to the 
property of any of their neighbors and have always said, ―You mind your business and 
I‘ll mind mine.  If either of us wants something from the other, we‘ll make a deal.‖  
Perhaps they do not realize how interconnected everybody‘s business is, and the 
complexity to which this gives rise.   
 When a downstream person realizes their interest in the forest, what can they 
do?  If the forest is divided into many small parcels of ownership, they won‘t be able 
to sue any of the owners for cutting down trees, because the actions of any one owner 
don‘t have a significant enough impact.  For this very same reason it would be useless 
to pay any particular owner not to cut down trees.  If there were but a single forest 
owner, and a downstream person, a mill owner for example, were considering paying 
that person to protect the forest, the mill owner‘s incentive to do so would be 
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undermined by the realization that everybody else downstream would benefit from the 
investment.  Other mill owners that don‘t have to operate with that cost would put the 
forest-protector out of business.  If somebody were collecting contributions toward 
forest protection, many potential contributors might reason that either enough other 
people will contribute or they won‘t, and the likelihood of one more contribution 
affecting the outcome is pretty small.  In any case, they can wait and see and maybe 
contribute later.   
 The situation with which people up and down this river are faced is that they 
all have an interest in the same thing—the forest‘s contribution to a healthy river 
system.  They would each like to be able to have a secure claim to this benefit.  What 
sort of arrangements would make this possible?  No matter how much we might like 
the idea of individual private property, we have to admit that there are some things for 
which this type of ownership doesn‘t work well:  specifically, things in which many 
people have an interest and which can‘t be divided up without a significant loss in 
value.  On a certain level, the solution to this problem is easy:  things that multiple 
people want and which can‘t be broken-up need to be shared.  This answer is most 
easily applied when we are talking about a particular group of individuals who all 
might hold title, jointly or in common, to an easily defined resource from which they 
all want to harvest the same kind of benefit(s).  For example, a tennis court or a 
pasture; and in the case of the latter, we are thinking of it only as a site of grass 
production and not as a cultural landscape, a means of carbon-sequestration, or habitat 
for birds.  This dissertation does not need to argue that common property is a viable 
alternative to the classical model, as the success of many long-functioning common 
property regimes has been well documented elsewhere (Bromley and Feeny 1992; 
Burger et al. 2001; Eggertsson 1993; McCay and Acheson 1987; Netting 1981; 
Ostrom 1990; Stevenson 1991).   
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 But in some respects, common property is only a small conceptual leap away 
from the classical model.  It is a shift from one easily identifiable owner to a group of 
easily identifiable owners; but these owners still might share between them a complete 
and sacred bundle of rights to a particular resource or to a particular piece of land with 
which they will brook no interference from society.  Such an arrangement, if well 
organized, may be the solution to some problems of collective action in rural land use; 
but it does not obviously apply to others.  In the example given above, of a river and a 
forest, most people in the valley and the village do not need to share in the ownership 
of the forest; they only want it to be managed in a way that maintains the health of the 
river.  The forest owners in turn have an interest in anything people downstream are 
doing that might interfere with fish, whose spawning runs bring nutrients back to the 
forest.  Most of these people may also have an interest in other forms of wildlife and 
their habitat needs; in the protection of farmland to ensure local food security; in the 
appearance of their surroundings; in recreational access to undeveloped land; and in 
countless other benefits that are affected by the decisions of landowners.  Our interests 
are scattered so broadly across the landscape that to address them within the 
framework of common property requires a concept of commons that can be scaled up 
to include entire communities and entire landscapes.  This seems to risk crowding out 
private ownership—unless we acknowledge that people may have secure claims 
regarding particular resources without actually owning those resources. 
 Two key points come into play here.  The first is that the bundle of property 
rights usually associated with ownership can be broken apart.  It is not necessary to 
acquire a farmer‘s land, for example, in order to prevent him or her from building on 
it.  A neighbor or an organization can simply acquire a conservation easement on all or 
part of the land, leaving title with the farmer but limiting his or her right to develop.  
Similarly, a group of people could purchase the hunting rights or trail easements from 
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a large number of landowners and in this way begin to knit together fragmented 
landscapes for recreational purposes without concentrating ownership.  A second and 
related point is that the owner is not the only person with rights regarding a piece of 
property.  The general public may also have rights.  Singer (2000) uses the example 
laws preventing discrimination in places of public accommodation in the United States 
to illustrate how the rights implied by an owner‘s title are limited by the entitlements 
of others.  In Norway and Scotland, all persons have a right of recreational access to 
undeveloped land (Norwegian statute 1957; OPSI 2003).  Landowners do not have the 
option of putting up ‗no trespassing‘ signs.  In Norway, public rights of access have 
existed since ancient times; but in Scotland they are new, having been established by 
the Land Reform Act in 2003.  The examples of Scotland and of the United States 
(where public accommodations law was articulated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 
show not only how the rights of ownership may be limited by society, but how these 
rights and limitations change over time.  To describe the public‘s rights as sticks that 
have been removed from the property owner‘s bundle is to create an image that 
privileges the rights of land ownership, making it seem as if the property owner has 
been deprived in some way and may be deserving of compensation.  One could just as 
easily describe these rights as sticks in the bundle of citizen‘s rights; for it is not only 
landowners who have rights.   
 The need for arrangements through which people can achieve secure protection 
for shared interests that are spread broadly across the landscape, while still leaving 
individual rights as intact and diffusely held as possible, invites us to think very 
creatively about property rights in general and about commons in particular.  In the 
case of the Norwegian jaktvald, or hunting management area, the land in question is 
divided into numerous parcels of private property.  Hunting rights go with ownership 
of the land, but landowners do not own the moose.  It is as if the moose were a river 
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flowing across the land, and being a landowner comes with the right to draw off a 
certain amount of water, although the exact amount might vary from year to year.  
Because the health of the moose population is affected by the actions of all 
landowners and cannot be effectively influenced by any particular landowner, they all 
have an interest in what the others are doing and participate in arrangements for 
managing the population cooperatively.  It is significant that the moose do not belong 
to the landowners.  Like all wildlife, they are held in trust for the people of Norway by 
the Norwegian state.  Although hunting rights belong to the landowners, permits from 
the state are required in order to exercise these rights.  These permits are allocated 
once the landowners have submitted their cooperatively-made management plan—
which explains the otherwise surprising fact of landowner cooperation:  they need to 
do it in order to get their permits.  The ability of the state to withhold hunting permits 
in the event that a management plan should be deemed unsatisfactory allows the larger 
public interest in moose to be protected.  In this example we see how a sort of 
commons can emerge on private property through the cooperation of private 
landowners in managing a resource, without any real estate actually held in common.  
The landowners each have a usufructory right to the same resource and have created 
an institution that enables them to manage their overlapping claims. 
 The word ‗commons‘ may have too great a tendency to conjure in people‘s 
minds the image of a thing, like a pasture, that may be shared or divided, and in so 
doing to divert attention away from the fact that the focus of concern in commons 
dilemmas is an outcome, a fate that is shared by a group of people and which is the 
cumulative product of each of their separate actions—actions that might just as easily 
take place on their own private property as on shared property.  The example of dairy 
farmers each producing more milk in response to low prices that are caused by 
overproduction might be referred to as a tragedy of the commons.  Using the word 
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‗commons‘ in this context creates a simpler and more immediate image of the 
situation than referring to it as a prisoner‘s dilemma game.  Indeed, one of the earliest 
uses of the commons analogy was to describe conditions in a labor market (Lloyd 
1833).  But when we speak of ‗tragedies of the commons‘ in reference to natural 
resource management, we have to be careful not to let the word ‗commons‘ lead us to 
thinking of a piece of ground over which ownership is shared.  Just as property is not a 
thing, but a set of relationships; we mustn‘t think of common property as a thing, but 
rather as a set of relationships for managing behaviors that affect a shared set of 
benefits.
42
  Once we define it in this way we can adjust our gaze and begin to see 
common property, or the need for common property, in a wide variety of situations—
essentially anywhere that people are faced with problems of collective action 
resembling a prisoner‘s dilemma game.  But we mustn‘t let the imagery of a grazing 
commons lead us to assume that the solution to these problems in natural resource 
management necessarily has to do with the way that ownership of land is distributed.  
The case of moose management in Norway makes it clear that it does not. 
 The example of moose management, at least as I have presented it, is fairly 
simple because it involves only one resource that is providing one type of benefit to a 
well-defined group of people who all hold similar rights regarding that resource.
43
  Far 
more complicated is the imaginary example discussed earlier of a river flowing 
through a valley and a village from its source in the forest above.  Different people 
rely on this river for different things, and neither the benefits it provides nor the 
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 It‘s also important in this regard to look at relationships in practice, and not only as they are legally 
defined.  In Norway it is often the case that separate but contiguous parcels of private grazing land are 
managed as if they were a commons; while some commons in Scotland have become de facto private 
property where the number of users has dwindled to one. 
43
 The example could, and should, be made considerably more complicated by introducing the interests 
of non-landowning hunters; of forest owners concerned about the effects of browsing; of the general 
public as expressed by state agencies; and of many other members of Norwegian society whose 
interests are in some way bound up with moose and the resources on which a healthy moose population 
depends. 
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sacrifices required to preserve these benefits fall equally on all interested parties.  It is 
a situation that closely resembles my case study in Vermont, where it was verified that 
problems of collective action are a significant obstacle to the achievement of a shared 
preference for a less developed, or less haphazardly developed, landscape.  There do 
not currently appear to be any adequate institutional arrangements that might enable 
people to cooperate around this goal; and the question arose, why couldn‘t the public 
planning process serve this function?  One might even naïvely suppose this to be its 
raison d'être.  The utility of planning as a tool for this purpose, however, was 
hampered in the case study community by people‘s beliefs and expectations regarding 
property.  These beliefs and expectations closely resemble the classical model of 
property, and were held by landowners and planners alike.  However little 
resemblance these beliefs bore to the legal reality, the effect they exercised on the 
planning process was decisive.   
 McKean and Ostrom suggest that in order to maximize the value of their own 
land, individual owners will want to makes sure that their neighbors ―make compatible 
and complimentary uses of their parcels.‖  In other words, ―owners of individual… 
parcels may have an interest in the mutual regulation of land use.‖  They go on to 
suggest that ―zoning and urban planning are actually the creation of common or shared 
property rights in choices over land use and the vesting of those rights in the citizens 
of a municipality‖ (1995: 8).  Geisler makes the similar observation that ―land use 
regulation is a collective property right in the bundle‖ (2000: 70).  From this 
perspective, Jefferson‘s idea that the land belongs to all might find expression, neither 
through equal division nor sharing of the soil, but through the public having a legal 
interest in all private land use.   
 The idea of land use planning as a form of mutual agreement between 
landowners (and other citizens) would seem to offer a good way for them to cooperate 
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in pursuit of shared goals.  But this is not the way people in my Vermont case study 
viewed planning.  Instead, it was seen as an encroachment on the interests of 
landowners and, as more than one person put it, a violation of their human rights.  The 
cultural dominance of the classical model has crippled our understanding of property 
in two ways that make it difficult to innovate.  First, we have come to believe that 
ownership is supposed to be a sphere of complete control.  This makes it hard to 
accept that those without title can have any rights regarding a piece of land.  Second, 
we are led to see property rights as the outcome of a contest between individuals and 
the state.  This perspective makes it hard to see that the rights of individuals are 
limited by the rights of other individuals, and that planning can be a way for people to 
negotiate these limits to their mutual advantage.  For planning in the United States to 
fulfill its potential, these cultural barriers must be addressed.  Rather than bowing to 
the popular conception of private property rights, planners should take pains to counter 
it with a discourse aimed at dissolving the hard shell of classical ownership and 
creating the space and flexibility needed for more innovative property arrangements.  
Civic republicanism may offer a moral high ground in terms of property rights 
rhetoric; and it may also be useful to employ imagery of shared landscapes knit 
together by natural processes and borderless human activity.   
 In Darin-Drabkin‘s (1977) model and in many of the Scottish cases where 
community buy-outs have taken place, individuals hold private use rights (they might 
own a house, for example) but the land itself is owned by the community.  This allows 
the community interest to be expressed regarding private land use.  Mutual regulation 
through democratic land use planning might be a viable alternative to shared 
 209 
ownership; but this would require that the absoluteness of each private owner‘s sphere 
of control be relaxed enough to make room for the claims of others.
44
   
 A major concern of landowners in the Vermont case study was that the costs of 
regulation would be distributed in ways that are not only unequal but unfair.  They 
feared that restrictions on land use would affect different property owners differently 
and cause some of them to lose a disproportionate share of value.  They are almost 
certainly right about this, and it presents us with a difficult puzzle.  Even those 
landowners in the study who agreed that wildlife habitat should be protected were 
angry at the unfairness of imposing restrictions on those who had practiced good 
stewardship, by zoning undeveloped areas as conservation land, while rewarding those 
who had already destroyed habitat by zoning their land for further development.
45
  
While it is certainly possible to devise mechanisms for transferring value, either 
between landowners directly (e.g. by establishing a market for development rights) or 
in the form of payments from the town to those whose opportunities are being 
restricted (payments that might be funded in part by increased taxes on those whose 
opportunities are being expanded); the real puzzle will be figuring out the extent to 
which this ought to be done.  This is partly a calculation problem.  The person whose 
land has been ―placed‖ in a conservation zone, for example, is losing some property 
value due to decreased development opportunity, but is also gaining some value as a 
result of being surrounded by other conservation land.  If we were to consider 
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 Geisler (2000) cautions us not to exaggerate the difference between community ownership and the 
tenure of a typical American property owner who must pay ―rent‖ in the form of property taxes to the 
municipality and who is subject to land use regulation from the same.  One of the reasons why 
community ownership is needed in Scotland is that there isn‘t any local government that could perform 
an equivalent role.  Lynch and Alcorn (1993) make a distinction between community ownership of land 
and community-based tenure systems.  In the case of the latter, ownership of land may be private and 
individual, but the institutions for organizing property rights and which give legitimacy to ownership 
are based in the community.   
45
 The anger and sadness of some landowners was less about the loss of development opportunity than it 
was about the fact that the community, instead of thanking them for their stewardship, was casting them 
in the role of a threat that needed to be restrained.   
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compensating people for lost property values resulting from public regulation, we 
would also have to begin accounting for the ways that public regulation and spending 
increase property values in order to arrive at an understanding of the net result (Morris 
2010).  The special status of landowners as being entitled to any compensation at all 
for a loss in property value might also be questioned, since the government regulates 
behavior and industry in any number of ways that might frustrate somebody‘s 
expectations and diminish an opportunity for making money.  But to suggest that 
landowners should understand their rights as being subject to change at any time flies 
in the face of one of property‘s basic functions, which is to provide stability and 
protection for people‘s ―reasonable expectations‖ (Sax 1980: 186).  Without secure 
property rights, the landowner‘s incentive toward investment and stewardship would 
be diminished.  So it may be that some degree of compensation is warranted when 
property owners experience a loss in value; but it does not necessarily follow that this 
compensation must equal the full market value (Dagan 2010).  Again we must 
consider that property owners are not the only ones with expectations.  Things like 
wildlife and river systems are held in trust for the people by their public institutions, 
whose claims overlap with those of private landowners.  ―The central idea of the 
public trust,‖ Sax tells us, is to prevent ―the destabilizing disappointment of 
expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title‖ (Sax 1980: 
188).  It may be that property owners need to keep the public‘s ―reasonable 
expectations‖ in mind when forming their own expectations.  The complexities of this 
are considerable; and the questions of when and to what degree landowners should be 
compensated are more than I can delve into here.  What I can say, however, based on 
my case study in Vermont, is that changes in zoning bylaw might face less resistance 
if efforts were made to spread the costs and benefits, if not equally, at least in some 
way that is perceived as fair.   
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The difficulty of rearranging property rights is of course an old story.  In the 4
th
 
century BC Aristotle wrote about Phaleas of Chalcedon, ―who was the first to affirm 
that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.  He thought that in a new 
colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a 
state was already established…‖ (The Politics: 1266a37-1266b3, italics mine).  It is 
significant to note in this regard that community ownership in both Scotland and 
Norway has come about as the result of market-based transactions.  What makes land 
reform in Scotland somewhat less than radical is the need for communities to buy their 
land from the landlord and that in most cases this can only be done if he or she is 
willing to sell.  In Norway too, in the case of the community commons, the ownership 
rights were purchased by farmers from certain merchants in the 18
th
 century.    
 In land use planning, the question of how costs and benefits are distributed 
may be secondary to the question of process.  If people are to perceive local land use 
planning as a community problem-solving tool rather than as an expression of state 
power, every effort needs to be made to ensure that the process really is as inclusive, 
participatory, and democratic as possible.  Numerous attendees at public meetings 
during the case study in Vermont spoke of ―the government,‖ which they perceived to 
be threatening their rights, as if it were something other than the group of neighbors in 
the room with them.  While it is true that the town planning process is both enabled 
and prescribed by Vermont statutes, the outcome of that process is in the hands of 
those local people who choose to participate in it.  It would be well for Vermonters to 
make a categorical distinction in their minds between their own local democratic 
processes and ―the government.‖  When cooperation of any kind is viewed with 
suspicion as an encroachment on individual liberty, it becomes hard to understand 
cooperation as an alternative to authority.  Society is full of problems that need to be 
solved collectively, and complex societies especially require a lot of coordination.  
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Any opportunity that people have for self-governance should be pursued in earnest, 
since failures to cooperate successfully are an open invitation for authoritarian 
intervention.  The connection between property rights and democratic practice in this 
regard is a close one.  The idea that private property rights are a product of negotiation 
in pursuit of shared values suggests the need for a process that can enable such 
negotiation to happen, and is tied to the civic republican belief that political liberty 
means the ability to engage with others in collective self-government.  The idea of 
property-as-commodity, on the other hand, is rooted in the idea of society as a market 
place where people compete in the absence of any social obligations—a situation that, 
however cloaked in the rhetoric of liberty, is bound to generate the need for authority.   
 Having cast the role of authority in a sufficiently ominous light, and having 
suggested in sympathy with Kropotkin (1902) that state intervention lies at the 
opposite end of a spectrum from community cooperation, I must now temper this view 
with a discussion of one of the more interesting observations that can be made across 
all four of my studies: that the state can serve as a facilitator of local cooperation.   
 Because the community forestry literature portrays local democratic control as 
something to be pursued in opposition to state power (Baker and Kusel 2003; Lee and 
Field 2005), I was quite prepared to see things that way as well.   In each of my 
studies, however, I was forced to abandon any simple notion of power shifting along a 
spectrum between the state and the community.  In most cases, the state‘s involvement 
served to increase rather than to diminish community capacity.   
 The state‘s enabling role in local resource management was greatest in the two 
Norwegian studies.  The way that a community commons operates, from the election 
of its board to the ways it may expend revenue, is determined by statute. The 
commons themselves were not created by statute—the law itself acknowledges that 
the use-rights of farms are founded on ancient custom—but they are today regulated 
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by statute.  Forestry practices are also highly regulated everywhere in Norway.  In the 
study about moose hunting, the effort to create larger management areas and to have 
longer-term planning was an initiative of the state.  Local hunters still write their own 
management plans, but the state offers them incentives to work together at a larger 
scale.  In the effort to weld many small local commons into a few larger ones, the state 
might have taken power from local groups and adopted a greater management role for 
itself.  Instead, it became a facilitator of inter-local cooperation.  In addition to the 
incentives for cooperation, state scientists act as a resource for hunters, who take an 
active role in research.  There is a two-way flow of information as hunters gather the 
data that is needed to do the science that informs their own management planning.  In 
the comparison between two Norwegian commons, what was most noteworthy was 
that the state appears to be more beneficial in its regulatory capacity than as an owner.  
Community ownership makes an important difference in terms of community 
development opportunities; and this becomes especially apparent over time as uses for 
the commons change. In the state-owned commons, the benefit of new uses goes to the 
state and doesn‘t get reinvested in the community.  In the community commons, the 
local community is able to capture the benefit of any new uses. 
 The most obvious role of the state in the Scottish study is in its legislative 
capacity.  Passage of the Land Reform Act established the community right to buy and 
stipulated the legal form that a community organization must take.  A number of 
community buy-outs occurred prior to or outside the provisions of this act; but even 
prior to the land reform act the Community Land Unit of Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise, the government development agency for the area, provided advice and 
assistance to communities who wanted to pursue community ownership.  Money to 
support community buy-outs has come from the National Lottery.  Like in Norway, 
the beneficial role of the state in Scotland seems to consist of providing resources and 
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a framework of rules within which local groups can take responsibility for managing 
their own assets.  The two communities in which things didn‘t seem to be working as 
well both deviated from this pattern:  In one, the land was bought by the government 
instead of by the community; and in the other there is no community organization as 
required under the provisions of the community right to buy. 
 The often beneficial role of the state in Norway and Scotland and the 
observation that it matters what the state does, not simply the degree to which it is 
present, invites speculation about what the state might do to improve the prospects for 
local community planning in Vermont.  Three things come most readily to mind.  One 
has to do with how the costs of landscape protection are distributed.  Since the effects 
of conservation are state-wide, benefitting both developed towns and the tourism 
industry (which is taxed by the state), it may help everybody for the state to enable 
greater conservation by making funding for it less local.  The second two things the 
state might do are both statutory.  One would be to change or expand the ways that 
towns are allowed to collect revenue.  The use of property tax instead of income tax is 
not only unfair in terms of people‘s ability to pay; it also creates a poor incentive 
structure for achieving Vermonters‘ current goals.  It pressures landowners to 
subdivide their land, increasing fragmentation (NASS 2005); while at the same time 
creating for the town an interest in real estate development rather than in conservation.  
From a community development standpoint, the use of property tax as the main source 
of revenue provides little incentive for the town to increase employment or raise 
incomes.  The focus instead becomes the increase of taxable property, much of which 
might provide little benefit to the community in terms of services or amenities.  Lastly, 
there may be ways that the state can nudge Vermonters toward greater engagement in 
the planning process without exerting too much control over the outcome of that 
process.  For example, the state might require each town to make a conservation plan 
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that meets certain minimum criteria without dictating what that plan should be.  
Towns are not currently required to have any plan at all—a fact often alluded to by 
those trying to obstruct the planning process.  The case of moose management in 
Norway suggests that instead of absolutely requiring people to cooperate with their 
neighbors, it can be effective to make the right to certain benefits of that cooperation 
contingent on participation in the process, as is the case with hunting permits in the 
jaktvald.  Such an arrangement is consistent with Simon‘s characterization of social-
republican property, ―requiring that the [rights-holders] bear a relation of potential 
active participation in a group or community constituted by the property‖ (1991: 
1336).   
 When it comes to deer management in Vermont, it may be that private 
individuals hold too few rights.  Like in Norway, wildlife in Vermont is a public trust.  
Unlike in Norway, however, where landowners own the hunting rights and take 
responsibility for wildlife management; hunting rights in Vermont belong to the state, 
which takes full management responsibility.  The problem with this is that there is 
very little the state can actually do to manage wildlife.  State agencies can place 
restrictions on the hunting of various species, but this mainly serves to limit 
overharvesting.  In places where the deer are too numerous and prevent forest 
regeneration, there is little the state can do to either protect the forest or to keep the 
deer population at a healthy level.
46
  Landowners control both hunting access and 
habitat, but don‘t currently have any incentive to provide either of these things.  The 
state and the public should acknowledge that since landowners are the only ones in a 
position to effectively manage wildlife, it would make sense to provide them with the 
incentives they need to do it well.  This might entail transferring the harvesting rights 
                                                 
46
 There is little that a private landowner could do either, even if he or she exercised complete autonomy 
on the property, so long as most of the neighbors refused to allow hunting (as is often the case).   
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(including the right to profit from the sale of hunting permits) to private landowners, 
but making the exercise of these rights contingent on participation in an organization 
of landowners in which the management rights (including the allocation of permits) 
are vested.  Like in Norway, the state could reserve the ultimate right to veto 
management plans if they violate the public trust.  The Norwegian example suggests 
that considerable devolution of power is possible so long as some mechanism exists to 
make the exercise of that power responsive to broader public interests. 
 
 The chief question with which I embarked upon the studies described in this 
dissertation was how the problems associated with fragmenting a landscape into 
separate spheres of control can be avoided while still maintaining a wide distribution 
of private rights.  As the various studies indicate, it is possible both to have divided 
ownership without divided management and to have shared ownership that maintains a 
wide distribution of benefits, including individual private use-rights.  Either situation 
has the potential to preserve the ecological functions of the land.  The generation of 
local economic development, however, may require not only that management be 
coordinated, but also that ownership be local.  My analysis of the community land 
movement in Scotland and my comparison of two Norwegian commons both indicate 
why this is so:  local ownership enables the community both to capture the value of 
their natural resources and to make locally-needed investments that mobile capital 
would avoid.
47
    
 Whatever cultural impediments may exist in the United States to implementing 
a civic republican model of property,
48
 practitioners in the fields of natural resource 
management and community development may take heart that such a model is feasible 
                                                 
47
 And that the state might avoid as well: witness the widespread closure of rural post offices in Britain.   
48
 Or social-republican, as Simon (1991) calls it. 
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and holds a certain amount of promise.  Because property rights are neither sacred nor 
absolute, but socially-created, flexible tools, people can arrange them in a wide variety 
of ways to serve their needs.  All of the cases described in these studies involve a 
mixing of public and private rights.   
 In the case of the Norwegian community commons especially, it was clear that 
many different kinds of property can be applied to the same landscape—even to the 
same farm, each where it is most useful.  At the heart of a Norwegian farm is the 
infield: an area of completely private ownership, intensive cultivation, and high 
investment.  Here one finds the house and other farm buildings; and these are often 
impressive.  In my case study communities, it was typical for there to be a timber arch 
or two large posts at the bottom of a driveway, making it clear that the visitor is 
passing into a private realm in which the owner takes great pride.  Beyond the infield 
lies the outfield: the forest, rough pasture, and mountains that usually are shared 
between multiple farms.  It may be that the ownership is shared between them; or they 
might only share the use-rights, with ownership belonging to the state.  This is an area 
of lower investment and less intensive use.  Here all people have a right to recreational 
access—a right that extends to the infield as well when it can be exercised without 
damaging crops.  The public‘s rights also take the form of forestry regulations and 
prohibitions on the subdivision or abuse of farmland.  Flowing from the outfield to the 
infield might be an irrigation system, the usufructory rights to which are shared 
between a few neighbors; and by the edge of the state-owned road might be a machine 
shop that several farmers own in common (or jointly, as the case may be).  Invisible 
but no less important are milk-quotas, a tradable form of property that dairy farmers 
created through their cooperative in order to overcome that classic problem of 
collective action, controlling production in order to stabilize prices.  Thus the 
Norwegian farmer moves in a world of many different kinds of property, each of 
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which is instrumental to its own purpose, and all of which are socially-created to fulfill 
this purpose.   
 All of the studies presented in this collection suggest that the state has a 
significant role to play, but this is primarily as a facilitator of local cooperation.  The 
community‘s role is important because, if the rights of private owners are to 
accommodate the interests of others, there must be some process of civic engagement 
in which these interests can be negotiated and rights can be defined.  Each of the cases 
has a different institution to fulfill this purpose.  In Vermont it is the town planning 
process; in the case of moose management in Norway, it is the jaktvald; in Scotland it 
is the community trusts; and in the case of Norwegian commons, it is the commons 
board.  How well the property rights arrangements work in each case depends heavily 
on how well these civic bodies function.   
Property may be difficult to see when we gaze at the land; but it can also be a 
lens that enables us to see other things more clearly.  Property is relationships; and the 
model of property that we adopt is inextricably connected to the kind of relationships 
and the kind of community that we have.  Because natural resource management and 
community development are to a large extent about overcoming problems of collective 
action, they are fundamentally about successful democracy.  In all of the cases 
described here it is clear, as the civic republican tradition would suggest, that the 
advancement of property rights well-suited to achieving the public good and the 
advancement of institutions for democratic practice go hand in hand.   
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